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Abstract
There are two main research purposes in this dissertation.
First, it aims to refine transaction cost economics (TCE) by including the scope condition of
power structure in the TCE framework. This study develops a model based on TCE and inter-
firm power theory. It proposes that power structuremoderates the effect of specific investments
on governance modes.
Second, this study investigates the interplay of governance modes and negotiation strategies.
Building on TCE and negotiation theory, the study proposes that the interaction between
governance modes and negotiation strategies influences the performance of relationship.
The hypotheses were empirically tested on a sample of 198 inter-firm relationships in the
Norwegian oil and gas industry. Data were collected through a survey of oil and gas supplier
firms
With regard to the refinement of TCE, the results yielded mixed support for the hypotheses,
indicating that the TCE prediction does not work well for all types of firms. First, it works well
for firms with low power in asymmetric-power relationships. Second, it works better for firms
in asymmetric-power relationships than for firms in symmetric-power relationships. Third,
TCE works better for firms in no-interdependent relationships than for firms in mutual-
dependent relationships.
With regard to the interplay of governance modes and negotiation strategies, the hypotheses
were partly supported. First, the results indicated that problem-solving negotiation strategy
enhances the positive effect of centralization on end-product enhancement outcomes. Second,
contrary to expectation, information exchange was found to hinder the positive effect of
problem-solving negotiation strategy on the same outcomes.
The findings indicate that (a) power structure should be included in the TCE framework to
improve the prediction ability of TCE and (b) relationship performance can be explained by
the interplay of governance modes and negotiation strategies. One finding, however, raises a
new question: to what extent does the firm’s use of information exchange (various types of
information) have a negative moderating effect on the association between problem-solving
negotiation strategy and end-product enhancement outcomes?
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11. Introduction
This dissertation has two main objectives. First, it aims to refine transaction cost economics
(TCE) (Williamson, 1975) by including the scope condition of power structure in the TCE
framework. Second, this research aims to investigate the possible synergistic effects of
governance structure and negotiation strategy on relationshipperformance.
1.1. Background and significance
Increasingly globalized and competitive markets, along with higher customer expectations,
have encouraged firms to collaborate with other firms (Tseng & Chen, 2013). Management of
inter-firm relationships has become increasing complex (Liu & Sharma, 2011). Firm managers
have to evaluate and decide strategically what forms of cooperation they should use (i.e., firm
boundary decisions) (Gulbrandsen, Sandvik, & Haugland, 2009).
There are several theories devoted to explaining organizational boundary decisions, including
the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Das & Teng, 2000; Peteraf, 1993), TCE, and agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Of these perspectives, the most important is TCE.
The awarding of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Science to Oliver Williamson provided
strong evidence that TCE has been an important and leading theory for understanding economic
organization during the last three decades. Many empirical studies have applied TCE in various
disciplines (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006), including economics, organization, law,
sociology, marketing, finance, accounting, and operations management.
Although TCE has been recognized for its outstanding contribution to the field of economics,
it has also been subject to wide-ranging criticism (e.g., Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Powell, 1990;
Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Of all the empirical research
reviews of TCE, the work of David and Han (2004) seems to be the most reliable, due to its
use of systematic selection and evaluation criteria. In their review, TCE received an overall
support of 47 percent. Why does TCE receive mixed support? In answer to this question, David
and Han (2004) suggested that future empirical research could refine TCE by specifying “scope
conditions,” (p. 54) so that researchers would understand “the conditions under which the
theory works and under which it does not.” Therefore, the challenge for the researcher is to
contribute to the field by identifying the scope conditions of TCE.
2A common tenet of TCE is that a firm makes specific investments tailored to its partner firm
to achieve value propositions and achieve positions of competitive advantage (Ghosh & John,
1999). However, the investing firm exposes itself to risk as specific investments create a lock-
in situation for the firm; such investments cannot be easily redeployed in other relationships
without a substantial sacrifice of productive value(Williamson, 1981, 1985). This enables the
receiving firm (a partner firm) to behave opportunistically. To safeguard assets at risk, TCE
suggests that the investing firm needs to establishhierarchical governance (a more integrated
contract). However, an investing firm does not always to choose to employ hierarchical
governance (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007) or have the ability to organize the
exchange relationship in the desired manner (Heide & John, 1992). Therefore, this study
considers the particular scope condition of power structure. Kim (2000) claimed that inter-firm
power and its use play a key role in management of inter-firm relationships.
It may be argued that TCE takes power structure into consideration when it claims that
transacting parties are far-sighted and anticipate potential dependence conditions at the
beginning of their relationship (Williamson, 1991a; 1999) Transacting parties solve the
dependence problem ex ante when designing their governance structure or premiums.
However, Buvik and Reve (2002) contend, “it is often difficult for the transacting parties to
estimate the power-dependence structure in the first place and to predict possible changes over
time” (p. 263). This dissertation supports the viewthat inter-firm power plays a modest role in
the TCE perspective, and that power structure should be emphasized more explicitly in TCE.
This dissertation aims to contribute to this line of research.
Inter-firm power (dependence theory) is not a new concept. The first empirical studies on inter-
firm power were published in the early 1970s (e.g., Hunt & Nevin, 1974). In the past four
decades, inter-firm power has been studied extensively in the area of sales and distribution
channels (e.g., El-Ansari & Stern, 1972; Frazier, 1983b; Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Hunt & Nevin,
1974). Some empirical studies have attempted to integrate power structure into the TCE
framework; their findings suggest hat power structure moderates the TCE predictions. They
found that in power relationships, hierarchical governance may not be chosen by firm
managers, despite the presence of specific investments. Nevertheless, these previous studies
leave some gaps, since they do not simultaneously include all types of power structures. For
example, Buvik and Reve’s (2001) study examines only symmetric-power relationships; in
another study (2002), they examine only asymmetric-power elationships. Heide and John
(1988) and Shervani et al. (2007) investigate only the effect of asymmetric power, leaving out
3symmetric power structures. The aim of this study is to include all major types of power
structures and investigate how different power structures may impact the TCE predictions. It
is common to classify power structures as asymmetric and symmetric. Symmetric-power
relationships can further be divided into mutual-dependent relationships and no-interdependent
relationships. Since firms make different decisions and behave differently towards their
exchange partner in different power structures (Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013
power structure may in fact limit the ability of TCE to correctly predict governance structures.
In addition to studying the determinants of governance mechanisms, TCE researchers have
investigated the effect of governance mechanisms onrelationship performance. TCE suggests
that the most suitable governance mechanism is the one that maximizes efficiency in carrying
out specific investments (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Following this logic, firms start to
collaborate with other firms when that collaboration enables them to lower costs or increase
profits. Therefore, inter-firm relationships can besuccessful when they organize their activities
in a way that minimizes both production and transaction costs. Many empirical researchers
have found that governance modes influence inter-firm performance (e.g., Cannon, Achrol, &
Gundlach, 2000; Corsten & Kumar, 2005; Ghosh & John, 2005; Jap & Ganesan, 2000).
In addition to the structural dimension (i.e., governance mechanisms) that has been suggested
as the explanation of performance of inter-firm relationship, the process (or behavioural)
dimension has been shown to influence the success of the collaboration. Negotiation seems to
be particularly relevant, since many researchers (e.g. Ganesan, 1993; Graham, 1986; Rinehart
& Page, 1992) have found empirically that negotiations have a significant impact on
relationship performance. Firms negotiate with their partner firms to secure better exchange
conditions (e.g., price, date of delivery, and guaranteed warranties), as firms experience
increasing performance pressures. The subject of negotiation management has therefore been
increasing in importance. (Herbst, Voeth, & Meister, 2011)
Negotiation strategies are styles of negotiating. Negotiation strategies for effecting relationship
outcomes have been hypothesized and empirically supported. When firms use an aggressive
negotiation strategy (coercive strategy), their partners perceive their action as exploitive
behaviour (Frazier & Summer, 1984) and become more inflexible in their views, leading to
more problems and less conflict resolution (Cadotte& Stern, 1979). By using problem-solving
strategies, firms indicate they will accommodate their partners’ concerns and are willing to
4work toward problem resolution. Their action results in profits and a greater satisfaction with
the negotiation (e.g., Clopton, 1984; Graham, 1986; Pruitt, 1981).
Both governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies have been tested with regard to their
influence on relationship performance. A few empirical studies have merged these two
concepts –i.e., Schurr and Ozanne (1985), Ness and Haugland (2005), Ness (2009); Lumineau
and Henderson (2009). There is a need for more empirical research that combines these two
theories. Furthermore, these previous studies are limited in that they do not aim to explain
relationship performance, but instead investigate the individual influence between governance
mechanisms and negotiations. Therefore, the second purpose of this dissertation is to test the
interaction effect of governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies on relationship
performance. This study posits that firm managers must acknowledge that different types of
governance modes may require the use of different types of negotiating strategies to achieve
specific goals (Das & Kumar,2011).
1.2. Positioning and contribution of the study
This study contributes both theoretically and managerially. With regard to theoretical
contribution, it contributes to the literature in two ways.
First, this study contributes to the existing TCE literature by adding all types of power structure
to the TCE framework. It takes the position that itis necessary to include power structure in
addition to the common transaction dimension of specific investments, to achieve a more
complete understanding of firm boundary decisions. This study responds to a call for more
empirical research focusing on contextual variables, according to the claim of David and Han
(2004) that finding such contextual variables “would shift the debate from one of empirical
‘success vs. non-success’ to one of ‘success under certain circumstances’” (p. 55).
Accordingly, the following research questions will be answered by this dissertation:
•  To what degree does power structure influence the TCE framework?
•  In various types of power structures, how do relationships between specific investments
and governance modes behave?
Second, this dissertation adds to the existing literature on inter-organizational relations by
exploring the interaction effect of governance mechanisms (structural dimension) and
negotiation strategies (behavioural dimension) on relationship performance. This study takes
the position that it is necessary to take into account the interplay of these two theoretical
5perspectives to enhance understanding of the relationship performance. Accordingly, the
following research question will be answered by this dissertation:
•  What is the relationship between governance modes and negotiation strategies in
explaining relationship performance?
With regard to managerial contribution, this study provides appropriate strategies for managers
in two aspects. The first is in the structural aspect and is particularly appropriate for firm
managers who want to succeed in asymmetric-power elationships. This study suggests that
firm managers hould identify their type of firm power (i.e., whether their firm is the stronger
firm or the weaker firm in the asymmetric-power relationship). Managers of stronger firms can
use market governance to coordinate with their partner firms and use their firm power to
safeguard their specific investments. By doing so, stronger firms can avoid the high cost of
hierarchical governance. Managers of weaker firms should use formalization to safeguard their
specific investments. This suggestion supports the logic of TCE.
The second managerial contribution focuses on both structural and process aspects of inter-
firm management. It provides useful knowledge for firm managers on choices of negotiation
style. The results suggest hat problem-solving negotiation strategy enhances the positive effect
of centralization on end-product enhancement outcomes (Ghosh & John, 2005). Firm managers
who aim to achieve a differentiation advantage should collaborate with their partner firms
under centralization and use a problem-solving negotiation strategy. However, since
information exchange was found to hinder the positive effect of problem-solving negotiation
strategy on these outcomes, this study suggests that firm managers use caution in exchanging
information with partner firms.
1.3. Dissertation outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the theoretical
background and review of empirical studies in the field of inter-organizational governance,
inter-organizational power, and the negotiation strategies; Chapter 3 describes the research
model and hypothesis development; Chapter 4 presents the research design and method;
Chapter 5 presents data analysis and hypothesis testing; Chapter 6 presents the results; and
Chapter 7 presents the discussion.
62. Theoretical background and literature review
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical background and review of empirical
studies. Investigations of the extent to which power structure affects the predictions of TCE
and the possible synergistic effects of governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies on
relationship performance are the main objectives ofthis study. In accordance with these two
objectives, this study relies heavily on (a) transaction cost theory, (b) relational contracting
theory (RCT), (c) inter-firm power theory, and (d) negotiation theory.
The first research question aims to determine the impact of power structure on the relationship
between specific investments and governance modes. TCE provides the main framework for
the investigation and inter-firm power theory describes the power structure that moderates the
effect of specific investments on governance modes. The second research question aims to
investigate whether relationship performance can beexplained by the interaction of governance
modes and negotiation strategies. TCE and RCT explain the properties of various governance
modes, and negotiation theory explains how the process of negotiation works.
Section 2.1 reviews the governance of inter-firm exchange by describing the transaction cost
framework and relational contracting theory. Section 2.2 examines inter-firm power. Section
2.3 outlines negotiation strategies. Section 2.4 presents the summary of the theoretical
background, and Section 2.5 presents empirical studies and findings that are relevant to the
positioning of this study, research questions, and hypotheses development.
2.1. Inter-organizational governance
This section details the theoretical background of governance mechanisms. Governance has
traditionally been defined as a mode of organizing transactions (Williamson & Ouchi, 1981).
It is the control structure, or the formal or informal rules of exchange (Ghosh & John, 1999).
Because of the broadness of this definition, firms have adopted many different mechanisms to
establish, structure, monitor, and enforce transactions with their exchange partners. Various
theoretical frameworks make various assumptions about the nature of governance modes. This
research focuses on two main perspectives of governance: TCE and RCT. The TCE perspective
was developed from the concept of market and hierarchy developed by Coase (1937) and
operationalized by Williamson (1975). With regard to RCT, Macniel (1978, 1980) developed
a typology of discrete versus relation exchange.
7Section 2.1.1 describes transaction cost economics. Section 2.1.2 outlines relational contracting
theory. Section 2.1.3 examines plural forms of governance, and Section 2.1.4 summarizes the
relevance of governance structures.
2.1.1. Transaction cost economics
The examination by Coase (1937) of market and hierarchy seems to be the first and most widely
accepted study on governance mechanisms. It suggests that the mode of governance between
markets and hierarchies is determined by differences in transaction costs. In a firm, hierarchical
governance is used because costs of economic exchange in the market governance xceed the
costs of organizing it within a firm. Bradach and Eccles (1989) review many scholarly works
on the insight of Coase, and conclude the basic argument is that “transactions will be governed
by the institutional arrangement that is most efficient” (p. 99).
Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) have defined transaction costs as “expenditures associated with
an economic exchange that vary independently of competitive prices and the product
exchanged” (p. 161). Williamson (1985) shows that transaction costs are composed of ex ante
costs and ex post costs. Ex ante costs are costs associated with bargaining costs and ex post
costs are associated with monitoring and maladaptation. Based on the research of Dahlstrom
and Nygaard (1999), three costs can be identified:
•  Bargaining costs  are expenditures associated with negotiation among exchange
partners; they are made periodically to modify contractual terms (Milgrom & Roberts,
1990).
•  Monitoring costs are expenditures paid for guaranteeing the fulfillment of contractual
obligations or ensuring that exchange partners act in the best interest of all parties (Lal,
1990;).
•  Maladaptation costs are expenditures associated with communication andcoordination
failures among exchange partners that occur, for example, when a product’s
information does not accompany the delivery (Reve, 1986).
Of the many studies of transaction costs, Williamson’s (1985) TCE has been the primary means
of operationalization. Williamson (1975) advanced the theory of Coase (1937) about the nature
of the firm. TCE explicitly considers the efficiency implications of adopting alternative forms
of governance and suggests three modes of governance on the continuum of the exchange:
market, hybrid, and hierarchy (as shown in Figure 2.1). The central question of TCE is whether
8a transaction is more efficiently performed inside a firm (hierarchical governance) or outside a
firm by autonomous exchange parties (market governance) (Geyskens et al., 2006).
Figure 2.1  The continuum of exchange and mode of governance (Williamson, 1985)
2.1.1.1. Market governance
Market governance corresponds to formal contracts, representing promises or obligations to
perform particular actions in the future (Macneil, 1978). It defines remedies for foreseeable
contingencies and specifies processes for resolvingunforeseeable outcomes (Poppo & Zenger,
2002). The more sophisticated the contract; the more precise the promises, obligations, and
processes for dispute resolution, in which the identities of the transacting partners are irrelevant
and no dependency relation exists between them (i.e., each exchange partner is autonomous).
It is therefore easy for firms to switch exchange partners with little penalty because other
prospective partners offer virtually identical resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Transactions are
governed by formal terms, interpreted in a legalistic way, and characterized by “hard
bargaining” between parties. Market governance occurs in many forms in inter-organizational
relationships, such as the industrial sourcing situation, in which a buyer (manufacturer)
acquires subassembly components from independent (external) suppliers (Heide, 2003).
Market governance benefits firms by providing the cost advantages of external specialists and
enabling firms to focus on their core business (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). However, Dyer and
Singh (1998) suggest that market relationships are not able to gain relational rent because
“there is nothing idiosyncratic about the exchange relationship that enables the two parties to
generate profits above and beyond what other seller-buyer combinations can generate”( p. 662).
2.1.1.2. Hierarchical governance
Hierarchy governance (or internal organization) is a governance structure that provides more
flexibility and adaptation than market governance. Adaptation to disturbances comes in the
form of fiat, meaning that parties in hierarchies resolve disputes internally, rather than relying
on the courts. This form of governance is supported by means of an authority structure,
providing one partner with the ability to develop rules and impose decisions on others.
2.1.1.3. Hybrid governance
Market Hybrid Hierarchy
9Hybrid governance (ideal type) (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) is characterized as being in between
markets and hierarchies. It corresponds to neoclassical law, which is more adaptable and elastic
than the classical law used in market governance, but less adaptable than internal organization
or hierarchies. Williamson and Ghani (2012) explain that hybrid governance mitigates
contractual hazards that would increase under market governance (due to specific investments
and uncertainty) without creating the additional costs of bureaucracy and the loss of incentive
intensity that usually occurs under hierarchical governance. Mechanisms that operate under
hybrid governance include penalties for breach of contract, information disclosure and
verification, and private arbitration before resorting to the courts. In hybrid form, exchange
parties maintain autonomy while being mutually dependent to a non-slight degree. The identity
of the exchange parties matters; one partner cannotbe replaced, without cost, by the other.
2.1.1.4. TCE assumptions
TCE is based on five assumptions: (a) bounded rationality, (b) opportunism, (c) specific
investments, (d) uncertainty, and (e) transaction frequency. The first two assumptions pertain
to human behaviours. The latter three are the primary transaction attributes.
Bounded rationalityrefers to the extent to which decision makers have constraints on their
cognitive capabilities and limits on their rationality. This assumption has important
implications for contracting parties, in that firm managers are unable to design comprehensive
contracts, accounting for all possible contingencies, due to their cognitive limitations.
Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). TCE
assumes that all economic actors are opportunistic, meaning that they may cheat, shirk, distort
information, mislead partners, provide substandard products and services, or appropriate the
critical resources of partners (Das & Teng, 1998). In fact, not all managers act
opportunistically, but it is impossible to know who would or would not; it is only known that
there is a risk of such behaviour.
Specific investments (or asset specificity)  refers to the degree to which the assets that are
tailored to a given transaction cannot easily be redeployed to “alternative uses and by
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1991b, p. 282). Firms
make specific investments with the hopes of, for example, reducing the costs of production or
increasing their sales.
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Williamson (1985) identifies three forms of specific investments: site specificity, physical asset
specificity, and human asset specificity. However, previous research includes dedicated assets
that do not belong to these three categories.
•  Site specificity  refers to the situation in which successive production stages that are
immobile in nature are located close to one another. Dyer (1996) suggests that site-
specific investments ubstantially reduce transportation and inventory costs, and lower
the cost of coordinating activities.
•  Physical asset specificity  refers to transaction-specific investments (such ascustomized
machinery) that tailor processes or operations to particular exchange partners. Physical
asset specificity leads to product differentiation and may improve quality by increasing
the degree of product fit or integrity (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994).
•  Human asset specificity  refers to transaction-specific “know-how” accumulated by
transaction makers through long-standing relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998). An
example of a human asset-specific investment by a supplying firm is the familiarity of
its computer programmers with customer systems. As exchange partners work together,
they accumulate specialized information, language, and knowledge. Moreover, they
communicate more efficiently and effectively, thereby reducing errors and delivery
time, and enhancing quality (Asanuma, 1989; Dyer, 1996).
•  Dedicated assets  refer to transaction-specific investments that do not have site,
physical, or human asset specificity, including, for example, idiosyncratic investments
in brand name capital. This dimension has received limited attention in the extant
literature.
Uncertainty is a property of the environment where exchange takes place. It occurs in two
forms: (a) environmental or external uncertainty and (b) behavioural or internal uncertainty
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
•  Environmental or external uncertainty  occurs when the relevant contingencies
surrounding an exchange are too unpredictable to bespecified ex ante in a contract.
•  Behavioural or internal uncertainty  is a problem of a performance evaluation or
difficulty in ensuring ex post whether contractual compliance is taking place (Geyskens
et al., 2006).
Transaction frequencyrefers to the extent to which transactions recur. TCE suggests that when
asset-specific transaction recurs, it requires a constant monitoring effort. The overhead cost of
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hierarchical governance will be easier to recover than the cost of market governance. Therefore,
in the presence of specific investments, transaction frequency pushes transactions away from
market, into hierarchy. Transaction frequency has received limited attention in TCE; Geyskens
et al. (2006) note that they did not include transaction frequency in their meta-analysis because
of the lack of studies that have included this assumption.
2.1.1.5. Logic of TCE
TCE provides “rational economic reasons” for crafting or predicting the governance
mechanism (Williamson, 1985, p. 52) as transactionsare different in their attributes and aligned
with governance modes in a discriminating way. This means that, among the three modes, any
mode of governance that minimizes the transaction costs becomes preferred over other modes.
The assumption of bounded rationality has implications for firm managers who are trying to
create complex contracts that account for all possible contingencies. It dictates that complex
contracts are unavoidably incomplete. This becomes problematic in uncertain environments.
Nevertheless, as long as firms do not make specific investments, firm managers can use many
short-term contracts (i.e., market governance) to reduce the risk of any hidden exchange
hazards (Williamson & Ghani, 2012).
The assumption of opportunism has implications for firm managers whose partner firms violate
contracts both actively and passively (Wathne & Heide, 2000). There will be costs of
monitoring. If such costs are very high, and as long as firms do not make specific investments,
there is no lock-in effect or safeguarding problem. Firm managers can terminate the contracts
and find new partner firms.
However, if firms make specific investments, the investing firms will become dependent on
the receiving firms. There will be switching costs when firms terminate their inter-firm
relationships because such investments have little or no value outside the relationship (i.e.,
lock-in effect) (Barney & Ouchi, 1986). Without dependence due to specific investments,
market governance would be efficient enough (Williamson & Ghani, 2012). Furthermore, in
market governance, investing firms may be subject to opportunistic behaviors of receiving
firms because market competition will not restrain opportunistic exploitation (Geyskens et al.,
2006). Thus, investing firms will need to safeguardtheir specific investments by establishing
the governance mechanisms that ensure the return ontheir specific investments i.e., hybrid or
hierarchical governance. It is noteworthy that in cases of hierarchical governance, bureaucratic
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costs may increase as parties become more integrated. However, these costs will be offset by
the gains from bilateral adaptation obtained from the new form.
The occurrence of specific investments transforms a governance mechanism from market
governance (in which the identity of parties is irrelevant) into hybrid or hierarchical governance
(in which the identity of exchange partners is important) (Williamson, 1991b).
With regard to the property of uncertainty, when circumstances cannot be defined ex ante and
performance cannot be easily evaluated ex post, the effect of cognitive limitation becomes
problematic (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Environmental uncertainty may cause an adaptation
problem that makes it difficult to adjust agreements, thereby raising transaction costs.
According to original TCE theory, such problems can be addressed through hierarchical
governance because parties in hierarchies resolve disputes internally, rather than relying on the
courts.
The effect of uncertainty on the choice of governance mode is conditional. The original theory
of TCE suggests that the association between uncertainty and specific investments is the key
determinant of governance choice, rather than the individual variable. When specific
investments are present at a slight degree, market governance should be employed, whatever
the degree of uncertainty, because continuity between exchange partners matters little and new
transaction arrangements can be easily arranged if necessary (Williamson, 1985, p. 59).
However, the argument of many researchers—that  high degree of environmental uncertainty
also encourages firms to maintain flexibility—is contradictory to the characteristics of
hierarchical governance. For example, Klein (1989) mentions that the concept of uncertainty
is very broad. Its various facets lead to both a desire for flexibility (market governance) and
motivation to reduce transaction costs (hierarchy).
Walker and Weber’s (1984) influential classification of environmental uncertainty provides a
good explanation of this concept. The authors distinguish and identify two types of
environmental uncertainty, i.e., volume uncertaintyand technological uncertainty:
•  Volume uncertainty  is defined as the inability to accurately forecast the volume
requirements in a relationship (Walker & Weber, 1984). When volume uncertainty
occurs, supplying partners may incur the problems of excess capacity or unexpected
production costs, and buying partners may face stock-outs or excess inventory. Such
problems can be addressed more efficiently if exchange partners coordinate variations
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in a hierarchically organized production stream. Volume uncertainty, therefore,
increases the likelihood of hierarchical, rather than market, governance.
•  Technological uncertainty  is defined as the inability to accurately forecast the
technological requirements in a relationship (Walker & Weber, 1984). This type of
uncertainty is caused by the unpredictable changes in the standards or specifications of
technology. When technological uncertainty occurs, as the result of reliance on market
governance, firms should terminate the existing relationship and switch to new
exchange partners who have technological capabilities that are more appropriate
(Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986).
2.1.1.6. Summary of TCE and its relation to research questions
The central prediction of TCE is the identification of the governance structure (market
governance or hierarchical) that performs a transaction more efficiently. TCE assumes that the
rationality of transactors is bounded and that they are risk neutral and opportunistic.
Furthermore, market governance is assumed to be more efficient than hierarchical governance
due to the benefits of competition. However, some transaction dimensions—specific
investment, uncertainty, and transaction frequency—increase transaction costs and cause
market failure, which makes hierarchical governance more efficient than market governance.
Accordingly, economic organization is an effort to align transactions with governance structure
in a discriminating way (Williamson, 1991).
This study proposes that inter-firm power structure may have implications that TCE does not
take into account. TCE (Williamson, 1991a) deals with the issue of inter-firm powers by
claiming that firm managers are farsighted and anticipate the potential problems of inter-firm
power. Such problems are solved ex ante when managers design appropriate governance
mechanisms or premiums for hazards.
However, if investing firms are weaker firms and their partners are stronger firms (according to
their asymmetric-power elationships), it will be difficult for investing firms to influence their
partners to use the more integrated governance modes; they are not the parties that decide the
trade terms. Heide and John (1988) suggest hat thepower structure of exchange partner firms
affects the firm’s ability to design the governancemodes. Because of ability limitation, weaker
firms may not be able to influence their partner firms to establish integrated governance to
safeguard their specific investments. They may need to use other types of governance
mechanisms rather than hierarchical governance. Section 2.2 describes how inter-firm power
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highlights the importance of asymmetric and symmetric-power relationships. Further, in
Chapter 3, hypotheses regarding the effects of power structure on the TCE framework are
developed.
2.1.2. Relational contracting theory
Based partly on Macaulay’s 1963 study of non-contractual relations, Macneil (1978, 1980)
proposes relational contracting theory (RCT) that characterizes the buyer-supplier elationship.
RCT views relationships between firms on a continuum, ranging from discrete transactions to
relational exchange, as depicted in Figure 2.2. Relationships vary according to the extent of
bonding between partner firms.
Figure 2.2 The continuum of exchange and mode of governance (Macneil, 1978, 1980)
2.1.2.1. Discrete exchange
Consistent with the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory and analogous to market
governance in TCE, discrete exchange assumes individual transactions to (a) be independent
of past and future relations between partner firms and (b) constitute nothing more than the
transfer of ownership to products or services (Goldberg, 1976). Exchange partners under
discrete exchange remain autonomous and maintain the vigorous desire to reach their goal,
which may create conflicts of interest and discourage unity of partner firms. Partner firms use
economic and legal sanctions, or even power, to enforce contractual obligations.
In general, discrete exchange is used when products or service performances are obvious and
can be easily evaluated and carted away. Exchange partners can pay little attention to
measurement and specifications. Payment is usually made with cash. Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh
(1987) show an example of this discrete transaction as “a one-time purchase of unbranded
gasoline out-of-town at an independent station paidfor with cash” (p. 12).
2.1.2.2. Relational exchange
Discrete Relational
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In contrast to discrete exchange, relational exchange refers to an exchange that occurs over
time, reflecting an ongoing process (Macneil, 1978, 1980). Each individual transaction must
be viewed in terms of its history and anticipated future. Partner firms are expected to receive
complex, personal, and noneconomic satisfactions and engage in social exchange.
Since relational governance is a non-juridical mechanism, legal enforcement is not easy.
However, this mode of governance operates as a self-enforcing safeguard by virtue of many
informal and diverse components, such as mutual dependence, trust, and norms.
Relational mechanisms can be explained according to two perspectives: economic and
sociological. Economists emphasize the rational or calculative origins. Partner firms expect
payoffs from the future and are motivated to deliver present collaboration (Axelrod, 1984). The
value of a future relationship is sufficient to discourage both partner firms to break a promise
or make short-term gains (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Telser, 1980).
Sociologists emphasize relational norms generated in a historical and social context in which
transactions take place between highly committed exchange partners (Uzzi, 1997). Norms are
expected behaviors, designed to enhance the well-being of the relationship as a whole (Dwyer
et al., 1987; Kaufmann & Stern, 1988; Heide & John, 1992). The acceptance of norms by all
exchange parties is required to render norms (Cannon et al., 2000).
Macneil (1980, 1983) proposes ten contract norms that emerge from the patterns of basic
contractual behaviour: (a) role integrity, (b) mutuality, (c) implementation of planning, (d)
effectuation of consent, (e) flexibility, (f) contractual solidarity, (g) the linking norms of
restitution, reliance, and expectation interests, (h) creation and restraint of power, (i)
harmonization with the social matrix, and (j) propriety of means. However, Heide and John
(1992), and Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggest four norms that are of particular importance in
cooperative relationships: flexibility, solidarity, information exchange, and restrain in the use
of power.
•  Flexibility is the attitude among parties that an agreement is but a starting point to be
modified as the market, the exchange relationship, and the fortunes of the parties
evolve.
•  Solidarity  is the extent to which parties believe that success comes from working
cooperatively together versus competing against one another. It dictates that parties
stand by one another in the face of adversity and the “ups and downs” of marketplace
competition.
16
•  Information exchange  occurs when parties expect to provide information proactively
that is useful to the partners.
•  Restraint in the use of power  is forbearance from taking advantage of one’s bargaining
position in an exchange. It reflects the view that the use of power not only exacerbates
conflict over time but also undermines mutuality and solidarity, opening the door to
opportunism.
2.1.2.3. Incorporating relational governance into TCE and its relation to research
questions
Recent research on TCE incorporates relational governance into the TCE framework
(Geyskens et al., 2006). Although TCE’s alternative forms of governance are widely
recognized, TCE has been subject to criticism. TCE traditionally describes departures from a
market-based exchange to hierarchical governance. Some researchers argue that it overstates
the exchange partners’ desirability for integrationto protect against ransaction hazards (Poppo
& Zenger, 2002). Moreover, it also overemphasizes the ability of hierarchical governance to
govern relationships (Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven, 1985) and fails to account for the social
structures within which exchange is embedded (Granovetter, 1985). RCT, therefore, introduces
the concept that the departure from market governance, i.e., discrete exchange, is the
establishment of relational governance. According to Macneil (1980), “contract without the
common needs and tastes created by society is inconceivable […] and contract without social
structure is—quite literally—rationally unthinkable” (p. 159).
However, Williamson (1991b) argues that relational governance addresses the problem of
uncertainty less effectively than market governance because relational adaptations cannot be
made unilaterally, but market adaptations can. Relational adaptations need mutual consent hat
takes time to acquire, which may not be possible inuncertain environments. The thought piece
by Williamson and Ghani (2012) argues that TCE treats calculated risk as a manifestation of
trust in commercial transactions, meaning that firms take the risk only if the expected net gains
are positive.
This study follows the line of reasoning regarding the incorporation of relational governance
into the TCE framework: it views relational norms as an alternative form of governance. With
regard to power structure, it proposes that relational norms may be used by weaker firms to
safeguard their specific investments since they maynot be able to establish a more integrated
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mode of governance. The hypotheses regarding this incorporation in all types of power
structures are developed in Chapter 3, and tested in Chapter 5.
2.1.3. Plural forms of governance
The presumption of TCE, that the governance continuum runs from markets to hierarchies,
may be misleading, because these approaches rest onthe premise that market and hierarchy are
independent and mutually exclusive means to controlthe industries. Bradach and Eccles (1989)
prove that firms simultaneously employ distinct governance forms for the same function, i.e.,
the plural form. They suggest hat modes of governance can be combined in a variety of ways,
just as market and trust are sometimes integrated to govern transactions between partner firms,
while franchises (market) and company-owned (hierarchy) units are operated under the same
trademark.
Bradach and Eccles (1989) show that the franchising system is an excellent example of the
plural form. Franchising systems are composed of company-owned units and franchised units.
It is perceived that hierarchical governance is employed in company-owned units. However, in
the company-owned unit, some elements of market governance can be found (for example,
profit centers and management incentive programs). In contrast, market governance is
perceived to be employed in franchised units, as the independent franchisees sign long-term
contracts with the franchisers. However, franchisees are not fully independent entrepreneurs.
Hierarchical governance is used when franchisers prescribe how franchisees must operate to
protect brand value.
Poppo and Zenger (2002) explain the co-existence of relational governance and TCE
governance. They suggest that relational governance does not replace market or hierarchy
governance, but functions as a complement. They propose that when exchange hazards are
present to a high degree, the combination of formal and informal governance may provide
greater exchange performance than exclusive reliance on one governance form. According to
their proposal, formal safeguards are clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies, and
processes of dispute resolution, and informal safeguards are relational norms of flexibility,
solidarity, bilateralism, and continuance. Similarly, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) argue, “it
might be impossible to cover all contingencies in aformal contract for sustained cooperation,
but if the partners have trust it may be unnecessary to cover all contingencies” (p. 23).
Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) logic is that the early stages are more vulnerable. Exchanges need
formal contracts to ensure success through formal specification of a long-term commitment,
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and clearly articulated clauses that specify punishments to limit the gains from opportunistic
actions. The collaboration in the present helps to build cooperation in the future. The process
of developing complex contracts requires exchange partners to make a mutual determination,
promoting expectations of cooperation and developing relational governance. In addition, all
exchange dimensions prove impossible to specify contractually. When change and conflict
arise, relational governance becomes a necessary complement to the adaptive limits of
contracts (Macneil, 1978). Specifically, the relational norm of solidarity fosters future
exchange because xchange partners have a “keep on with it” attitude that makes partner firms
mutually dependent. Therefore, as the contracts become highly customized, relational
governance increases the continuance of the relationship and safeguards pecific investments
from premature and costly termination.
2.2. Inter-organizational power
Inter-organizational power plays a pivotal role in the management of inter-firm relationships.
A number of research studies address the issue of inter-firm power (e.g. Belaya, Gagalyuk, &
Hanf, 2009). According to the framework of Dwyer et al. (1987), inter-firm power operates
closely with bargaining processes in the exploration and expansion phase. Inter-firm power is
brought to bear on bargaining, both in the exploration phase and in day-to-day commitment, in
the hope that concessions or resources, which exchange partners require, will be granted or
obtained. However, exercise of unjust power sources may lead other exchange partners to
terminate the association when interdependencies are minimal. The effect of power is a crucial
topic for both managers and academics. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical
background of this concept.
2.2.1. What is power?
There are many conceptualizations of power. One of the fundamental determinants of power,
according to sociologists, is dependence. Emerson (1962) suggests that the power of  A  over B
is equal to and based on the dependence of  B  on  A. Power is not an attribute of the actor but a
property of the social relation. Many researchers adopt Emerson’s conceptualization and adjust
it to their research context. For example, Dwyer (1984) states that dependence and power “rests
on the extent to which  B is dependent on  A for valued resources” (p. 682).
A research review of the definition of power leads to the conclusion that a firm has power over
its partner firm when its partner firm perceives that the firm has expertise, information,
attractiveness, a right to prescribe the partner firm’s behaviour, or the ability to mediate
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punishments and rewards for the partner firm (e.g., French & Raven, 1959; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Wilkinson, 1979; Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Gaski, 1986; Scheer & Stern, 1992).
Alternatively, a partner firm is dependent on a firm when a firm possesses valued resources,
such as capital, products, services, information, or status (Dwyer et al., 1987; Scheer & Stern,
1992) that create partner firm rewards and benefits that are not easily replaced.
2.2.2. Factors influencing power
Heide and John (1988) suggest four factors that influence power or dependence.
First, dependence is increased if the outcomes obtained from a relationship are important or
highly valued or if the exchange magnitude itself is high (i.e., a firm provides a large fraction
of partner firm’s business). This is consistent with the “sales and profit” approach developed
by El-Ansary and Stern (1972). In that approach, the greater the percentage of sales and profit
contributed by a firm, the greater a partner firm’sdependence on a firm. Many previous studies
use the importance or magnitude of exchange to explain the dependence of firms (e.g., El-
Ansary & Stern, 1972; Etgar, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Dickson, 1983).
Second, if outcomes obtained from a relationship are higher or better than outcomes obtained
from alternative relationships, dependence is increased. Previous studies use role performance
or comparison of outcome levels as the basis of dependence (e.g. Frazier, 1983b; Anderson &
Narus, 1984). The concept of role performance, developed by Frazier (1983a), refers to how
well a firm fulfills its role in a relationship with its partner firms.
Third, dependence is increased if there are fewer alternative exchange sources. The
concentration of exchange or the fraction of business done with a particular partner firm are
factors that arise from previous empirical and conceptual studies (e.g., El-Ansary & Stern,
1972; Etgar, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Dickson, 1983).
Fourth, if there are fewer potential alternative sources of exchange available for replacing a
partner firm, it is difficult for a firm to substitute another partner. Dependence is therefore
increased. Previous empirical studies use the replaceability of the incumbent partner as a
measure of dependence (e.g., El-Ansary & Stern, 1972; Etgar, 1976; Brown, Lusch, &
Muehling, 1983; Buchanan, 1992).
2.2.3. Power base
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Extant research studies of power share (1959) the power typology developed by French and
Raven ((1959). According to this view, power exists in six forms: reward power, coercive
power, legitimate power, referent power, and information power. Each form of power is
defined by its ability to bring tangible or intangible consequences into use for a target.
Reward powerrefers to the granting of consequences that a receiving firm regards as desirable,
or the withdrawal of consequences that a receiving firm considers as aversive. The use of non-
coercive power may take considerable time to implement effectively (Kasulis & Spekman,
1980; Frazier & Summers, 1984). A firm that uses non-coercive power can expect the return
use of non-coercive power from its exchange partners, contributing to a supportive exchange
atmosphere (Frazier & Rody, 1991).
Coercive poweror punitive powerrefers to the granting of aversive consequences, or penalties,
as well as the withdrawal of desirable consequences (Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989). A firm
might possess destructive resources that can wound partner firms (Molm, 1989). When a firm
intentionally inflicts damaging consequences on itspartner, the act is defined as punitive action
(Lusch, 1976; Gaski & Nevin, 1985). Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1998) dissect punitive
action and use the term “punitive capability” (p. 226) to explain the firm’s ability and
willingness to deliver negative consequences to its partner. The firm might develop its punitive
capability by investing in the systems that control the withdrawal of valued resources or
exercising destructive resources and having the will to deliver negative consequences to its
partner.
Legitimate poweroccurs when a firm is perceived to have a right (i.e., a legitimate right), to
influence its partner firm, when the partner firm is obligated to comply with this influence.
There may not be any granting of direct consequences involved. Legitimate power can be
divided into two types: traditional legitimate and legal legitimate (Kasulis & Spekman, 1980).
The former refers to the perceived hierarchies in which stronger firms may feel they have
legitimate power and consequently can influence certain policies (Stern & El-Ansary, 1977);
the latter is based on contractual agreements that all exchange partners make to govern their
collaboration, such as franchising agreements between franchisors and franchisees (Stern &
El-Ansary, 1977).
Reference power is based on a firm’s desire to be closely associated with its partner. Some
firms pride themselves on being associated with certain partner firms or brands. Such firms are
willing to be influenced by their partners.
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Expert poweroccurs when a firm perceives that its exchange partner is knowledgeable about
a certain area, and allows its exchange partner to influence its decision and behaviours.
A firm has information power over its partner firm when it has the ability to (a) provide
information that was previously unavailable to its partner and (b) interpret existing information
to be meaningful but yet unknown by its partner (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970).
2.2.4. Contingency of power effect
Positive and negative effects can occur either contingently or non-contingently. Contingent
influence occurs when a firm promises or threatens to signal explicitly that it will mediate
positive or negative consequences, depending on the response of its partner firm. Non-
contingent influence occurs when a firm mediates consequences for its partner unilaterally in
the hope that its partner will subsequently behave in the way sought by the firm; the firm
exercises resources before its partner complies (Scheer & Stern, 1992).
2.2.5. Power structure and its relation to research questions
Two types of inter-firm relationships can be identified: symmetric-power relationships and
asymmetric-power elationships. Power symmetry occurs when both partner firms have the
same degree of power; power asymmetry occurs when partner firms have different degrees of
power. This power structure affects behaviours and attitudes of firm managers toward their
partner firms. (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1986). Bilateral deterrence theory (a
sociological theory), ably explains the effects of interdependence of exchange partners. It views
asymmetric-power relationships as unstable, consistent with extant research findings that show
that asymmetric relationships are less stable and less beneficial than symmetric relationships
(e.g., Buchanan, 1992; Kumar et al., 1995).
A firm with relatively high power (a stronger firm)is expected to exploit its weaker partner by
frequently using coercive power (Bannister, 1969; Robicheaux & El-Ansary, 1975). A firm
with relatively low power (a weaker firm), lacking alternatives and status, is prone to have high
tolerance for the use of coercive power by its stronger partner and to have minor equity
concerns. A weaker firm, therefore, does not (or barely attempts) to retaliate (Bucklin, 1973;
Blalock & Wilkin 1979). A firm with high power due to the availability of alternatives and
status levels has a low level of tolerance for the use of coercive power (Frazier & Rody, 1991).
Many previous empirical studies have shown that the possession of power encourages a firm
to act opportunistically by unfairly gaining a share of profit from an exchange (e.g., Roering,
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1977; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978; Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Kale, 1986; McAlister, Bazerman,
& Fader, 1986; Frazier et al., 1989; Frazier & Rody, 1991).
A stronger firm is likely to be able to utilize non-coercive strategies effectively, as it has the
prerequisite time and attention from its exchange partner; a weaker firm is likely to be forced
to use coercive power more frequently to make its presence felt and demands known, though
its effort might be ineffective (Emerson, 1962; Frazier & Rody, 1991).
In line with previous research, this study takes the position that inter-firm power plays a key
role in inter-firm relationships. In particular, itshares the view of Heide and John (1998) that
power structure influences a firm’s ability to choose or design governance mechanisms. It is
not always possible for firms to establish the desired mode of governance. Firms need to
consider their own power in addition to assessing the transaction dimension. By accounting for
power structure, the TCE framework will be completeand will be able to explain all types of
firms. Hypotheses based on this logic are developedin Chapter 3.
2.3. Negotiation strategy and its relation to research questions
Negotiation play a key role, particularly in buyer-seller markets (Herbst, Voeth, & Meister,
2011). Negotiation is the fundamental phenomenon in inter-firm relationships (Perdue &
Summers, 1991). Zachariassen (2008) claims that communication and negotiation is
responsible for most of the success in supply chains. Without negotiation, the supply chain
would not exist.
In this study, negotiation is defined as the interaction process through which partner firms
establish the terms of a purchase agreement or exchange conditions (for example price or date
of delivery). Negotiation strategies are styles of interaction between partner firms. To choose
the most appropriate type of negotiation strategies, several researchers, including Thomas
(1976), Putnam and Wilson (1982), Pruitt (1983), Pinkley and Northcraft (1994), and Gelfand,
Leslie, and Keller (2008), have proposed a typology of negotiation. However, Pruitt’s (1983)
typology has received strong empirical support bothin the field and in laboratory studies (Das
& Kumar, 2011; De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer & Nauta, 2001; Liu & Sharma, 2011).
Pruitt (1983) advanced the work of Blake and Mouton(1970) and proposed the dual concern
model based on two orthogonal dimensions of concern. To decide which strategy to employ to
negotiate effectively with other exchange partners, firms should consider two types of
concerns: concern about their own outcomes and concern about partner firms’ outcomes.
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Mapping out high degrees and low degrees for each of these two concerns creates a 2 x 2 matrix
of the following negotiation strategies: (a) problem-solving, (b) contending, (c) yielding, and
(d) inaction (as depicted in Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3 Five negotiation strategies
First, firms use a  problem-solving  or collaborative negotiation strategy  when concerns with
both their own and their partners’ outcomes are high, i.e., they share responsibilities to reach a
mutually beneficial relationship (Day, Michaels, & Perdue, 1988) and take into account the
long-term working relationship (Liu & Sharma, 2011). Previous research has found that this
strategy positively influences firms’ profits and satisfaction (e.g., Ganesan, 1993; Graham,
1986). However, this strategy is most effective when power relationships are equal,
interpersonal conflicts are minimal, and long-term relationships are sought (Weitz, 1978).
Second, a  contending  or aggressive  or  competitive negotiation strategy  stems largely from a
zero-sum or win-lose orientation (Clopton, 1984) and represents a “Let’s do it my way!”
approach (Day, Michaels, & Perdue, 1988). When adopting this strategy, firms desire to win
their own concerns at their partner’s expense and thus engage in demanding, threatening
(Dwyer & Walker, 1981), and inflexible behaviour (Clopton, 1984). This strategy is used in
asymmetric-power elationships. In such relationships, a stronger party is mainly concerned
with its own interests and exercises its power to gain significant outcomes, neglecting the
deteriorating effects on the relationship (Atkin & Rinehart, 2006); subsequently, the stronger
party’s perspective usually prevails (Das & Kumar, 2011). Aggressive actions from one party
are more likely to invite retaliation from the other and lead to distrust, hostility, and negative
outcomes in the relationship (Liu & Sharma, 2011). Therefore, this aggressive negotiation
strategy seems to be inappropriate in most cases. However, Graham, Kim, Lin, and Robinson
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(1988) empirically found that in the Japanese and Korean cultural contexts, aggressive
negotiation strategy leads to positive outcomes.
Third, a  yielding, subordinating,  or  accommodative negotiation strategy  occurs when firms
desire to satisfy the concerns of the other withoutattending to their own concerns (Day et al.,
1988). Normally an accommodative party is the weaker party in the relationship. This weaker
party receives the requests of the stronger party only because the stronger party has little to
lose (Liu & Sharma, 2011). However, the stronger party may use the strategy to encourage
more support and dependence from the weaker party.
Fourth, an avoiding  or inactive negotiation strategy reflects a “better let the situation cool down
before we act” strategy (Day et al., 1988). Firms do little to guide the negotiation process (Das
& Kumar, 2011), are indifferent to the concerns of either party, and tend to avoid confrontation
(Perdue, Day, & Michaels, 1986). Relying on this strategy signifies a firm’s unresponsiveness
to its own and other’s interest. Although avoidance seems less aggressive than contending
strategy, it can result in resentments and encourage negative attitudes between parties,
especially in the Japanese context (Liu & Sharma, 2011).
Note that previous research (Thomas, 1976) has identified another type of negotiation, the
compromising or  sharing strategy, in which firms interact by engaging in equal or reciprocal
concessions based on their initial positions (Ganesan, 1993). However, this strategy provides
only moderate satisfaction for the parties involved(Das & Kumar, 2011) (as depicted in Figure
2.3). In addition, Liu and Sharma (2011) summarize that research in the areas of managerial,
inter-organizational, and interpersonal conflict management has modified the dual concern
model by including measures of assertiveness versus cooperativeness, benefit to self versus
benefit to others, manager’s priority versus other party’s priority, and substantive gain versus
relationship outcome (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975).
As previously mentioned, many empirical studies have found that negotiation has an impact on
exchange performance (e.g., Ganesa, 1993; Graham, 1986). This research study agrees with
these findings. However, it argues that relationship performance can be explained not only by
negotiations, but also by governance mechanisms. Negotiations refer to processes, while
governance mechanisms refer to structure. However, only a few empirical studies have
investigated the relationship between these two concepts. This study takes the position that
negotiation and governance mechanism interplay and affect performance of inter-firm
relationships. A more detailed description and hypothesis are presented in Chapter 3.
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2.4. Summary of theoretical background
This chapter provides a theoretical background on governance structure, inter-firm power and
negotiation strategies. Governance is a structure of organizing transactions, involving
initiation, ongoing relationship maintenance, and termination. Two main perspectives on
governance, TCE and RCT, make different assumptions about the nature of governance and
propose choices of governance mechanism. Williamsonand Ghani (2012) conclude that TCE
provides a constructive framework for analyzing contractual exchange by examining economic
organization through the lens of governance and using the transaction as the unit of analysis.
The key attributes of human actors are bounded rationality and opportunism. Of the
transactional dimensions, the key attribute is specific investments that lead to dependency.
Adaptation is the main problem of economic organization. There are two types of adaptations:
autonomous and coordinated. Alternative modes of governance are markets and hierarchies. If
specific investments are low, autonomous adaptationto change in the simple market exchange
will be efficient. However, as specific investments increase and mutual dependence develops,
hierarchical governance can reduce the hazards from consequential disturbances. As
transactions are aligned with governance structures, the transaction cost that economizes
outcomes prevails. There has been significant variation in support for TCE’s predictions (David
& Han, 2004). Some research studies provides empirical support for its tenets (e.g., Buvik &
Andersen, 2002; Heide & John, 1990; Walker & Weber, 1987), while others do not (Klein,
Frazier, & Roth, 1990; Russo, 1992). Given this mixed support for TCE, some empirical studies
have focused on the scope conditions or moderating variables that affect its tenets (Shervani et
al., 2007).
RCT suggests a typology of discrete and relational exchange. Individual transactions in discrete
exchange are independent of past and future relationship of exchange partners, while relational
exchange accounts explicitly for historical and social context. Relational exchange operates as
a self-enforcing safeguard by using many informal and diverse components. Involved firms
jointly develop policies with the aim of reaching certain goals. Recent research on transaction
costs incorporates relational governance into TCE, either as a replacement of hierarchical form
or as a complement (e.g., Artz & Brush, 2000). However, some firms may employ the multiple
and distinct types of governance for the same function (i.e., plural forms).
With regard to inter-firm power, it is the case that power is relevant only when at least two
parties are involved. Many extant research studies prove that power is the ability of one
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exchange partner to affect the decisions of anotherexchange partner. The power of partner A
over a partner B is a result of  B’s dependence on  A, reflecting (a) how essential the resources
obtained from  A are to  B in achieving its goals and (b) the difficulty  B perceives in switching
to alternative sources of supply. The more attractive the resources that A controls, the more that
B  will view its relationship with  A  is essential. Firms use power to control their partners’
behaviour. Firms with relatively high power are expected to exploit their partners.
With regard to negotiation strategy, firms use negotiations in their inter-organizational
relationships to interact and find an agreement regarding the exchange conditions. Pruitt (1983)
suggests that firms use five negotiation strategies—problem solving, contending,
accommodative, avoiding, and compromising—dependingon their level of concern with their
own outcomes (assertiveness) and those of their partners (cooperativeness). Two dominant
styles used in research are problem-solving and aggressive negotiation strategies. Many
previous studies show the empirical finding that problem-solving negotiation strategy has a
positive influence on partner firms’ profits and satisfaction (e.g., Graham, 1986), while
aggressive negotiation strategy weakens the relationship (e.g., Liu & Sharma, 2011).
2.5. Review of empirical studies
There are several excellent overviews of TCE and RCT (e.g., Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 2010;
David & Han, 2004; Gatignon & Gatignon, 2010; Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006;
Gibbons, 2010; Iven, 2002; John & Reve, 2010; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997, Seggie, 2012); of
inter-firm power (Belaya, Gagalyuk, & Hanf, 2009; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009), and
of negotiation (e.g., Herbst, Voeth, & Meister, 2011; Rubin & Brown, 1985; Zachariassen,
2008). Therefore, this chapter does not review those overviews individually, but rather
highlights the literature related to the research questions, and the theoretical positioning of this
dissertation. Section 2.5.1 presents the findings from empirical research that investigates the
relationships among TCE, RCT, and inter-firm power theory, while Section 2.5.2 presents the
research findings related to the relationships between governance structure and negotiation
strategies. The review is drawn from the inter-organizational literature. Section 2.5.3
summarizes the review.
2.5.1. Empirical studies of TCE, RCT and power structure
This section provides an overview of empirical findings related to the relationship among TCE,
RCT, and asymmetric-power elationships. David and Han (2004) suggest hat TCE receives
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mixed support for their prediction, and call for more empirical research on scope conditions.
This study responds to that call. It takes the position that power structure moderates the effect
of specific investments on governance modes. There are previous empirical studies that have
investigated this issue. Heide and John (1988) show that weaker firms in asymmetric-power
relationships do not have the ability to establish more integrated mode of governance. These
weaker firms could not use integrated governance to protect their specific investments due to
low level of power. Instead of making a contract with the manufacturers, they attempted to
bond themselves more closely to their customers. Heide and John (1988) refer to this effort as
offsetting investments. This study is in line with their reasoning, and intends to improve their
methodology by measuring the type of power more systematically and adding the condition of
symmetric power to the study.
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) extend the empirical knowledge of TCE. They study the co-
marketing alliance between firms in the computer and semiconductor industries. Co-marketing
alliances are a lateral relationship created for the joint management of complementary products
and controlled by separated partner firms. Among their findings, they determine that high
specific investments and transaction frequency lead to high perception of power asymmetry.
However, the interaction of formality, exit barriers, and exclusivity may help reduce damaging
perceptions of imbalance among partners. This implies that contractual governance (i.e.,
formalization) in co-marketing relationships may be effective in reducing asymmetric power
when specific investments are high. This dissertation takes the view that Bucklin and Sengupta
(1993) confirm the argument of Williamson (1991a, 1999), i.e., that transactors are far-sighted
and design governance structure with consideration of dependence x ante. Their findings
support the common prediction of TCE, and oppose the position of this study, which is that the
TCE prediction is subject to scope conditions.
Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) empirically study the relationship between asymmetric
power and trust, commitment, and conflict, using the survey data from automobile dealers.
They find that as asymmetric power increases, the dealer’s trust in and commitment to the
supplier decreases, and conflict increases. Relationships with greater mutual dependence
exhibit higher trust, stronger commitment, and lower conflict than relationships with lower
mutual dependence. This dissertation agrees with the findings of Kumar et al. (1995). However,
it aims to extend TCE by using specific investments as the determinant, power structure as the
moderating variable, and relational governance (analogous to trust) as the dependent variable.
In addition, this dissertation also includes the condition of no-interdependent relationship
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which is neither asymmetric nor mutual dependent relationships, expanding the scope
conditions of TCE.
Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, and Kumar (1996) empirically investigate the joint impact of
dealer’s perceptions of the channel interdependence structure and its trust in the supplier on
both “affective” and “calculative” commitment, using survey data from automobile industries
in both United States and the Netherlands. They define affective commitment as the extent to
which firms  like  to maintain relationship with specific partners, and calculative commitment
as the degree to which firms experience the need to maintain a relationship. The findings show
that high inter-dependence (i.e., mutual dependence) increases the calculative commitment of
both parties, and that asymmetric relationships are associated with more calculative
commitment by weaker partners and less calculative commitment by stronger parties. This
dissertation takes the view that the findings of Geysken et al. (1996) are consistent with many
empirical studies that incorporate relational governance into TCE by replacing hierarchical
governance with commitment. As firms make specific investments, they need to commit to the
relationship to ensure the return on those investments. In addition, Geyskens et al. (1996) find
that asymmetry has a small positive effect on affective commitment. Asymmetry and trust have
a positive interactive effect on affective commitment. This dissertation supports the suggestion
that trust strengthens the effect of asymmetric power on affective commitment. Furthermore,
these findings are consistent with the findings (previously cited) of Kumar et al. (1995).
Similarly, this dissertation agrees with the findings of Geykens et al. (1996), and aims to extend
that work by using the TCE framework, with the moderations of power structure, and including
relational norms as dependent variables.
Lusch and Brown (1996) conduct a thorough empirical investigation of the relationship
between power architecture in the wholesaler-supplier elationship and governance modes,
using data from small merchant wholesalers and agents or brokers in the United States who
carry either durable or non-durable goods. The researchers find the structure of dependency
has an impact on modes of governance. First, high mutual dependence between the wholesaler
and its supplier leads to more reliance on normative contracts (analogous to relational
governance), which leads to improved wholesaler performance. Second, in the relationship in
which the wholesaler is a weaker party and its supplier is a stronger party, the wholesaler
develops a long-term orientation, which leads to both explicit (analogous to hierarchical
governance) and normative contracts. However, only normative contracts lead to a high
performance level for the wholesaler. Third, in the relationship in which the supplier depends
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on the wholesaler, a more explicit contract is present and the wholesaler has a higher
performance level. This dissertation agrees with all findings. However, the Lusch and Brown
(1996) study is limited, in that it overlooks the no-interdependent relationship. This dissertation
seeks to include all types of power structures as determinants of governance mechanisms; it
also considers specific investments.
Buvik and Reve (2001) empirically investigate how the composite of specific investments
affects governance structure in industrial purchasing relationships, using data from 161
relationships. In their study, they assume that dependence arises from specific investments.
Their finding relevant to this dissertation is thatmutual-high specific investments (i.e., mutual
dependence) are more positively related to contractual safeguarding than mutual-low specific
investments (no-interdependence). They explain further that this finding is contradictory to the
original hostage model in which mutual-high specific investments reduce the problem of moral
hazards (Williamson, 1983). This dissertation takes the view that the findings of Buvik and
Reve (2001) support the common tenet of TCE, which is opposite to the position of this
dissertation. This view of this dissertation is that the study of Buvik and Reve (2001) is limited
in that it does not consider asymmetric-power relationships.
Buvik and Reve (2002) extend the theory of TCE by combining it with resource-dependence
theory. They empirically examine whether the buyer’s power influences the alignment of
governance mode and specific investments of buyer and supplier, using survey data from 160
industrial purchasing relationships. They find that the buyer’s power moderates the positive
association between supplier-held specific investments and formalized purchase contracting.
On one hand, the dependence of the supplier on its buyer reduces the supplier’s ability to
safeguard its specific investments with formalized purchase contracting. On the other hand, as
the buyer’s power increases, buyer-held specific investments are strongly associated with
formalized purchase contract. This dissertation agrees with the findings of Buvik and Reve.
However, their study is limited in that it does not consider symmetric-power elationships in
which partner firms may have mutual-dependent or no-interdependent relationships.
Berthon, Pitt, Ewing, and Bakkeland (2003) extend understanding of the role of relational
norms in the context of the relationship between buyers and their sole supplier, implying that
buyers are dependent on their only supplier. Data are drawn from the buyer side as well as the
supplier side of the dyad. The empirical finding is that norms do not play a significant role in
the research context. This dissertation agrees with the findings that, in asymmetric-power
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relationships, it is hard to establish relational norms, because stronger firms are likely to retain
their power to obtain benefits of the use of power. The Berthon et al. (2003) study is limited in
that it does not use the TCE framework, and does not consider all types of power structures.
Shervani et al. (2007) question whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types
of firms in all business settings; they conduct an empirical investigation of the manufacturer-
distributor relationship in the context of the electronic and telecommunications industry, in
which manufacturers are firms with high market power. Analysis suggests that firms with high
market power may be able to lower transaction costs even though they make high specific
investments under high uncertainty in non-integrated distribution channels because they are
likely to have significant monitoring and surveillance capabilities, as well as the ability to
exercise legitimate authority and offer various incentives. In contrast, firms with low power do
not have such capabilities. Such firms, therefore, need to conduct highly integrated forward
channels. This dissertation agrees with the line of reasoning and findings of Shervani et al.
(2007). However, the Shervani et al (2007) study is limited in that the symmetric-power
relationship is not included.
2.5.2. Empirical studies on governance structure and negotiation strategies
The following section presents empirical studies that examine the relationships between
governance structure and negotiation strategies. Of the few studies that focus on this topic,
most deal with the influence between the two concepts, which is an approach that differs from
the research questions of this dissertation.
Schurr and Ozanne (1985) empirically examine the buyer-seller communication and
concession-making processes as influenced by a buyer’s prior belief about a seller’s
trustworthiness and bargaining toughness, using the experimental method with 103 MBA
students. Their findings show that if a buyer believes that a seller will use a tough bargaining
stance (analogous to aggressive negotiation strategy) and at the same time believes that the
seller is untrustworthy, the buyer-seller interaction is least favorable to the seller in terms of
total concessions and level of agreement reached. This dissertation agrees with the findings.
However, Schurr and Ozanne’s (1985) study is limited in that TCE governance was not
included in the research model. In addition, their data are drawn from students instead of firm
managers (although the researchers claim that students have the characteristics of effective
negotiators).
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Ness and Haugland (2005) apply case study to investigate the development of governance
mechanisms and negotiation strategies in inter-firm relationships with a fixed endpoint. Their
findings suggest that trust evolves and changes the relationship structure and interaction
process. Even though it is known when the relationship will end, trust and cooperative
behaviour can emerge. The study is limited in that the purpose of the researchers i  to study the
co-evolution of negotiation strategies and governance modes, an approach that differs from the
purpose of this dissertation (i.e., interaction effects of the two factors on performance).
Lumineau and Henderson (2009) empirically investigate the impact of governance structure in
a buyer-supplier elationship on negotiation strategies, using data from legal files concerning
102 disputes in a number of industries. They find that relational governance leads to
collaborative negotiation strategy, but that contractual dimension of control reduces the
positive association between relational governance and collaborative negotiation strategy. The
study is limited in that it investigates the determination of the concepts, which is an approach
that differs from the purpose of this dissertation.
Ness (2009) investigates the combination and recombination of governance mechanisms and
negotiation strategies to understand the evolution of relational practice, through a study of three
longitudinal cases. He finds that governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies co-evolve.
The frequently observed combinations are (a) ‘trust’ and problem-solving negotiation strategy,
(b) ‘price’ and contending strategy, and (c) ‘price’ and problem-solving strategy. Furthermore,
he suggests that governance mechanisms also change as the result of the use of negotiation
strategies. Finally, he suggests that the combination of process and on-going structure might
provide a better explanation of alliance outcomes. In the view of this dissertation, The Ness
(2009) study focuses on the co-evolution and influence between the two concepts, which is an
approach that differs from the purpose of this dissertation.
2.5.3. Summary of review of empirical studies
Several empirical studies focus on the relationships among TCE, RCT and inter-firm power.
With regard to integration of TCE and power, Buvik and Reve (2002) find that the buyer’s
power over the supplier reduces the association relationship between supplier-held specific
investments and formalized purchasing contract. Thesupplier (weaker firm) does not have the
ability to establish a more integrated mode of governance. However, this finding is
contradictory to the finding of Shervani et al (2007) that weaker-held specific investments are
positively related to a highly integrated forward channel, but stronger-held ones are not.
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Although the findings of both studies are inconsistent regarding the mode of governance of
firms under asymmetric power, they show that asymmetric power has some moderating effects
on TCE. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to investigate this issue.
With regard to the integration of RTC and power, Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) find
that asymmetric power reduces trust, while mutual dependence increases trust. Similarly,
Lusch and Brown (1996) find that mutual dependence leads to more use of normative contracts
(analogous to relational governance), while the asymmetric-power relationship leads to the use
of explicit contract (analogous to hierarchical governance) and normative contracts. In
addition, Berthon, Pitt, Ewing, and Bakkeland (2003) find that norms do not play a significant
role in relationships in which buyers depend on their sole supplier. This dissertation notes that
without the consideration of specific investments, all findings suggest hat asymmetric power
reduces trust but increases hierarchical governance, while mutual dependence increases trust.
Although previous studies show consistency, they have not investigated the moderating effect
of power structure on the relationship between specific investments and relational governance.
This dissertation, therefore, seeks to close that gap.
With regard to the relationships between governance structure and negotiation strategies, the
conclusion (based on the previous review), is that only some empirical studies focus on this
topic. Most investigate the relationship between relational governance and negotiation
strategies. Findings show that a high degree of relational governance leads to the use of
problem-solving negotiation strategy. There have not been any studies of the interaction effect
of negotiation strategies and governance modes on performance. This dissertation, therefore,
seeks to close that gap.
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3. Research model and hypotheses
3.1. Introduction
To maximise its profit, a firm may lower its costs or increase its sales, by making specific
investments to fit the specific requirements of itspartner firm. According to TCE, such specific
investments create a safeguarding problem because an investing firm cannot exit the
relationship without cost. As a result, an investing firm exposes itself to the opportunistic
behaviour of its partner firm. This leads to the need for contractual safeguarding to prevent
such assumedly inherent opportunism. TCE suggests that hierarchical governance can be a
solution (Williamson, 1985). However, although the investing firm is motivated to employ a
more integrated governance structure to safeguard its specific investments, this firm may not
have the ability to convince its partner firm to establish governance structure in the desired
manner (Heide & John, 1992). It seems, therefore, that the conventional TCE framework may
not be able to explain all types of firms. The meta-analysis of David and Han (2004) shows
mixed support for TCE and calls for more research on “scope conditions” (p. 54), to explain
the conditions under which TCE works well. This dissertation addresses the issue of scope
conditions concerning the impact of power structure on TCE; it aims to show that in
relationships with various types of power structures, firms may choose modes of governance
that are different from the prediction of TCE. Therefore, the TCE framework may need to be
augmented by consideration of power structure to increase its ability to explain all types of
firms.
It is also of interest to investigate the synergy of governance structure and negotiation
strategies. Previous research has called for more efforts to merge governance structures and
negotiation strategies (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). So far,
however, only four empirical studies have attempted to integrate the two theoretical
perspectives: Lumineau and Henderson (2009), Ness and Haugland (2005), Ness (2009), and
Schurr and Ozanne (1985). These studies are limitedin that they focus on the influence between
the two concepts, while this research aims to show that the use of the two theoretical
perspectives together may enhance understanding of the relationships and trade-offs among the
factors that affect relationship performance. The use of specific types of negotiation strategies
for certain modes of governance goals may lead firms to achieve specific goals.
The research model is therefore based on an integration of TCE, RCT, inter-organizational
power, and negotiation strategies. Figure 3.1 illustrates a model of testable hypotheses
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developed regarding the extent to which (a) the power structure moderates the effect of specific
investments on modes of governance, (b) the interaction or alignment between specific
investments and modes of governance affects relationship performance, and (c) the interaction
between modes of governance and negotiation strategies affects relationship performance. This
is the traditional way to present the model; it is also possible (from a broader point of view)
that relationship performance influences specific investments, power structure, negotiation
strategies, and even the mode of governance. Research on these more complex relationships is
beyond the scope of this study. Rather, this study regards relationship performance as an
outcome variable. Furthermore, it is possible for firms to adopt more than one negotiation
strategy simultaneously (Euwema, Vliert, & Bakker, 2003). For example, they may adopt
different strategies at different stages of their inter-organizational relationships. This results in
a more complex study. However, it is established that different strategies are associated with
different substantive and relational outcomes (Das & Kumar, 2011).
Figure 3.1  The preliminary conceptual model
According to the TCE framework (Williamson, 1985), transactions constituting the economic
exchange between buyers and suppliers are considered the units of analysis. The three principal
attributes of transaction are specific investments, uncertainty, and transaction frequency. The
combination of these three transaction dimensions determines the most cost-efficient mode of
governance.
This research focuses only on specific investments, which reflect the degree to which firm
assets are tailored to a particular transaction. Williamson (1985) argues that asset specificity is
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a critical determinant of firms’ choice between market and hierarchical governance and “the
big locomotive to which transaction cost economics owes much of its predictive content” (p.
36). As a result, previous TCE studies have most frequently used asset specificity as an
independent variable (David & Han, 2004).
The power structure between exchange partners also plays a modest role in the TCE framework
(Williamson, 1991a) because TCE assumes that exchange partners are farsighted, and therefore
anticipate potential power issues from the beginning. Exchange partners also tend to address
the dependency issue ex ante  while designing a suitable mode of governance. However, it is
not always the case that firms can organize their governance mode in the most preferred way.
For example, a firm may lack the ability to persuade its exchange partner to agree to its desired
contracting mode. Such ability to influence the terms and conditions of contracts is based
largely on its power (Argyris & Liebeskind, 1999; Stinchcombe, 1985). Therefore, both a
firm’s motivation and its ability or power needs to be considered (Heide & John, 1992). This
research supports this reasoning and accordingly examines the moderating effect of power
structure on the relationship between specific investments and firm’s choice of governance
modes.
Although many governance modes exist, this study focuses on two main perspectives, TCE
and RCT. The original non-market TCE mode of governance is hierarchy. However, many
researchers have argued that relational exchange can be used as a viable alternative to
hierarchy. Many studies have shown that norms have a safeguarding capacity, a condition that
is positively related to the degree of specific investments (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Bello &
Gilliland, 1997; Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Heide & John, 1990, 1992; Lusch &
Brown, 1996). Thus, previous research (Powell, 1990) has argued that relational contracts
should be viewed as governance mechanisms in their own right because they have the capacity
to function in both an ex ante role in dictating socially accepted behaviours and an ex post role
in evaluating whether and to what extent exchange partners’ behaviours conform to established
standards.
With regard to dual negotiation strategies, Pruitt’s (1983) dual concern model has received
strong empirical support. It suggests four alternative strategies, including problem solving,
contending, yielding, and inaction. However, problem solving and contending are two general
strategies that have appeared in buyer-supplier relationships (Perdue & Summers, 1991).
Therefore, the current study considers only these two strategies. A problem-solving negotiation
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strategy involves coordinating and searching resolution to ensure that both parties gain. In
contrast, firms using contending or aggressive negotiation strategies strive only for individual
gain.
Previous researchers have called for efforts to merge governance structures and negotiation
strategies (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). So far, however,
only three empirical studies have attempted to integrate the two theoretical perspectives:
Lumineau and Henderson (2009), Ness and Haugland (2005), and Schurr and Ozanne (1985).
Use of the two theoretical perspectives together may enhance understanding of the relationships
and trade-offs among the factors that affect relationship performance. Therefore, a secondary
goal of this study is to investigate the interaction effect between governance modes and
negotiation strategies on relationship performance.
The remainder of Chapter 3 is organized as follows: Section 3.2 focuses on the hypotheses
concerning the replication of TCE tenets and the integration on TCE and negotiation strategies.
Section 3.3 focuses on the effect of power structure on TCE. Section 3.4 focuses on comparing
the effect of symmetric and asymmetric-power elationships on TCE. Section 3.5 presents
hypotheses regarding the comparison of the effect of mutual-dependent and no-interdependent
relationships on TCE.
3.2. TCE prediction and expansion hypotheses
Hypotheses development for this study begins with testing the common tenet of the TCE
framework. Next, the TCE framework is expanded by integrating governance modes with
negotiation strategies. This group of hypotheses does not consider power structure. Therefore,
power structure is not included in the Section 3.2 model (see Figure 3.2), but is included in the
model of Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
The purpose of this section is to present a testable model of governance modes, negotiation
strategies, and relationship performance. Section 3.2.1 replicates the common tenet of the TCE
framework concerning the determinants of governance modes. Section 3.2.2 proposes
hypotheses concerning the antecedents to relationship performance, including governance
modes, negotiation strategies, and various alignments of specific investments, governance
modes, and negotiation strategies.
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Figure 3.2 A hypothesized model of the common tenet of TCE and the integration
between governance modes and negotiation strategies
3.2.1. Antecedents to modes of governance
3.2.1.1. Specific investments
TCE makes the a priori assumption that market governance is more efficient than hierarchical
governance due to the benefits of market competition. Integrated transactions under hierarchical
governance are protected from competitive pressures, while market transactions are less subject
to bureaucratic costs. However, to acquire cost savings or value creation, a firm must tailor its
investments to fit the specific requirements of its particular exchange partner. Such specific
investments may create some problems because a firm cannot exit the relationship without cost
(i.e., lock-in effect), and thus the identity of the parties is crucial. As a result, the firm exposes
itself to opportunistic behaviours of its exchange partners, such as failure to perform according
to an agreement.
Once a firm makes specific investments, the transaction costs associated with market
governance increase, leading to the need for contractual safeguarding to prevent assumed
inherent inclinations of its exchange partner to appropriate “quasi rents” (Klein, Crawford, &
Alchian, 1978, p. 299). TCE suggests that vertical integration (hybrid or hierarchy) provides a
possible solution to such safeguarding problems (Williamson, 1975, 1985); in this case, rules
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related to the particular transaction are specified(i.e., formalization), and one party can impose
decisions on the other party (i.e., centralization).
The first baseline hypothesis tests whether the common tenet of TCE framework is supported
empirically, i.e. whether the mode of governance is likely to be hierarchical when there is a
high degree of specific investments.
Hypothesis 1:  The degree of specific investments is positively related to
hierarchical governance.
Geysken et al (2006, p. 522) summarize that the TCE framework originally focused on the
dichotomy between market and hierarchical governance. However, researchers have raised the
criticism that TCE overstates the desirability of exchange partners on the two mechanisms (i.e.,
integration and explicit contracts). Many firms conduct collaborative exchanges that are neither
market nor hierarchy (Dyer, 1997). Moreover, the meta-analysis of Geyskens et al. (2006)
shows that many studies support the notion that as asset specificity increases, relational
governance becomes preferred over market governance. In general, the logic is the same as the
original idea of TCE, i.e., when specific investments are high, firms are exposed to
opportunistic behaviour of exchange partners and thus need to safeguard their specific
investments.
Relational contracts have traditionally complemented other contracts in the form of norms and
informal agreements (Heide & John, 1992). However, relational contracts can be considered
governance mechanisms in “their own right” (Powell, 1990). Two main reasons support this
statement. First, relational contracts have the capability to dictate ex ante socially accepted
behaviours that maintain the relationship as a whole and promote the goals of the exchange
partners (Heide & John, 1992). Second, relational contracts can serve as ex post reference points
in the case of non-compliant behaviours, i.e., to evaluate whether and to what degree a partner
firm’s behaviour conforms to established standards (Ivens, 2002).
Many empirical studies find that the commitment between exchange partners increases
following investments (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Genesan, 1994), which suggests that a
high degree of specific investments influences the creation of relational sentiments.
Expectations of payoffs from the future cooperativebehaviours prompt the present cooperation
(Axelrod, 1984). Socialization processes identify socially accepted behaviours and make clear
that deviant behaviours will be punished. As a result, norms are developed and strengthened by
trustworthy interactions between exchange partners that generate a win-win exchange situation
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(Dwyer et al., 1987; Macneil, 1980; Uzzi, 1997). Eventually, norms obtain sufficient
safeguarding capability, thus mitigating exchange hazards. The second baseline hypothesis tests
whether the alternative mode of governance is supported empirically.
Hypothesis 2:  The degree of specific investments is positively related to
relational governance.
3.2.2. Antecedents to relationship performance
3.2.2.1. Hierarchical governance
It is hypothesized that hierarchical structure influences relationship performance. This mode of
governance controls and coordinates the inter-firm relationship by providing flexibility, and
adaptability to disturbance, through clearly articulated clauses (i.e., rules and instructions) that
specify penalties. This specification limits opportunistic behaviour and promotes cooperative
behaviour (David & Han, 2004; Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Poppo & Zenger,
2002), which leads the partners to the goal of joint profit maximization (Geyskens et al., 2006).
Many previous empirical studies have found a positive association between hierarchical
governance (vertical integration and formal governance modes) and relationship performance
(e.g., Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999; Ghosh & John, 2005;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Mohr, Fisher, and Nevin (1996) find that as the level of integration
increases from independent o company-owned, dealers report higher levels of satisfaction. It
is expected, therefore, that when hierarchical governance is used as a form of transaction
governance, the transacting parties will obtain greater profit.
Hypothesis 3:  Hierarchical governance is positively related to relationship
performance.
3.2.2.2. Relational governance
Relational governance is expected to influence relationship performance. Rather than relying
on an authority structure, parties practicing relational governance jointly develop policies to
achieve certain goals (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). By relying on this governance
structure, partner firms can reduce transaction costs (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; Buvik & John,
2000; Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998), mitigate opportunistic behaviour (Cannon, Achrol, &
Gundlach, 2000; Heide & John, 2002), and facilitate cooperation by using relational norms
(Lui, Wong, & Liu 2009; Macneil, 1980). This increases the ability of partner firms to achieve
better relationship performance.
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Many previous empirical studies support the positive associations between relational
governance and relationship performance (e.g., Buvik & John, 2000; Dyer, 1997; Ghosh &
John, 1999; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Lui, Wong, & Liu 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Rokkan,
Heide, & Wathne, 2003). In line with hypothesis 2, exchange partners are likely to obtain
higher performance when their mode of governance is relational governance.
Hypothesis 4:  Relational governance is positively related to relationship
performance.
3.2.2.3. Aggressive negotiation strategy
Aggressive negotiation strategy is expected to influence relationship performance. The effect
of aggressive negotiation strategy on relationship performance is generally negative. When
relying on this negotiation strategy to resolve conflicts, firms implicitly or explicitly use threats,
persuasive arguments, or punishments to maximize self-gain at the expense of partner firms.
Partner firms perceive this aggressive strategy as exploitive behaviour (Frazier & Summer,
1984) and become more inflexible in their views, which leads to more problems and less
conflict resolution (Cadotte & Stern, 1979). The use of an aggressive strategy is more likely to
worsen the conflict than solve it (Ganesan, 1993).
Previous research offers convincing theoretical arguments and empirical support for the
negative association between an aggressive negotiation strategy and economic and relational
outcomes (e.g., Ganesan, 1993; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985).This study seeks to replicate the
primary findings regarding outcomes of an aggressive negotiation strategy by testing the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5:  An aggressive negotiation strategy is negatively related to
relationship performance.
3.2.2.4. Problem-solving negotiation strategy
In contrast, research consistently suggests and empirically supports a positive relationship
between a problem-solving negotiation strategy and performance (e.g., Clopton, 1984; Graham,
1986; Pruitt, 1981). By using problem-solving strategies, firms indicate that they will
accommodate their partners’ concerns and are willing to work toward problem resolution. This
results in profits and a greater satisfaction with the negotiation. This study seeks to replicate the
previous findings regarding outcomes of a problem-solving negotiation strategy by testing the
following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 6:  A problem-solving negotiation strategy is positively related to
relationship performance.
3.2.2.5. Alignment of specific investments and mode of governance
A contingent alignment framework explains differences in performance across firms based on
an alignment of governance structure and conditionsthe firm encounters (Ghosh & John, 2005;
Wathne & Heide, 2004). Firms that align governance structures with their transaction
dimensions may economize on transaction costs, which should result in better performance
than those who do not (Williamson, 1985).
Many findings from empirical research support the TCE predictions. For example, Brettel,
Engelen, & Muller (2011) find that firms that employ direct distribution channels (i.e.,
hierarchical governance) when specific investments,technological uncertainty, and transaction
frequency are high, outperform firms that choose the opposite structure in terms of cost-
inclusive performance measures.
Therefore, it can be expected that high levels of specific investments hould be associated with
the use of hierarchical governance. An efficient alignment between specific investments and
governance modes should be associated with lower transaction costs and thus increase the
relationship performance (Williamson, 1985).
Hypothesis 7:  The interaction of specific investments and hierarchical governance
is positively related to relationship performance.
Many empirical studies support the finding that relational governance also offers a
structure that reduces transaction costs and leads to better relationship performance. For
example, Jap (1999) finds that, over time, coordination efforts (analogous to relational
governance) and specific investments are positivelyrelated to strategic outcomes. Brown,
Dev, and Lee (2000) find that relational exchange and a hotel’s specific investments have
a synergistic effect on reducing hotel opportunism. Similarly, Artz and Brush (2000)
empirically validate that relational norms mitigatethe impact of manufacturer’s specific
investments on ex post costs of renegotiation and adjustment of contract between
manufacturers and their suppliers. Lui, Wong, and Liu (2009) find that specific
investments are related to relationship performancethrough cooperative behaviour. The
following hypothesis is therefore developed:
Hypothesis 8:  The interaction of specific investments and relational governance
is positively related to relationship performance.
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3.2.2.6. Interaction of mode of governance and negotiation strategy
In this section, four hypotheses are developed with regard to the interaction effect between
governance mode and negotiation strategy on relationship performance. The first hypothesis is
developed on the assumption that transaction parties adopt hierarchical governance to manage
their relationships and use aggressive negotiation strategies when interacting. Hierarchical
governance is supported by an authority structure in which one party is able to develop rules
and impose decisions on the other party. This structure allows the implementation of an
aggressive negotiation strategy, i.e., “Let’s do itmy way” (Day, Michaels, & Perdue, 1988, p.
155). The decision-making party exploits and elicits unilateral concessions from its partner
(Bannister, 1969; Pruitt, 1981; Robicheaux & El-Ansary, 1975), such as obtaining better trade
terms (Beier & Stern, 1969). Furthermore, the decision-making party is able to persuade its
partner to work more closely than usual (i.e. over-coordinate). As such, the decision-making
party can possess ignificant monitoring and surveillance capabilities over its partner (Shervani
et al., 2007).
Such over-coordinated governance is not an efficient mode of governance, and may hinder
profit maximization. The use of an aggressive strategy in which one party strives for individual
gain increases opportunism and decreases the relationship performance.
Hypothesis 9:  The interaction between hierarchical governance and aggressive
negotiation strategy is negatively related to relationship
performance.
In contrast, the second hypothesis is developed on the assumption that transaction parties adopt
hierarchical governance to manage their relationship and use problem-solving negotiation
strategies when interacting. Hierarchical governance relies on fiat to resolve disputes, but
parties use problem-solving negotiation strategy to exchange information, discuss their needs,
create acceptable rules, and justify command. The focus is on the integration of both parties’
needs and striving for the best outcomes. Many previous studies support the finding that
problem-solving negotiation strategy leads to high profit and satisfaction (e.g., Ganesan, 1993;
Graham, 1986; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).
The interaction effect between hierarchical governance and problem solving is therefore
hypothesized to increase relationship performance. The use of a problem-solving negotiation
strategy in hierarchical governance leads to that are more acceptable and justified command,
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which in turn increases relationship performance. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is as
follows:
Hypothesis 10:  The interaction between hierarchical governance and problem-
solving negotiation strategy is positively related to relationship
performance.
Third, a hypothesis is developed based on the assumption that parties use relational governance
in their relationships, but employ aggressive negotiation strategies when communicating with
their partners. When adopting an aggressive negotiation strategy, parties pursue tactics such as
threats, persuasive arguments, and time pressures to win their own concerns, usually at the
expense of their partners’ concerns. Such tactics emphasize the conflicting goals between
partners, thereby hindering the safeguarding effectof relational norms on opportunism (Lusch
& Brown, 1982). Moreover, aggressive tactics may provoke psychological resistance, which in
turn increases opportunism (Provan & Skinner, 1989). The use of aggressive negotiation
strategy is expected to decrease the positive association between relational governance and
relationship performance. Accordingly, the hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 11: The interaction between relational governance and aggressive
negotiation strategy is negatively related to relationship
performance.
In contrast, if transacting parties develop relational governance to manage their exchange and
choose problem-solving negotiation strategies as their style of interaction, their choice is
expected to lead to positive relationship performance. In relational governance, relational norms
control the exchange partners’ behaviour by describing and assessing the appropriate behaviour
(Cannon, Achrol et al., 2000), which hinders opportunistic behaviour. While establishing such
norms requires inter-firm communication that assists in resolving disputes and aligning
perceptions and expectation (Etgar, 1979; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), an accumulation of trust
leads to better communication (Anderson & Narus, 1990).
Many previous studies propose and confirm that relational governance (Janda, Murray, &
Burton, 2002; Morgan & Hunt, 1994) and the collaborating or problem-solving strategy (e.g.,
Ganesan, 1993; Graham, 1986; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) lead to satisfaction with the interaction
between exchange partners
Therefore, the interaction effect between relational governance and a problem-solving
negotiation strategy is expected to increase relationship performance. An increase in relational
governance reduces opportunism, while an increase in problem-solving strategy simultaneously
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increases the satisfaction in coordination. Accordingly, the interaction effect between relational
governance and collaborating negotiation strategy is hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 12: The interaction between relational governance and problem-
solving negotiation strategy is positively related to relationship
performance.
3.3. Asymmetric power hypotheses
The purpose of this section is to propose hypotheses intended to expand the ability of the TCE
framework. A testable model of the effect of asymmetric power on TCE in buyer-supplier
relationships is presented (see Figure 3.3). The asymmetric-power elationship is one type of
relationship related to power structure. This section elaborates on the relationship among
specific investments, asymmetric power, and mode of governance, a topic that some
researchers (e.g., Buvik & Reve, 2002; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Shervani et al., 2007) have also
empirically studied. These researchers posit that the power structure has an impact on the mode
of governance used.
Under conditions involving a high deployment of specific assets, both partner firms become
highly inter-dependent because such specific assetscannot be redeployed to another application
or relationship without a significant loss in value. Market safeguards against opportunism are
no longer effective. TCE predicts that both firms will try to employ contractual safeguarding
to protect assets at risk and to minimize transaction costs.
However, asymmetric power should play a role. In an asymmetric-power elationship, even
though a firm has assets at risk, hierarchical governance may not be employed because a
stronger firm can get its interests met and extractthe best exchange terms by using its power
(Beier & Stern, 1969; Bosse & Alvarez, 2010); the stronger firm is able to avoid the high cost
of establishing hierarchical governance.
A stronger firm is expected to exploit its weaker partner (Bannister, 1969; Robicheaux & El-
Ansary, 1975) and gain more protection for its assets at risk (i.e., safeguarding) and more access
to its partner’s information (Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Frazier et al., 1989;
Heide & John, 1992; Kale, 1986; Roering, 1977; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978). A stronger
position may allow the stronger partner to monitor the weaker partner’s behaviour or give the
stronger partner more authority to modify contractual provisions to safeguard its specific
investments (Stinchcombe, 1985). With regard to stronger firms, asymmetric power is
hypothesized to reduce the effect of specific investments on hierarchical governance. To protect
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themselves from opportunistic behaviours, however, weaker firms need to rely on hierarchical
governance as they make specific investments. Shervani et al (2007) empirically find that
weaker-held specific investments are positively related to the highly integrated forward
channel, but stronger-held ones are not.
With regard to relational governance, it may be less motivating for stronger firms to develop
relational governance because the stronger partner is likely to retain its right to use its power to
earn unilateral benefits from the relationships at the expenses of its weaker partner (Dwyer &
Walker, 1981; Frazier et al., 1989; Frazier & Rody; 1991; Kale, 1986; Roering, 1977;
Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978). Asymmetric power should distract the stronger firm from the
potential for joint gains (McAlister et al., 1986) and attract it to individual goals (Dwyer, Schurr,
& Oh, 1987). In contrast, a weaker firm should be motivated to develop relational governance,
as it can benefit from relational norms that mitigate opportunistic behaviour.
Therefore, it can be expected that TCE better explains firms with lower power than firms with
high power. That is, specific investments held by weaker firms are expected to be positively
related to hierarchical and relational governance, while specific investments held by stronger
firms are expected to be negatively related to hierarchical and relational governance.
Hypothesis 13:  Transaction cost economics explains firms with lowpower better than
firms with high power.
Figure 3.3 A hypothesized model of the impact of asymmetric power on TCE
3.4. Asymmetric and symmetric power hypotheses
The purpose of this section is to propose hypotheses comparing the ability of the TCE
framework to explain mode of governance under asymmetric and symmetric-power
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relationships. A testable model is presented in Figure 3.4. Two general types of power structure
are power symmetry and power asymmetry. With multiple-group analysis, the testable model
can be represented as in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.4 A hypothesized model of the impact of power structure TCE
Figure 3.5 A hypothesized model of the impact of asymmetric-power and symmetric-power on TCE
Symmetric-power elationships occur when the power of a firm over its partner is the same as
the power its partner has over a firm (Dickson, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). This relationship is
opposite to asymmetric power, in which partner firms have varying degrees of power relative
to one other.
Under conditions involving a high deployment of specific assets, TCE predicts that both firms
will try to employ contractual safeguarding to protect assets at risk and minimize transaction
costs. However, to the degree that both parties view the power as balanced (i.e., both mutual-
dependence and no-interdependence), they are likely to resist complying with one-party
dominance. Partner firms in symmetric relationships may hesitate to employ hierarchical
governance, since hierarchical governance is supported by means of an authority structure,
providing one partner with ability to develop rules and impose decisions on the others. In
contrast, in asymmetric-power relationships, partner firms are more receptive to power
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imbalance. It is more likely that partner firms are less hesitant to develop hierarchical
governance to safeguard their assets at risk.
With regard to relational governance, it may be difficult to develop such a governance structure
in cases of asymmetric power. According to hypothesis 13, stronger firms may hesitate to
employ relational governance because this governance mode can hinder the use of their power.
Weaker firms may be motivated to develop this governance, but they do not have the ability to
convince their stronger partner firms to agree. In contrast, partner firms in symmetric-power
relationships are likely to employ relational governance, as it expresses the sentiment of joint
responsibility (Cannon et al., 2000). By relying onrelational exchange, both partners can avoid
the high costs of establishing and maintaining the bilateral contract (Harrigan, 1983).
Some previous research investigates the relationship among asymmetric power, symmetric
power, and relational governance. For example, Lusch and Brown (1996) find that the structure
of dependency has an impact on modes of governance. First, high mutual dependence between
a wholesaler and its supplier leads to more reliance on normative contracts (analogous to
relational governance), which in turn leads to improved wholesaler performance. Second, in a
relationship in which the wholesaler is the weaker party and its supplier is the stronger party,
the wholesaler develops a long-term orientation that leads to both explicit (analogous to
hierarchical governance) and normative contracts. Third, in a relationship in which the supplier
depends on the wholesaler, a more explicit contractis present and the wholesaler has a higher
performance level.
Therefore, it can be expected that the relationshipbetween specific investments and governance
structure is not the same as the relationship between asymmetric and symmetric power groups.
Hypothesis 14:  The degree of specific investments is more positively related to
hierarchical governance in an asymmetric-power relationship than
in a symmetric-power relationship.
Hypothesis 15:  The degree of specific investments is more positively related to
relational governance in a symmetric-power relationship than in an
asymmetric-power relationship.
3.5. Symmetric power hypotheses
The purpose of this section is to propose hypotheses regarding the effect of the symmetric-
power relationship (a type of power structure), on the TCE framework. It expands the previous
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hypotheses. Symmetric-power relationships consist of mutual-dependent and no-
interdependent relationships. A testable model of the effect of symmetric power on TCE in
buyer-supplier relationships is presented (see Figure 3.6). With multiple-group analysis, the
testable model can be represented as Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.6 A hypothesized model of the impact of power structure TCE
Figure 3.7 A hypothesized model of the impact of symmetric power on TCE
Exchange partners have mutual-dependent relationships when they depend on each other.
When both partners are highly mutual-dependent, they are faced with high exit barriers
(Geyskens et al., 1996). Mutual trust characterizes this type of relationship. In contrast, partner
firms in no-interdependent relationships have more availability of alternative partners. It does
not cost much to leave the relationship.
Under conditions in which partner firms have high asset levels at risk due to their deployment
of specific investments, TCE predicts that firms will choose a more integrated governance
mode to safeguard their investments and reduce transaction costs. However, with regard to the
two types of symmetric-power elationships, it may be unnecessary to develop a high cost of
hierarchical governance when firms are in mutual-dependent relationships. Relational
governance can be used to mitigate opportunism and reduce transaction costs.
In contrast, partner firms in no-interdependence relationships do not have power over each
another. As a result, they do not have the ability to control the opportunistic behaviour of their
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partners. It may be necessary for firms in no-interdependent relationships to develop
hierarchical governance to reduce transaction costs. With regard to relational governance, it is
unlikely that firms in no-interdependent relationships will develop relational governance,
because trust and commitment are less relevant to the functioning of the relationship (Kumar,
Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995).
Some researchers have studied the relationship between mutual dependence, no-
interdependence, and governance structure. For example, Kumar et al. (1995) find that
relationships with greater mutual dependence xhibit higher trust, stronger commitment, and
lower conflict than relationships with lower mutualdependence.
Therefore, it can be expected that the relationshipbetween specific investments and governance
structure in the TCE framework is not the same in groups of non-interdependent relationships
and mutual-dependent relationships. The hypotheses are developed as follows:
Hypothesis 16:  The degree of specific investments is more positively related to
hierarchical governance in no-interdependent relationships than in
mutual-dependent relationships.
Hypothesis 17:  The degree of specific investments is more positively related to
relational governance in mutual-dependent relationships than in no-
interdependent relationships.
3.6. Summary
Chapter 3 details all hypotheses in this study. Hypotheses 1 and 7 test the common tenet of
TCE. Hypotheses 2 and 8 test the incorporation of relational governance into the TCE
framework. Hypotheses 3 and 4 test the positive relationship between governance structure and
relationship performance. Hypotheses 5 and 6 test the effect of two types of negotiation
strategies on relationship performance. Hypotheses 9 and 11 test the negative interaction effect
of governance structure and aggressive negotiation strategy on relationship performance.
Hypotheses 10 and 12 test the positive interaction effect of governance structure and problem-
solving negotiation strategy on relationship performance. Hypothesis 13 tests the effect of
asymmetric power on the relationship between specific investments and governance structure.
Hypotheses 14 and 15 test whether the relationship between specific investments and
governance structure is different in asymmetric-power and symmetric-power relationships.
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Hypotheses 16 and 17 test whether the relationship between specific investments and
governance structure is different in mutual-dependent and no-interdependent relationships.
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4. Research design and methods
This chapter presents the research design, validity concerns, empirical setting, sample frame
and sample procedures, measurement of the variables, and data collection.
4.1. Research design
As this study is an empirical study designed to conduct theory testing of a causal model, several
research designs could be used (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). The four broad
categories of quantitative research design are classical experiment, quasi-experiment, non-
experimental field study, and correlation design. Each type has limitations.
The classical experiment is generally preferred over the rest. This design allows researchers to
fully control all variables in the research model and situation, use standardized procedures,
manipulate the treatment while controlling the stimuli imposed on the respondents, and
compare groups that have received different stimuli. Through experimental research design,
the researcher can minimize the possibility of spurious effects on the dependent variable as
well as establish that the independent variable precedes the dependent variable in time,
allowing the strongest est of the theory (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981). The design ensures
that internal validity is strong and causal relationship can be established. Moreover, by relying
on laboratory settings, rather than field research, researchers can conduct multiple
operationalizations of variables at lower cost (Calder et al., 1981). However, with regard to the
model of this dissertation, the experimental research design is limited by three factors. First,
because there are many independent variables in the models, the researcher must establish
many experimental groups, which is complicated and costly. Second, external validity tends to
be weak because the classical experiment does not allow the researcher to replicate real-life
situations in the laboratory. Finally, as the unit of analysis of this study is the relationship
between two firms, it is impossible to reproduce complex relationship phenomena for the
treatment manipulation in the laboratory. Therefore, the classical experiment is not a suitable
research design for this dissertation.
In a  quasi-experiment,  the classical experiment is “brought out” to natural settings, while still
maintaining the core characteristics of the classical experiment (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
In this research design, not all variables can be controlled. If the critical variable can be
controlled to a non-slight degree, we can assume that ex ante manipulation and ex post
comparison are the same as in the classical experiment. Hypothetically, this form of research
acquires a high score on internal and construct validities, while making the setting more natural.
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However, this form is not suitable for this study because using this design would imply that the
degree of specific investments, inter-firm power, and negotiation strategies would be
manipulated in a subset of the groups, with the effect on the governance mode studied ex post.
This procedure would be difficult to implement in practice because there would be many
experimental groups. The time perspective would be an additional obstacle. Therefore, the
quasi-experiment is not suitable for this study.
The non-experimental field design  or longitudinal design (for example, panel and time series
designs) demonstrates direction of influence. Researchers hould collect observations from at
least two periods to demonstrate statistically thatthe alleged cause precedes effect. Although
this research design could be a suitable option, for this study, the practical limitations of time
and the high cost of data collection make it unsuitable.
The primary strengths of the  correlation design  or  cross-sectional design  are internal and
construct validities (Cook & Campbell, 1979); this design can also deliver sufficiently high
statistical validity, and external validity to a lesser degree. Since this study includes hypotheses
that can be tested only when internal and constructvalidities are high (Mitchell, 1985), cross-
sectional design may be a suitable choice. When there are high internal and construct validities,
the process of further statistical analysis will also be smooth. A sufficiently high degree of
statistical conclusion validity is very important to this study, because it is correlation research
requiring a valid statistical conclusion. Cook and Campbell (1979) identify typical threats to
statistical conclusion validity that need to be addressed, including low reliability of the
measures, low statistical power, violated assumptions, and random irrelevancies in the
empirical setting.
As this study uses a casual model, there are three challenges, identified by Bollen (1989), to be
faced by researchers using a correlation design: directionality, isolation, and association. First,
with regard to  directionality, it is impossible for correlation design to prove directionality if
the study is conducted at one point in time. However, it can be a starting point for further
longitudinal studies. Second, the  isolation  challenge requires researchers to find any third
variables that threaten valid inference making, since the existence of third variables may
degrade the internal validity of the study. Mitchell (1985) suggests that researchers find third
variables through systematic thinking and literature reviews; the sample should be
homogeneous and a control variable should be included in the model. Third, with regard to
association, there are two conditions to meet: (a) having variance in the independent construct
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to acquire the desired co-variation between the constructs and (b) having a long enough time
elapse between cause and effect to ensure that the effect has materialized..
In summary, although experimental research design is generally preferred over other research
designs due to its full control of variables and manipulations, it is not suitable for this
dissertation due mainly to the impossibility of reproducing the complex inter-firm relationship
phenomena. With regard to quasi-experimental research, despite the assumption that ex ante
manipulation and ex post comparison are part of the experimental design, the quasi-
experimental design is not suitable for this dissertation because there are many independent
variables and moderation variables in this study, leading to many experimental groups.
Although longitudinal design can help researchers how that cause leads to effect, it takes too
much time and is too expensive. The conclusion is that cross-sectional design is the most
suitable for this dissertation because it delivers a high degree of the internal and construct
validity required to test the hypotheses.
4.2. Validity concerns
Cook and Campbell (1979) suggest four forms of validity that must be considered when
conducting research: internal, external, statistical conclusion, and construct. Internal validity
occurs when two variables co-vary. Changes in the independent variable must influence the
changes in the dependent variable, a condition under which the effect of other factors must be
ruled out, and directionality must be established. External validity refers to the generalizability
of the study results, i.e., whether they are applicable to other contexts. Statistical conclusion
validaty  is defined as “inferences about whether it is reasonable to presume co-variation given
a specified alpha level and the obtained variances” (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 41), i.e.,
whether co-variation between two variables can be assumed. Construct validity  is defined as
“… the degree to which a measure assesses the construct it is purported to assess” (Peter, 1981,
p. 134), or the degree of correspondence between a theoretical construct and an operational
measure (Mitchell, 1985). A valid measure assesses the magnitude and direction of the
construct, as well as contamination. It is concerned with the confounding problem, i.e., whether
the measures of constructs can be otherwise construed.
Construct validity can be further divided into trait validity and nomological validity; both must
be addressed when conducting correlation research. Campbell and Fiske (1959) identify the
primary concerns of trait validity, including  consistency of measure  (i.e., absence of
measurement errors), convergent validity (i.e., the measure should not vary with the construct),
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and discriminant validity (i.e., the measure should not vary with other constructs). Nomological
validity is concerned with the examination of the relationship among theoretical constructs,
and the empirical relationships between measures ofthose constructs (Peter, 1981).
Ideally, researchers hould select a research design that provides a high degree of validity for
all kinds of validity. However, reaching that ideal is impossible due to the nature of empirical
research. According to McGrath (1982), “the research process can be viewed as a series of
interlocking choices, in which we try simultaneously to maximize several conflicting
desiderata” (p. 69). Typically, when a study scores high on one form of validity, it scores low
on another. For example, empirical research conducted using a classical experimental design
may achieve high internal validity but its external validity is likely to be low (Cook &
Campbell, 1979; McGrath, 1982).
4.3. Empirical setting
Calder et al. (1981) identify two types of application in research: (a)  effect application, which
focuses on knowledge about some particular real-world context and (b)  theory application,
which focuses on general and scientific knowledge about the real world. The latter type of
application employs falsification procedures to test the particular theory or model in a certain
context. Since this study is theory-testing research, it is classified as a theory application.
In theory testing of a causal model, internal and statistical conclusion validities are more
important than external validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because external validity can be
established by conducting several similar studies in different contexts. As a result, the chosen
empirical setting must provide a sufficient variation over the main variables in the model, and
no variation in other variable, and the sample should be homogenous (Calder et al., 1981).
However, it is difficult to find such a setting, because variable variation is usually the result of
a heterogenic sample (which comes with the variation over extraneous variables). On one hand,
it will be hard to rule out alternative explanations and establish any statistically significant
effects of the focal independent variables in the model. On the other hand, if the sample is
homogenous, variation over critical variable is usually not provided. Therefore, researchers
must balance this tradeoff.
To acquire high scores on internal and statistical conclusion validities, the use of a single
industry seems to be appropriate because it ensures that the samples are homogeneous (Cook
& Campbell, 1979). It can be presumed that confounding factors associated with a specific
industry will be excluded or reduced. External validity is sacrificed to acquire internal validity,
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and if the theory is not falsified in that industry, further research in other industries should be
conducted to prove the external validity.
Although this study uses a single industry (thereby reducing the external validity), there will
be differences between samples due to different segments of the industry; the study will include
a broad selection of transactions, oil companies, and their suppliers. Some suppliers are
specialist firms, while some supply commodity products. Ideally, one segment would be
sufficient to minimize noise. However, all segments will be included to ensure an optimal
sample size. Since this study uses only one industry, it will control for (more or less) the need
for a homogenous context.
The requirements of the empirical context will be fulfilled when all variables in the research
model materialize in the empirical context to different degrees. For the study, an industry must
be found that demonstrates, to varying degrees, the following phenomena: (a) specific
investments, (b) power-structured relationships, (c) hierarchical governance, (d) relational
governance, (e) negotiation strategy, and (f) relationship performance.
The oil and gas industry (O & G industry) appears to fulfil these requirements. As a buyer, an
oil firm pays a straight fee for service or buys supplies and equipment from supplier firms or
contractors, in a buyer-supplier dyadic relationship. These purchases have evolved from
market-based exchanges to more integrated relationships and have involved the sharing of risk
and reward (Ernst & Steinhubl, 1997).
With regard to the first requirement of specific investments, partner firms in the O & G industry
deploy specific investments. For example, they make specific investments to ensure that
working targets are met, while preserving the safety of people involved and minimizing the
probability of damage to the environment (Green, 2003). Therefore, the first requirement of
specific investments exists and materializes in this industry to varying degrees.
With regard to the second requirement of power structure, particularly asymmetric power, the
power asymmetry phenomenon exists in the O & G industry between oil firms and their
suppliers, and exhibits in two directions. The first direction is that an oil firm is the firm with
relatively high power and its supplying firm is the weaker partner. The degree of asymmetric
power is likely to be high because there are small numbers of oil firms serving as operator
firms, but a large number of industrial vending firms providing products and services for the
construction and maintenance of offshore fields (Reve & Johansen, 1982). These vending firms
are direct competitors in the open market (Green, 2003). The small numbers of oil firms
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increase the scarcity of rewards that oil firms provide to supplying firms, thus increasing the
degree of power asymmetry. The second direction is that a supplying firm possesses power
over an oil firm. The O & G industry includes types of suppliers known as specialist firms
(usually small firms), that have specialized “know-how” and technology that oil firms (usually
large firms) would like to acquire (Ernst & Steinhubl, 1997). Under the harsh and potentially
hazardous conditions of the industry, operator firms rely heavily on specialist contractors to
support their operations (Green, 2003). Such technological expertise may create technical
dependency (Reve & Johansen, 1982).
The third and fourth requirements concern the mode of governance. Extant studies of mode of
governance in the O & G industry show that exchanges are governed by various types of
structures. For example, Ernst & Steinhubl (1997) identify governance modes that vary from
hybrids to hierarchies. Green (2003), Green and Keogh (2000), and Sunde (2007) emphasize
the existence, benefits, and development of trust in this industry. Olsen, Haugland, Karlsen,
and Husøy (2005) investigate applicability and limits of TCE and RCT.
The fifth requirement involves the negotiation styles used between exchange partners.
Negotiation exists between buyers and sellers because communication is possible in a context
in which each party is interested in conducting an exchange to achieve their goals. However,
each party has competing interests that require the buyer and seller to negotiate to obtain the
best possible outcomes for their firms (Clopton, 1984; Dwyer & Walker, 1981). Firms in the
same industry manage their conflicts in different ways (Gelfand et al. 2008; Pinkley &
Northcraft, 1994; Pruitt, 1983; Putnam & Wilson, 1982; Thomas, 1976). Therefore, firms in
the O & G industry constitute the appropriate empirical setting.
Relationship performance is the dependent variable and the final requirement for the research
context. Firms in the same industry generally have different degrees of performance. Therefore,
the O & G industry is an appropriate empirical setting for this study.
4.4. Sample frame and sample procedures
The literature is not consistent on the issue of sample size. Many factors can determine sample
size but the subject can be viewed from two perspectives. The first perspective considers the
experience of extant studies. There are many empirical studies on closely related topics, with
sample sizes ranging from a hundred to more than a thousand observations.
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The second approach is to consider the number of independent variables to be estimated. If a
moderating effect will also be considered, the required sample size will increase. The more
independent he variable, the larger the sample size required (Bollen, 1989; Hair, Anderson,
Tatham et al., 1998). At least 100 informants are needed when conducting theory testing
(Bollen, 1989). Low numbers of informants (low n) and low alpha level may increase the
possibility of making an incorrect no-different conclusion (Type I-error), thereby rejecting a
true model.
Bentler and Chou (1987) suggest a rule-of-thumb with regard to sample size. They indicate a
ratio between sample size and the number of free parameters as 5:1. However, relative to the
structural equation modeling (SEM) used in this study, Hair et al (1998) suggest four factors
to take into account: (a) model misspecification, (b) model size, (c) departure from normality,
and (d) estimation procedure. Specification error occurs when relevant variables in the model
are omitted. Sample size should be increased when the researcher suspects this error. The ratio
of 5:1 is recommended, however, a ratio of 10:1 is considered most appropriate; and if the
researcher suspects the data violates the assumptions of multivariate normality, the ratio is
increased to 15:1.
The conclusion is that the literature on sample size is highly divergent. Many factors can
determine sample size. Sample size for this study can be estimated from previous study in the
field or based on consideration of the number of variables to be estimated. A ratio range of 5:1
to 15:1 between observation and variables is advised, depending on whether the researcher
suspects specification errors. In this study, the number of free parameters to be estimated is
approximately 30. The actual number varies from one model to another. Since the literature
does not give an exact ratio, the ratio of 5-15 observations to one variable should be maintained.
Therefore, the sample size should be in the range of 150 (i.e., 5 × 30) to 450 (i.e., 15 ×30)
observations. As previously mentioned, it is difficult to determine the exact number of
population of dyadic relationships between buyers and sellers in the O & G industry. The
sample frame is estimated by sample size divided by expected response rate, a figure that can
be acquired from the literature in the industry. Sunde (2007) suggests that a response rate of
approximately 40% can be expected. Therefore, the sample frame should fall between 375 and
1,125 informants.
The Norwegian O & G industry consists of several hundred companies. The exact number of
the population of the exchanges or relationships between buying and supplying companies was
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difficult to obtain. Authors of two empirical studies shared their contact lists of supplier
companies that sold a large share of their products and services to other companies in O & G
industry; Sunde (2007) provided a list of 433 companies and Vatne (2007) provided a list of
515 companies. The lists were combined and updated with Brønnøysundregistrene, producing
a final list of 444 companies. An additional 158 relevant companies were identified from an
Internet search of the following websites: www.offshore.no, www.oilinfo.no, www.oilport.net,
www.intsok.no, www.odin.dep.no, www.og21.no, www.nfp.no, www.olf.no,
www.petromagasinet.no, www.petrad.no, www. Navitasnetwork.no, www.nortrade.no, and
www.norskindustri.no\olje_og_gsss\, www.subsea.org. In total, the initial study sample
included 602 companies.
4.5. Measurement
This section describes the various stages of the measurement process and presents all constructs
included in the theoretical model.
4.5.1. The measurement process
With regard to the measurement process, Bollen’s (1989) procedure is highly acknowledged
and frequently cited. Bollen (1989) suggests that this process begins with the concept, which
is an idea that unites phenomena under a single term. The measurement process links the
theoretically developed concepts to one or more latent variables, and these latent variables are
further linked to observable variables. Four steps are suggested: (a) give the meaning of the
concept; (b) identify the dimensions and latent variables to represent it; (c) form measures; and
(d) specify the relation between the measures and the latent variables.
The first two steps of this process were completed in Chapter 2. In the first step, all of the
theoretical constructs were defined and explained by the extant literature. In the second step,
the latent variables and their indicators (representing the constructs) were also explained.
Because a theoretical construct may consist of one or more dimensions, there must be one latent
variable for each dimension of the construct. In this research study, there are five main
constructs in the full theoretical model, as depicted in Figure 3.1. Three constructs have more
than one dimension: hierarchical governance, relational governance, and relationship
performance. All other constructs have only one dimension.
The third step is to form measures to represent he latent variables in the theoretical model.
This dissertation applied well-established theoretical constructs and established measures that
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have been validated by previous research. This eased the measures-forming process.
Conversely, when identical constructs are operationalized ifferently across empirical studies,
it is difficult to accumulate knowledge (Churchill, 1979).
An intensive literature review in the field of inter-organizational relationships was conducted
to identify potentially relevant empirical measures. Multiple measures were taken to ensure
that constructs are not underrepresented and the ability to test validity requirements was
provided. In inter-organizational literature, theory is well developed. Established and validated
measures have been developed. This study uses the same unit of analysis as used in the inter-
organizational iterature, which is the relationship between buyer and seller. This implies that
if the measures need to be re-formed to fit within the empirical setting, only a low degree of
adjustment will be required. Therefore, the validity of the measurements should be convincing.
However, face validity was established to increase the degree of validity. Face validity is a
subjective evaluation of the measure validity by researchers (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias,
1996). Before collecting the data though the e-questionnaire, face validity was established
through consultation with both industry and academic experts, including sales managers in
supplier firms, purchasing managers in oil firms, and academics engaged in procurement,
logistics, and production planning.
All constructs in the model have been operationalized and measured a number of times in the
inter-organizational literature. This applies to both first and second sub-models. Therefore, it
was straightforward to use their measures in this study.
The fourth step of the measurement process is to specify the relationships between the measures
and the latent variables. This was achieved after data was acquired and analyzed. Reflective
scales were used instead of formative scales because measures were assumed to share a
common factor. As constructs increase its value, the value of items should be reflected and
increased. In addition, all constructs were measured by the use of perceptual data.
4.5.2. The measures
Construct, as Peter (1979) states, is defined as too complex to be measured effectively with a
single measure. It is necessary to use multiple indicators to achieve construct reliability and
validity. Bollen (1989) argues that at least two indicators should be incorporated per latent
variable within a confirmatory factor analysis. However, Jaccard and Wan (1996) indicate that
research with two indicators has the potential for analytic complications resulting from
empirical under-identification. As mentioned previously, theory is well developed in the inter-
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organizational iterature. Measures in this study have been developed from existing, validated
measures, with the exception of the measure of contract design capability (which is one of the
control variables).
4.5.2.1. Dependent variables
Mode of governance is the single dependent variable in the first sub-model (see Figure. 3.1).
Variables for mode of governance are hierarchical and relational governances. However, these
two variables are independent variables in the second sub-model. The only dependent variable
of the second sub-model is relationship performance.
Hierarchical governance
Hierarchical governance is defined as the degree towhich one exchange partner has the ability
to develop rules (e.g. dispute resolution mechanisms), give instructions (i.e., formalization),
and, in effect, impose decisions on others, and to the degree to which the exchange partners
follow the agreed-on rules and procedures during the execution of the exchange (Geyskens et
al., 2006; Haugland & Reve, 2004; Stinchcombe, 1985). This study conceptualizes hierarchical
governance as higher-order concept centralization of formalization and centralization. These
two elements are useful in reducing uncertainty because they provide insight into the internal
structure used to govern the exchange.. A scale is developed based on the inter-organizational
literature, and adjusted to the appropriate object of analysis and context. There seems to be
agreement in the literature about operationalization of the formalization, though it is
inconsistent regarding centralization. Indicators of formalization are developed based on
Haugland and Reve (2004) and Sunde (2007). Items reflecting centralization are developed
based on Heide and John (1992), using a nine-item, seven-point scale, anchored from “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree”. Note that hierarchical governance is also an independent variable
for the model in the second phase.
•  Formalization
1. Either our company or this customer has developed rules and procedures for most issues
in the exchange.
2. How to handle the day-to-day management of the exchange is written in a formal
contract document.
3. Both our company and this customer intend to follow jointly agreed-on rules and
procedures in the daily management of the exchange.
4. It is important to our company to behave correctly according to the contract.
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5. In dealing with this customer, our contract precisely states how disagreements hould
be solved.
•  Centralization
1. The processes in the exchange are entirely decided by one party, either our company or
this customer.
2. On-going changes in the exchange are entirely decided by one party, either our
company or this customer.
3. Subcontractors/contractors are chosen by one party, either our company or this
customer.
4. The quality control procedures in the exchange are entirely decided by one party, either
our company or this customer.
Relational governance
Relational governance is a governance mode in which the parties to a transaction jointly
develop policies directed toward the achievement of certain goals. It refers to norms of
obligation and cooperation for coordinating exchange process (Geysken et al., 2006; Haugland
& Reve, 2004). Relational norms are expectations about attitudes and behaviours that are at
least partly shared by a group of decision makers (Gibbs, 1981).
According to Cannon et al. (2000), Heide and John (1992), and Poppo and Zenger (2002), there
are four norms of particular importance in cooperative relationships: flexibility, solidarity,
information exchange, and restraint in the use of power. Note that relational governance is also
an independent variable for the model in the secondsub-model.
•  Flexibility
Reliance-on-flexibility parties are willing to makeadaptations as circumstances change (Heide
& John, 1992). This norm represents asafeguard to both parties if the exchange is plagued with
a high degree of uncertainty. Both parties know that the exchange will be subject to good-faith
modifications and have an attitude that the agreement could be modified as the relationship
evolves and develops.
Based on empirical studies (Antia & Frazier, 2001; Dwyer & Oh, 1988; Heide & John, 1992;
Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Lusch & Brown, 1996; Rokkan etal., 2003) the items are adjusted to fit
the context (three items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”):
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Both our company and this customer…
1. are flexible in their response to last-minute requests made by the other party.
2. are open to each other’s request o modify a prior agreement.
3. would rather work out a new deal than hold each other to the original terms, when some
unexpected situation arises.
•  Solidarity
Reliance-on-solidarity parties have the attitude that success comes from working cooperatively
together, not competing against one another. Parties stand by one another in the face of
adversity and the “ups and downs” of marketplace competition (Cannon et al., 2000).
“Solidarity promotes a bilateral approach to problem solving, creating a commitment to joint
action through mutual adjustment” (Poppo & Zenger, 2002, p. 710). A high degree of solidarity
represents a safeguard to both parties because it deters both parties from using decision control
in an opportunistic way.
Based on empirical studies (Antia & Frazier, 2001; Bello, Chelariu, & Zhang, 2003; Dant &
Schul, 1992; Dwyer & Oh, 1988; Heide & John, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Lusch & Brown,
1996; Rokkan et al., 2003) the items are adjusted to fit the context (four items, seven-point
scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”):
Important problems that arise in the course of this exchange are treated by my firm and the
partner firm as joint, rather than individual responsibilities.
Both our company and this customer…
1. are committed to improvements that may benefit theexchange as a whole and not only
the individual parties.
2. do not mind owing each other favours.
3. solve problems as joint rather than individual responsibilities.
4. have a relationship that is better described as a cooperative effort rather than an “arms-
length negotiation.”
•  Information exchange
Information exchange, as described by Heide and John (1992), “defines a bilateral expectation
that the parties will proactively provide information useful to the partner” (p. 35). A high degree
of information exchange functions as a safeguard when decision control is transferred in the
project.
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There seems to be consistency among researchers on how to operationalize this construct. A
measure was developed based on the inter-organizational literature, and adjusted to the research
context (Dwyer & Oh, 1988; Heide & John, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 2000; Lusch & Brown,
1996). The items include (five items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”):
1. In this exchange, it is expected that any information that might help another party will
be provided to them.
2. Information is informally exchanged in this exchange.
3. Both our company and this customer are expected to keep each other informed about
events or changes that may affect the project.
4. Exchange of information in this exchange takes place frequently.
5. Both our company and this customer are expected to provide proprietary information if
it can help another party or the exchange.
•  Restraint in the use of power
Restraint in the use of power refers to a bilateralexpectation and attitude that power asymmetry
and dependency should not be exploited opportunistically. It reflects the view that the use of
power exacerbates conflict over time and undermines mutuality and solidarity, leading to
opportunism (Cannon et al., 2000).
Based on Cannon et al. (2000) and Kaufmann and Dant (1992), items include (three items,
seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”):
1. Our company or this customer will not take advantage of a stronger bargaining position.
2. It is expected that even the more powerful party should restrain the use of its power in
attempting to get its own way.
3. It is expected that each party should limit the use of power they have over the other
party.
Relationship performance
Relationship performance is conceptualized with three dimensions: cost reduction outcomes,
end-product enhancement outcomes, and satisfaction with collaboration.
•  Cost reduction outcomes
Based on the empirical study of Ghosh and John (2005), this study originally defined cost
reduction outcomes as joint net gains at the relationship level. However, in this study, this
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variable is associated only with the supplier’s cost reduction outcomes. Therefore, cost
reduction outcomes refer to the supplier’s net gains from lower production and administrative
costs of a sold item that result from using customized production techniques and processes,
cheaper materials, simplified designs, and other cost-saving measures. This dimension of
relationship performance enables exploration of what factors contribute to realizing a cost
reduction strategy. The following items are based on Sunde (2007) (five items, seven-point
scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “stronglyagree”):
Due to this exchange …
1. our company can reduce costs.
2. our company’s business processes and procedures become more efficient.
3. coordination of activities with this customer has become more efficient than with
other customers.
4. our company has been able to realize cost reductions through implementation of
efficient practices.
5. our company is better able to respond to fluctuations in the market.
•  End-product enhancement outcomes
Based on the empirical study of Ghosh and John (2005), this study identifies end-product
enhancement outcomes as the joint net gains from increased customer utility delivered by the
end product. However, in this study this variable concerns only the supplier’s end-production
enhancement outcomes. Therefore, end-product enhancement outcomes refer to the supplier’s
net gains from increased customer utility delivered by the end product. This dimension of
relationship performance enables exploration of which factors contribute to the realization of
differentiation strategy. The following items are based on Sunde (2007) (five items, seven-
point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”):
Due to this exchange …
1. our sales have been boosted.
2. the consumer’s perception of our end-products/services has become better.
3. the image of our products/services in the consumer’s eyes has been significantly
strengthened.
4. our products/services are positively different fromour competitors.
5. our company is better able to capture design and engineering synergies between this
customer’s end products and our products/services.
•  Satisfaction with the collaboration
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Satisfaction with the collaboration refers to a positive affective state created by the evaluation
of all aspects of a relationship (Jap, 2001). This variable is one of the frequently used outcome
variables (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999). Thefollowing items are based on empirical
study (Jap, 2001) (three items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”):
The collaboration with this customer…
1. has been a successful one.
2. more than fulfilled my company’s expectations.
3. has made our company satisfied with the outcomes.
4.5.2.2. Independent variables
Independent variables in the first sub-model are specific investments and power asymmetry.
Independent variables in the second sub-model are governance modes and negotiation
strategies.
Specific investments
Specific investments or asset specificity is defined as the degree to which the assets that support
a given transaction, or modify processes, product technologies or procedures, are tailored to it
and cannot be redeployed easily outside a particular exchange relationship (Cannon et al., 2000;
Geyskens et al., 2006). Examples of specific investments are site specificity, physical
specificity, human asset specificity, brand name capital, dedicated assets, and temporal
specificity (Reve & Levitt, 1984; Williamson, 1985, 1991). Since switching costs arise if a firm
is changes partners, these investments create dependency on a specific partner.
There seems to be consistency in the literature regarding the definition and the
operationalization of this construct. The following items are based on empirical studies (Buvik
& John, 2000; Cannon et al., 2000; Haugland & Reve, 1994; Heide & John, 1990; Heide &
Stump, 1995; Joshi & Campbell, 2003; Rokkan et al., 2003) (eight items, seven-point scale,
anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”):
•  Supplying firm’s specific investments
With regard to investments that our company dedicates for this particular exchange, our
company…
1. spent significant resources in reorganizing/adjusting our own organization.
66
2. spent resources on training and developing our employees.
3. has made significant investments in tools and equipment.
4. has carried out considerable product adjustments to meet the requirements from this
customer.
5. has made several adjustments to adapt to this customer’s technological norms and
standards.
6. has acquired competence, which has a limited value for us if the exchange is terminated
or our company stops doing business with this customer.
7. has used considerable time and resources to build the relationship with this customer.
8. will have a great loss if this exchange terminates.
•  Buying firm’s specific investments
With regard to investments that this customer dedicates for this particular exchange, in your
perception this customer…
1. spent significant resources in reorganizing/adjusting their organization.
2. spent resources on training and developing their employees.
3. has made significant investments in tools and equipment.
4. has carried out considerable product/service adjustments to meet the requirements from
us.
5. has made several adjustments to adapt to our technological norms and standards.
6. has acquired competence, which has a limited value for them if the exchange is
terminated or they stop doing business with us.
7. has used considerable time and resources to build the relationship with us.
8. will have a great loss if this exchange terminates.
Power structure
Power structure describes what type of relationshipa firm has with its partner. It is divided into
two types: asymmetry and symmetry. These two types represent opposite ends. A low degree
of power asymmetry is a high degree of power symmetry, and vice versa. Both types of power
can be measured. Many research studies have operationalized power asymmetry. Therefore,
reviewing the measure of asymmetric power is the starting point.
Power asymmetry has been defined as the difference between a firm’s power and its partner’s
power in a dyad (Gundlach & Cadotte, 1994; Kumar etal., 1995). Power is the ability of a firm
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to control or influence the decision variables of its partner (Anderson & Narus, 1990; El-Ansary
& Stern, 1972; Etgar, 1977; Hunt & Nevin, 1974). Ingeneral, the measure of asymmetric power
can be constructed in two ways: direct and indict operationalization.
First, direct operationalization distinguishes the respondents in groups between symmetric and
asymmetric-power elationships. The measure can reflect power either by (a) the influence of
one firm on another (e.g. Brown, Lusch, & Nicholson; 1995) or (b) the dependence between
the partners (e.g. Jambulingam, Kathuria, & Nevin; 2011)
Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) directly classify the respondents into three groups
according to decision variable scores. The groups with the highest and lowest scores are said
to belong to an asymmetric-power relationship. According to this approach, we can distinguish
between symmetric and asymmetric-power elationships, but we cannot identify what type of
firm comprises certain relationships. For example, a symmetric-power elationship can result
from mutual high power (i.e., both partners have a high degree of power over each other) or
mutual low power (i.e., both partners have a low degree of power over each other).
The categorical scale, or dummy variable, developed by Jambulingam, Kathuria, and Nevin
(2011), based on Emerson’s (1962) power dependence theory, can both distinguish respondents
between symmetric and asymmetric relationships and identify the type of symmetric power
between mutually-dependent relationships or no-interdependent relationships. Many studies
(e.g., El-Ansary & Stern, 1972; Frazier & Summers, 1986; Spekman, 1979) operationalize the
measurement of power on the concept of power dependence. That is, the power of  A over  B  is
equal to, and based on, the dependence of  B  on  A.
Second, the asymmetric power construct can be operationalized by calculating the absolute
value of the difference between a firm’s power and its partner’s power (Bucklin & Sengupta,
1993; Kumar et al., 1995). The amount of power of both firms is measured and the difference
of these two values is calculated. The power-composition of the relationship can be identified
using this approach.
This study adopts the first approach to acquire richer data and be methodologically compatible
with, and adjusted to, the empirical setting of this research. The approach is to measure the
power structure directly. The following items are based on Jambulingam et al. (2011) (with the
measure using dependence to reflect power [Emerson, 1962]):
•  Power structure
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Please check the one statement below that best describes your relationship with this customer.
1. Our company is more dependent on this customer.
2. This customer is more dependent on our company.
3. Our firm and this customer are equally dependent oneach other.
4. Our firm is not dependent on this customer, and this customer is not dependent on our
firm.
Aggressive negotiation strategy
Aggressive negotiation strategy refers to the interaction pattern used by exchange partners to
develop conflict solutions through the implicit or explicit use of threats, persuasive arguments,
and punishments (Ganesan, 1993). The following items are based on Ganesan (1993) (eight
items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”)
When our company and this customer interact with each other, both parties...
1. press to get their points made.
2. make efforts to get their way.
3. are committed to their initial position during the negotiation.
4. try to win their position.
5. threaten to break off negotiations with each other.
6. indicate that we wanted to deal with other alternative partner.
7. make implicit threats to each other.
8. express displeasure with each other’s behaviour.
Problem-solving negotiation strategy
Problem-solving negotiation strategy refers to the interaction pattern used by exchange partners
to develop conflict solutions that integrate the requirements of both parties (Walton &
McKersie, 1965). The following items are based on Ganesan (1993) (six items, seven-point
scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “stronglyagree”):
When our company and this customer interact with each other, both parties...
1. lean toward a direct discussion of the problem witheach other.
2. try to show each other the logic and benefits of their position.
3. communicate their priorities clearly to each other.
4. attempt to get all their concerns and issues in theopen.
5. tell each other their ideas and ask the other for their ideas.
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6. share the problem with each other so that they can work it out.
4.5.2.3. Control variables
It is necessary to account for the potentially spurious effects of potential extraneous variables,
so these effects can be ruled out statistically. Data on variables that seem correlated with the
dependent variables must be collected. Variables from other perspectives that offer competing
explanations to varying degrees of governance mode and firm performance must be considered.
Once explanations from such perspectives are ruled out statistically, the confidence in the
theoretical model will increase (Jøreskog & Sørbom, 1993; Meehl, 1990).
Environmental uncertainty
Although uncertainty is a transaction dimension, itreceives ample support in the organizational
and institutional economics literature as a key environmental dimension that influences mode
of governance (Achrol, Reve, & Stern, 1983).
As specific investments increase to a non-slight degree, the continuity of relationship is
relevant. High degrees of environmental uncertaintycreate problems of adaptation, as partner
firms find it hard to specify contractual agreements ex ante. Exchange partners will have to
make sequential adaptations (Williamson, 1985). Moreover, change in environment offers
opportunities for agents to shirk and to renegotiate to their advantage (Anderson & Gatignon,
1986).
When experiencing environmental change, the firm is likely to increase the degree of control
by increasing the complexity of contract to cover all possible contingencies, i.e., the problem
of adaptation problem can be addressed through hierarchical governance. However, several
researchers (e.g. Afuah, 2001; Balakrishnan & Wernerfelf, 1986; Folta, 1998; Kogut, 1991)
argue that high degrees of environmental uncertainty should also encourage firms to maintain
flexibility by lowering the degree of specific investments; this position argues against
hierarchical governance (Geyskens et al., 2006). As a result, environmental uncertainty must
be included as a control variable.
Environmental uncertainty refers to the degree to which the relevant contingencies urrounding
an exchange cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted (Geyskens et al., 2006; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) suggest that among transaction dimensions,
environmental uncertainty seems to be the most problematic construct. Two decisions must be
made when operationalizing this construct. First, it must be decided whether this construct is
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treated as an objective or perceptual measure. In this study, the decision is to treat
environmental uncertainty as a perceptual measure, because decision makers make their
decisions based on their perceptions, not on objective numbers (Heide & John, 1995). Degree
of environmental uncertainty is in the eye of the beholder (Wathne, 2001).
Other issues are the source for the study and the type of uncertainty (Wathne, 2001). In this
study, the sources for the study of the environmental uncertainty construct will be the buyer
market. Therefore, the type of uncertainty to be studied is buyer-market unpredictability.
The following items are based on empirical studies (Anderson, 1985; Buvik & Grønhaug, 2000;
Celly & Frazier, 1996; Haugland & Reve, 1994; Heide & John, 1990; John & Weitz, 1988,
1989; Wathne, 2001) (three items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree”):
1. Market demand is hard to predict’
2. The sales for this market are hard to predict’
3. The competition in this market is hard to predict’
Opportunism
Opportunism refers to “taking advantage of opportunities with little regard for principles or
consequences” (Macneil, 1981) or self-seeking behaviours with guile (Williamson, 1975).
Opportunism is likely to degrade the cooperative climate of the relationship, and be negatively
related to relational governance. The followed items are based on empirical studies (Rokkan et
al., 2003; Wathne & Heide, 2000) (six items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree”):
1. On occasion, this customer lies about certain things to protect its interests.
2. This customer sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later.
3. This customer does not always act in accordance with contract or agreement.
4. This customer sometimes tries to breach informal agreements between our companies
to maximize its benefit.
5. This customer will try to take advantage of “holes” in the contract to further its own
interests.
6. This customer sometimes uses unexpected events to extract concessions from my
company.
Market governance
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Market governance is presumed to have an impact on exchange performance (Haugland &
Reve, 2004). In this mode of governance, the buying firm can enjoy benefits from market
competition by having many alternatives of supplying firms. Market governance is
characterized by market incentives or a pricing system that specifies all relevant information
needed to complete and evaluate the product or service delivered by the supplier firm. The
following items are based on the study by Haugland and Reve (2004) (three items, seven-point
scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “stronglyagree”):
1. This customer draws/drew our attention to competing offerings, so that we
work/worked more effectively.
2. This customer monitors/monitored the market to ensure that our offer prices are not
substantially higher than other suppliers in the market.
3. This customer will/would change to another supplierif another supplier can deliver this
product/service at cheaper price than our company can.
Importance
The complexity of an exchange is presumed to influence the mode of governance (Williamson,
1979; Cannon et al., 2000; Sunde, 2007). In particular, the economic scope of an exchange is
presumed to influence how firms organize the transaction. Partners pay more attention to the
crafting of a control structure when the exchange is more important. Therefore, the importance
of exchange may create spurious effects between independent and dependent variables.
The importance of an exchange is operationalized by measuring the size of an exchange in
terms of number of people involved and the financial value.
1. How many people are involved in an exchange?
2. How much is an exchange value?
Past experience
The past experience of exchange partners is presumed to influence mode of governance,
because past experience is likely to affect the development of relational governance (Lambe,
Spekman, & Hunt, 2000; Sunde, 2007). Therefore, past experience may be the source of
spurious effects between independent and dependent variables. The following items are based
on Sunde (2007) (two items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”):
1. Our company has many years of experience with this customer before this exchange.
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2. Our company has had a very good relationship with this customer before this exchange.
Future expectations
Expectation about future business is presumed to influence the mode of governance (Sunde,
2007). Based on the “shadow of the future” effect, a firm is likely to perform better if the
performance of the present exchange will affect future decisions and future business with its
partner. A high expectation of future business will affect the degree of cooperative norms.
Therefore, future expectation may be the source of spurious effects between independent and
dependent variables. The following items based on Sunde (2007) (two items, seven-point scale,
anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”):
1. Our company expects to have future business with this customer.
2. Our company has a binding agreement to work with this customer in the future.
Product/service characteristics
The characteristics of the product or service may have an impact on transaction costs, which
affects the mode of governance (Pilling, Crosby & Jackson, 1994). If an exchanged product or
service is a standard one, transaction costs shouldbe low. If it is highly specialized, transaction
costs should be high; and partner firms are more likely to adopt a more coordinated mode of
governance to reduce such transaction costs. Therefore, product or service characteristics may
be the source of spurious effects between independent and dependent variables. The following
items are developed (two items, seven-point scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”):
1. The product/service xchanged is a highly specialized one.
2. Our company invests a lot to facilitate this product/service xchange.
3. This customer invests a lot to facilitate this product/service xchange.
Contract design capability
According to Argyres and Mayer (2007) and Mayer and Argyres (2004), contract design
capability is presumed to have a positive impact on performance. The difference between
firms’ contract capabilities determines the difference between their contract efficiencies. The
following measures for this construct have been developed five items, seven-point scale,
anchored by “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”):
1. Contract terms are aligned with contractual risks.
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2. The contract has been developed based on previous contracts.
3. Our company and this customer have made efforts to make effective contracts.
4. Different types of employees or outsiders have helped on contract design depending on
their expertise.
5. Personnel involved in contract design have learned the trade-offs for different types of
contractual provisions.
4.6. Data collection
As there is no archival data available, there is a need to collect primary data. Structured
questionnaires and the key informant technique are determined to be suitable when the nature
of variables in the theoretical model is considered.
4.6.1. The key informant technique and the number of informants
The key informant technique has been commonly used for collecting data in inter-
organizational research. Using this technique, one or a few informants with expert knowledge
about the phenomenon of interest are identified (Seidler, 1974). These informants are capable
of describing critical factors related to the unit of analysis and are willing to communicate
about them (Campbell, 1955; Phillips, 1981). Characteristics of the phenomenon described by
informants must also exist independently of the informants (Heide & John, 1995). If informants
provide information about themselves, such information does not exist independently of the
informants. The research must acquire information from a representative sample of informants
(Wathne, 2001).
In this study, critical constructs are related to (a) mode of governance, i.e., level of hierarchical
and relational governance, (b) transaction hazard, i.e., level of specific investments, (c) firm
power, i.e., type of relationship, (d) negotiation strategy, and (e) relationship performance. All
of these phenomena re assumed to be independent ofthe informants. Researchers can choose
informants based on their knowledge instead of their representativeness in a statistical sense
(Svendsen, 2005).
Researchers can decide to (a) collect data from one or more informants from an individual
organization and (b) collect data from one or both sides of the dyad. These two decisions attract
a great deal of discussion (see, e.g., Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991; Philips, 1981). The first
decision is whether researchers hould collect datafrom one or more informants from the same
firm Philips (1981) recommends the use of multiple informants, because there is a low degree
of convergence among informants representing the same unit. However, using single-informant
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design has become the more dominant approach due toresource constraints and implacability.
Since researchers may have limited time and resources, it is not always possible to use multiple
informants. In the single-informant design, data can be registered directly as a report of the
informant. Investigation is kept at the structural level and incurs less cost (Seidler, 1974).
Further, it may be inapplicable to collect data from many informants from the same firm. Some
firms may only “establish one person as the focal point for relations with a given supplier”
(Heide & John, 1990, p. 30) or customer.
The second decision is whether researchers hould collect data from one side or both sides of
the dyad. The choice depends on the degree of potential discrepancy between the peerceptions
of each exchange partner on the variables in the model. It may be appropriate to collect data
from both sides, because researchers can validate the data from one side, compared with those
from the other side, to obtain a more accurate value. Many empirical studies adopt this
approach (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Haugland, 1988; Reve, 1980).
However, if such discrepancies are assumed to be slight, a single-side design is sufficient.
Collecting data from both sides is time consuming and requires a lot more resources (Kumar
et al., 1993). Since this study had limited time and resources, collecting data from one side of
the dyad was more appropriate. Moreover, if data is collected from both sides, the process of
analysis also requires more time because there are many observations for the same phenomenon
(Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993); the data must be analyzed for convergences, and joint
understanding should be reported. There may be interpretation ambiguity that does not occur
with single-informant data collection. By using data from one side, the results can be directly
reported, and analysis of data divergence is not required.
Another benefit of collecting data from one side ofthe dyad is that researchers can focus as
many observations as possible. Although a multiple-informant design for each relationship is
preferred due to its advantage of avoiding or reducing the risk of biased information (Phillips,
1981), collecting data from multiple informants is time consuming and would be likely to
reduce the number of observations.
Literature in the field of inter-organization relationships concludes that it is justifiable to
conduct a one-sided approach (Heide & John, 1994). Many authors of empirical studies with
the same variable in the models argue that there is correspondence between measures of
variables, such as perception of transaction characteristics (Heide & John, 1990; Dyer & Chu,
2003), structural form of the relationship (John & Reve, 1982; Reve, 1980), specific
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investments and commitment in the relationships (Anderson & Weitz, 1992), and the
perception of performance (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Therefore, there seems to be sufficient
evidence that there is correspondence between buyerand seller perceptions of the variable in
the model. On this basis, it is justifiable to sample from one side of the dyad.
In this study, data was collected from one side of the dyad. General managers in the relevant
companies were contacted and asked if they had the knowledge and willingness to be
informants. If the general managers were not ready to participate in the research, they were
asked to make introductions to their marketing, sales, product, brand managers, or dedicated
salespersons. (Since the unit of analysis in this study is the relationship, the choice of informant
is the marketing or sales or product or brand managers, or salespersons with in-depth
knowledge of the exchange.) Accordingly, the requirements of Campbell (1955), Phillips
(1981), and John (1984) were satisfied. Marketing managers have deep understanding about
the exchange, customers, and power asymmetry between their firms and their customers’ firms.
4.6.2. Data collection procedures
Data was collected in three phases. First, qualitative data was collected from specially selected
supplier firms in the O & G industry. Second, informants from the relevant companies were
identified. Third, a structured e-questionnaire wasprepared and attached to the invitation email.
The first phase consisted of becoming familiar withthe empirical setting and making contact
with the relevant companies. It also included becoming familiar with the practical use and
practical understanding of critical constructs and the hypothesized relationships between them.
In this phase, qualitative data was collected through interviews with three specially selected
marketing managers in the supplier companies. Additionally, six academic experts were
consulted regarding measurements and questionnaire.
In phase two, informants in the supplier companies were identified. The initial sampling frame
was 602 contacts. Subsequently, however, during thetelephone invitation process, it was found
that there were 43 duplications and 49 out-of-scope firms. Therefore, the updated sampling
frame was 510 contacts. The companies in the sample range in size from small to very large;
and provide a wide variety of products and services that support the O & G industry.
E-questionnaires and reminders were distributed in the third phase. It was necessary to recruit
a research assistant whose native language is Norwegian; a bachelor student was found to fill
the position. The assistant was trained to approach key informants through telephone calls.
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(The telephone call guidelines are presented in Appendix A.) In addition to having a native
speaker contact the key informants, two further incentives were included to increase
willingness to participate in the survey. First, prospective informants were promised that they
would receive the results of the research. Second, every respondent had a chance to win an
iPad.
During the telephone conversation, the research assistant asked the prospective respondents if
they were knowledgeable, had time, and were interested in joining the survey. They were
informed that in return, they might benefit from the research results, and they would have the
chance to be the winner of the iPad.
The telephone recruitment began in February 2012 and ended by November of 2012. During
two periods, the 17 May national holiday in Norway and the early-June to early-August
summer holidays, it was difficult to reach prospective respondents, thereby slowing the process
of data collection.
The research assistant made telephone calls to all 602 contacts in the initial sample. He found
that there were 43 duplications, 49 out-of-scopes, 32 wrong numbers, 29 answering machines,
11 cases of language difficulties, 43 cases of lackof time, 26 cases of no interest in the survey,
4 cases of organizational constraints, and 16 cases in which the contact could not be reached
by phone. As a result, 349 prospective respondents agreed to participate the survey. They were
sent an invitation email that included a link to the research webpage. To ensure that the
prospective respondents received the invitation email (see Appendix B), the invitation
requested that the prospective respondents reply to the email.
Many of the 349 prospective respondents answered without the need for reminder emails.
Reminder emails were sent four weeks after the original email. After a further two weeks, if
the prospective respondents till had not answered or had answered incompletely, the research
assistant made contact by telephone to persuade therespondents to answer the e-questionnaire.
Some further responses were received. By the end of November, there were 198 usable
responses and 151 incomplete responses. Incomplete responses occurred, for example, when
respondents answered some questions but did not proceed to the next questions. These
incomplete responses were not used in the data analysis. Therefore, the response rate was 38.82
per cent, calculated from 198 usable responses, divided by 510, which was the updated
sampling frame.
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The link to the research study (www.nhh.no/oil) waschosen as the result of the advice provided
by an academic expert, during the consultation in the first phase, to use a URL that would
would be easy for respondents to remember (see Appendix C). The webpage included two links
to Part 1 and Part 2 of the e-questionnaire. (Actual links to e-questionnaires were not
interpretable and hard to remember). The e-questionnaire was developed using Qualtrics.
The original questionnaire had only one part with 139 questions. However, during the
consultation in the first phase, several academics uggested that it be divided into two parts, so
that the respondents did not have to finish the questionnaire in one session (see Appendix D).
With a two-part format, respondents could complete each part in 10 to 15 minutes. Since the
questionnaire was divided, a way to link between the two replies was needed. Therefore a
question was added to obtain each respondent’s email address. This step was also necessary
for the respondents to receive the research resultsand join the draw for the iPad.
4.7. Summary
This chapter reviews types of research designs and the criteria for selecting research designs.
Based on the review, the correlation design (cross-sectional design) is chosen. Validity
concerns, including internal validity, external validity, statistical conclusion validity, and
construct validity, are described. The empirical setting that requires the existence of key
variables in relationships is also described, with the Norwegian oil and gas industry selected as
the research context. Sample frame and sample procedures are explained, and measurement
issues are addressed. The final section of the chapter addresses issues and procedures of data
collection.
78
5. Analysis and hypotheses testing
This chapter contains all data analysis of this dissertation. It is divided into four sections.
Section 5.1 presents the test for hypotheses concerning TCE core predictions and the
integration of governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies. Section 5.2 examines the
effect of asymmetric-power elationships on TCE, i.e., comparing a group of stronger firms
with a group of weaker firms. Section 5.3 is a multi-group analysis that compares the effect of
asymmetric and symmetric power on TCE. Section 5.4 is also a multi-group analysis intended
to examine whether firms with mutual-dependent relationships and firms with no-
interdependent relationships behave differently in the TCE framework.
5.1. Test of the core TCE predictions and their integration with negotiation strategies
This section tests hypotheses concerning the commontenet of TCE, and the integration effect
of TCE and negotiation strategies on relationship performance, as developed in Section 3.2.
Data used are all 198 observations collected during data collection, as described in Chapter 4.
First, in Section 5.1.1, all data were analyzed to determine whether they are multivariate normal
distributed. Next, Section 5.1.2 presents the test for the measurement model, using
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). After the measurement model was established, the
structural model was analyzed in Section 5.1.3. Section 5.1.4 summarizes the results of
hypotheses testing.
5.1.1. Requirements for multivariate analysis
A key step in multivariate data analysis is to examine the input data to determine whether the
statistical requirements and assumption of multivariate analysis are followed (Hair et al., 1998).
Most common estimators—for example, maximum likelihood (ML)—assume the data are
continuous and have a multivariate normal distribution. In this study, the majority of data are
ordinal Likert scale. However, researchers may assume that these ordinal variables derive from
continuous data and formulate the measurement model based on the underlying continuous
variable (Jøreskog, 1993). Non-normal data violates the multivariate normality assumption.
Consequently, the standard errors of ML parameter estimates would be too small. Model fit
indices are likely to be underestimated. As well as, the model 2 statistics would be too big
(e.g., Browne, 1982; Satorra, 1992).
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Two main causes of non-normal data are kurtosis andskewness. In this section, three measures
(Hair et al., 1998) are conducted to check whether the data is non-normal: (a) graphical
examination, (b) missing values analysis, and (c) non-normality assessing.
Before the data examination, two observed variables for construct of importance (IMP1 and
IMP2) were transformed by taking the natural logarithm of their values. This helped to shift
these variables closer to a normal distribution. However, it should be noted that transformation
reduces the effects of these variables as they become greater. For example, it is likely that the
difference between one and five million Norwegian crones has a greater effect than the
difference between 100 and 105 million Norwegian crones.
• Graphical examination
Histograms and frequency tables produced by using IBM SPSS 20 provide better
understanding of the data. Observed variables reflecting contract design capabilities, formal
contract, past experience, and product or service characteristics, problem-solving negotiation
strategies, end-product enhancement outcomes, and satisfaction with the collaboration seem to
be skewed towards high values on the Likert scale, while observed variables of exchange
length, opportunism, aggressive negotiation strategies, and buying firm’s specific investments
seem to be skewed toward low values.
• Missing values analysis
Since missing values may lead to bias results, it is necessary to employ a missing values
analysis (Hair et al., 1998). In general, missing data were the result of informants not answering
all the questions. In this study, the telephone interview and two parts of a web-based
questionnaire were used. There are ways to reduce the numbers of missing data.
At the beginning of the questionnaire, informants were asked to fill in their email addresses o
that the two parts of their answers could be combined. This step also made it possible to contact
informants who did not provide meaningful answers or did not complete the questionnaires.
Informants who did not complete the questionnaire were contacted again and asked to
complete. However, some informants refused due to time constraint or lack of interest. In total,
151 cases were eliminated because informants did not finish the study. The remaining 198
cases were completed. Therefore, there are no missing values in this study.
• Normality assessing
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In addition to the graphical examination, it is necessary to employ statistical tests to assess
normality. By checking the values for kurtosis, variables suffering from non-normality can be
identified. If kurtosis values of any variable exceed the limit of +/-2.58 (Hair et al., 1998), it is
indicated that the data are not from a multivariatenormal distribution. Therefore, such variables
should be excluded before conducting further analysis.
The descriptive statistics in Appendix E, produced by using IMB SPSS 20, show that 10
observed variables exhibit the evidence of kurtosis: FORM4, AGG5, AGG6, AGG7, AGG8,
PAST2, FUT1, and PCHA2. This presence of kurtotic variables is likely to be sufficient to
render the distribution as multivariate non-normal.
Violation of the assumption of normal distribution associated with the most common estimator
(such as ML) can invalidate statistical hypothesis testing. Therefore, the analysis under Section
5.1 uses robust estimators that adjust the ML estimator to account for non-normality. The term
“robust” means that the computed estimates are valid, and even the assumption of normality is
violated (Byrne, 2012).
There are several statistical modelling programs that provide data analysis tools for researchers,
including LISREL, Mplus,  EQS, and AMOS (SPSS). This study includes multi-group analysis.
Due to its advanced features, Mplus seems to be the most suitable program for the multi-group
analysis. Therefore, further analysis for measurement and structural models are conducted
using Mplus Version 7.0.
The Mplus program provides several robust estimators. However, MLM seems to be suitable
for this study. It provides robust standard errors and mean adjusted 2 statistic. Its 2 statistic is
referred to as the Satorra-Bentler2, or S-B 2. Satorra and Bentler (1988) developed a statistic
that adjusts the 2 statistic with a scaling correction. S-B 2has been marked as the most reliable
test statistic for evaluating covariance structure models with varying distributions and sample
sizes (Byrne, 2012). In addition, robust versions of the CFI, TLI, and RMSEA are also provided
when using MLM estimators (Byrne, 2012).
5.1.2. Measurement models
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggest a two-step approach to model building. First, the
researcher should estimate the fit of the measurement model. Next, the researcher can analyze
the structural model. Jøreskog (1993) emphasized the necessity of this two-step approach,
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indicating that the structural analysis may be meaningless unless the researcher has confirmed
that the measurement model holds in the sample.
This section features the measurement model analysis. CFA is performed on the dimensions of
hierarchical governance in Section 5.1.2.1, on relational governance in Section 5.1.2.2 and on
the full measurement model in Section 5.1.2.3 with the detail of assessment of fits, reliability,
and validity. Section 5.1.2.4 presents the summary of the measurement model. The structural
analysis is detailed in section 5.1.3.
Assessment of model fit
Before making the model estimations, it is necessary to know how to refer to the extent to
which the hypothesized model is consistent with the data. Byrne (1998) suggests that fit
assessment should be based on a variety of sources. This study uses five indices, as briefly
detailed in Appendix F: 2 statistic, comparative fit index (CFI, Bentler, 1990), Tucker-Lewis
index (TLI, Tucker & Lewis, 1973), non-normed fit index (NNFI, Bentler & Bonett, 1980),
root-mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger & Lind, 1980), and standardized
root mean square residual (SRMR).
5.1.2.1. The dimensionality of hierarchical governance
Since this study uses two variables to measure hierarchical governance, it is necessary to
examine the dimensionality of this construct. Thereare three possibilities: (a) one-factor model,
(b) two-factor model, and (c) second-order model with fixing loadings. All three models were
analyzed and compared. The model that best fits thedata will be chosen.
One-factor hierarchical governance measurement model
CFA of the application hypothesizes a priori that (a) the hierarchical governance can be
explained by one factor and (b) residuals associated with each item are uncorrelated.
•  Model 1: All nine items from the hierarchical governance dimensions, e.g.,
formalization (FORM1-5), and centralization (CENT1-4), were used in the priori
measurement model. All fit indices exhibited poor fit, as presented in Table G.1 in
Appendix G.
•  Model 2: By removing items with low loading, the hypothesized model of hierarchical
governance was re-specified. As a result, the model fits the data very well: MLM 2(2)
= 0.249; CFI = 1.000; TLI =1.031; RMSEA = 0.000, 90% CI = (0.000, 0.068), close-
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fit test P = 0.926; SRMR = 0.007. Therefore, Model 2 was chosen to be the final model
for one-factor hierarchical governance. A diagrammatic representation of this final
measurement model is presented in Figure G.1 in Appendix G.
Two-factor hierarchical governance measurement model
This section postulates a priori that (a) hierarchical governance is a two-factor structure
composed of formalization (FORM) and centralization (CENT); (b) each item-pair measure
has a nonzero loading on factor that it was designed to measure and zero loading on all other
factors; (c) the two hierarchical governance factors, consistent with the theory, are correlated;
and (d) residual errors associated with each measure are uncorrelated.
•  Model 1: The a priori CFA model exhibited moderate fit (see Table 5.1).
•  Model 2: The model was re-specified by removing items with the low loading. The
model results showed perfect fit. Therefore, the model is chosen to be the final model
•  Model 3:  The model was re-specified by fixing the loadings to the un-standardized
estimates acquired in model 2. This produces a model that can be compared with
second-order hierarchical governance in the next application. The model is presented
schematically in Figure 5.1. The model results became slightly better.
Figure 5.1  Final model for two-factor CFA model of hierarchical governance
CENT
FORM
FORM1
FORM2
FORM3
FORM5
CENT1
CENT2
1.000
0.889
1.414
1.057
1.000
0.780
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Table 5.1  Two-factor hierarchical governance with robust estimators
Note: In model 3, loadings were fixed as the valuesbehind @ sign
MLM 2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
Close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Specification
M1 70.590(26),0.0000
0.093,
0.067-0.119,
0.004
0.899 0.860 0.099
FORM1 FORM2
FORM3 FORM5
CENT1 CENT2
CENT3 CENT4
M2 1.222(8), 0.9964
0.000,
0.000-0.000
0.999
1.000 1.043 0.011
FORM1 FORM2
FORM3 FORM5
CENT1 CENT2
FORM4 CENT3
CENT4 were
removed.
M3 1.249(12),1.0000
0.000,
0.000-0.000 1.000 1.046 0.011
FORM1@1.000
FORM2@1.414
FORM3@0.889
FORM5@1.057
CENT1@1.000
CENT2@0.780
FORM4 CENT3
CENT4 were
removed.
Loadings were
fixed to un-
standardized
estimates in
model4
Second-order measurement model for hierarchical governance
The present application hypothesizes apriori that (a) hierarchical governance can be explained
by two first-order factors (formalization: FORM and centralization: CENT) and one second-
order factor (hierarchical governance: HRCH); (b) each item has a nonzero loading on the first-
order factor it was designed to measure, and zero loadings on the other first-order factor; (c)
all factor loadings are fixed to the un-standardized factor loadings acquired from two-factor
model, revealing which model has a better fit; (d) residuals associated with each item are
uncorrelated; and (e) covariation among the two first-order factors is explained fully by their
regression on the second-order factor.
• Model 1: The result showed that the a priori model was non-convergent and could not
be identified, since the standard error of HRCH cannot be computed. This means that
the model does not fit the data.
•  Model 2: The model was re-specified by fixing the loadings of first-order constructs
(i.e., FORM and CENT) to 0.5. This provided Mplus with more information. The
model became convergent. The fit indices showed perfect fit. This model is chosen to
be the final model for the second-order construct of hierarchical governance. The
schematic model is presented in Figure H.1 in Appendix H.1.
In summary, it is evident that of the three models, the latter two are equally good. However,
the decision was made to choose the two-factor model, because using a second-order model
represents the opportunity to have less fit structural model in the further analysis. Therefore, in
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this study, hierarchical governance is explained by two different factors: formalization and
centralization.
5.1.2.2. The dimensionality of relational governance
With regard to relational governance, the research literature does not concur on how the
construct should be conceptualized. Some researchers measure it as a unidimensional construct
(e.g., Cannon, Achrol et al., 2000; Poppo & Zenger; 2002), while others treat it as multiple
constructs (i.e., different norms) or multi-dimensional construct consisting of many norms
(e.g., Heide & John, 1992; Noordewier, John et al., 1990). Therefore, the decision was made
to perform CFA for: (a) a one-factor model, (b) a four-factor model, and (c) a second-order
model with fixed loadings. The results could then be compared to determine which structure
better fit the data. The test is similar to the test for dimensionality of hierarchical governance.
(See Appendix I for details of how the test was conducted.)
In summary, it is evident that of the three models, the four-factor model delivers the most fitting
indices. Based on these findings, the conclusion is that relational governance is better explained
by four different constructs or norms. A diagrammatic representation of the final measurement
model for relational governance is presented in Figured I.2 in Appendix I.
5.1.2.3. The full measurement model
In this section, the full measurement model is analyzed, following the same approach as the
CFA of two-factor hierarchical governance in the previous section. It postulates a priori that:
a. The full measurement model consists of the following constructs: formalization ( 1 =
FORM), centralization ( 2 = CENT), flexibility ( 3 = FLEX), solidarity ( 4 = SOL),
information exchange ( 5 = INF), restraint to the use of power ( 6 = RPW), supplier-
held specific investments ( 7 = SSI), buyer-held specific investments ( 8 =BSI),
problem-solving negotiation strategy ( 9 = PSV), aggressive negotiation strategy ( 10 =
AGG), cost reduction outcomes ( 11 = CRO), end-product enhancement outcomes ( 12
= EPE), satisfaction with collaboration ( 13 = SAT). All control variables were also
included in the measurement model. They include environmental uncertainty ( 14 =
UNC), opportunisms ( 15 = OPP), market governance ( 16 = MKT), importance ( 17 =
IMP), exchange length ( 18 = EXLG), past experience ( 19 = PAST), future expectation
( 20 = FUT), product/service characteristics ( 21 = PCHA), and contract design
capability ( 22 = CDC).
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b. Each item-pair measure has a nonzero loading on the factor that it was designed to
measure and zero loading on all other factors.
c. All factor loadings of FORM, CENT, FLEX, SOL, INF, and RPW are fixed to un-
standardized factor loadings acquired from their final measurement models in Section
5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.2. This is ensure the location ofthese concepts (Anderson & Gerbing
,1988);
d. All constructs are correlated to achieve the strongest test of measurement model
(Jøreskog, 1993).
e. Residual errors associated with each measure are uncorrelated.
f. The covariance matrix of the constructs was unconstrained. Therefore, a lack of fit can
be attributed only to the relations among the measures and their error terms.
The CFA model was run and modified several times; the model results showed good fit: MLM
2(612)= 704.159; CFI = 0.969; TLI =0.961; RMSEA = 0.028, 90% CI = (0.016, 0.037), close-
fit test P = 1.000; SRMR = 0.045. The final model is presented schematically in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 The full measurement model, un-standardized estimates
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Assessment of measurement model
In the previous section, a full measurement model was established with good global fit indices.
However, the internal fit of the model should be justified. In evaluating the measurement
model, the focus is also on the relationships between the latent variables and their indicator
variables or items. The purpose is to determine thereliability and validity.
• Reliability
Reliability refers to the consistency of measurement. Four evaluation criteria for reliability
measures are suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). First, the parameter estimates and their
significance should be evaluated. The cut-off criterion for factor loading is 0.6, and must be
significant by the t-value greater 1.96 in absolute terms. Second, the individual item reliability
or measurement reliability should be evaluated. This statistic is defined as the extent to which
the variance of the observed variable is explained by the true score that the variable is supposed
to measure (Lord & Novick, 1968). Since all individual items in this model are loaded only on
one factor, this value is the reliability of the observed variable as an indicator of the underlying
construct. There are no definite rules about the cut-off values for this statistic. Third, the scale
reliability or composite reliability of the constructs should be evaluated. This value should be
greater than 0.6. Fourth, the average variance extracted should be evaluated. The value should
be greater than 0.5.
The results of testing the full measurement model are presented in Table 5.2. All measures have
significant parameter estimates greater than the 0.6 cut-off. All individual item reliabilities are
high and satisfactory. Composite reliabilities of all constructs are greater than the 0.6 cut-off.
All values of average variance extracted are higherthan the 0.5 cut-off.
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Table 5.2  The full measurement model
Note to the table: (a) called R-SQUARE in the Mplus 7.0 output, (b) calculated as the square of the
highest correlation of each construct
Factor loading Error term
Item
reliability
(a)
Composite
reliability
Average
variance
extracted
Highest
shared
variance(b)
Standardized
estimate t-values
Standardized
estimate t-values
Formal contract ( 1) 0.81 0.52 0.47
FORM1
FORM2
FORM3
FORM5
0.729
0.794
0.695
0.656
26.872
29.141
26.511
22.275
0.468
0.370
0.517
0.570
11.815
8.568
14.192
14.740
0.532
0.630
0.483
0.430
Centralization ( 2) 0.83 0.71 0.11
CENT1
CENT2
0.909
0.770
27.677
31.136
0.173
0.408
2.893
10.715
0.827
0.592
Flexibility ( 3) 0.75 0.60 0.26
FLEX2
FLEX3
0.853
0.691
24.654
21.703
0.273
0.523
4.632
11.884
0.727
0.477
Solidarity ( 4) 0.73 0.58 0.42
SOL3
SOL4
0.679
0.833
23.012
22.672
0.539
0.306
13.440
5.000
0.461
0.694
Information exchange ( 5) 0.77 0.63 0.28
INF3
INF4
0.829
0.751
30.470
18.090
0.312
0.436
6.918
7.002
0.688
0.564
Restraint o the use of power ( 6) 0.86 0.75 0.42
RPW2
RPW3
0.809
0.919
27.200
35.105
0.346
0.156
7.191
3.250
0.654
0.844
Supplier-held specific investments ( 7) 0.82 0.61 0.16
SSI2
SSI4
SSI5
0.675
0.836
0.813
15.771
25.905
24.728
0.544
0.300
0.339
9.406
5.559
6.352
0.456
0.700
0.661
Buyer-held specific investments ( 8) 0.83 0.50 0.10
BSI1
BSI3
BSI5
BSI6
BSI8
0.771
0.772
0.716
0.615
0.632
19.151
22.564
16.505
11.202
12.699
0.406
0.405
0.488
0.621
0.601
6.540
7.667
7.852
9.195
9.553
0.594
0.595
0.512
0.379
0.399
Problem-solving negotiation strategy ( 9) 0.81 0.68 0.19
PSV5
PSV6
0.891
0.749
24.016
18.086
0.206
0.438
3.106
7.059
0.794
0.562
Aggressive negotiation strategy ( 10) 0.81 0.67 0.29
AGG5
AGG6
0.808
0.834
16.764
28.930
0.347
0.305
4.446
6.353
0.653
0.695
Cost reduction outcomes ( 11) 0.75 0.61 0.16
CRO1
CRO2
0.604
0.930
9.363
13.594
0.635
0.135
8.133
1.057
0.365
0.865
End-product enhancement outcomes ( 12) 0.89 0.81 0.36
EPE2
EPE3
0.902
0.897
29.307
31.355
0.186
0.195
3.352
3.808
0.814
0.805
Satisfaction with collaboration ( 13) 0.87 0.77 0.36
SAT1
SAT3
0.910
0.849
37.127
31.125
0.171
0.279
3.842
6.024
0.829
0.721
Environmental uncertainty ( 14) 0.87 0.76 0.07
UNC1
UNC2
0.878
0.868
14.742
13.593
0.228
0.247
2.181
2.229
0.772
0.753
Opportunisms ( 15) 0.79 0.65 0.29
OPP1
OPP4
0.820
0.795
15.973
15.074
0.327
0.369
3.885
4.399
0.673
0.631
Market governance ( 16) 0.75 0.60 0.28
MKT1
MKT2
0.732
0.821
17.313
18.935
0.464
0.327
7.498
4.591
0.536
0.673
Contract design capability ( 22) 0.68 0.52 0.47
CDC3
CDC5
0.706
0.737
15.796
15.998
0.502
0.456
7.963
6.711
0.498
0.544
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• Validity
This section evaluates the construct validity of the measures, i.e., “the degree to which a
measure assesses the construct it is purported to assess (Peter, 1981, p. 134).”  Convergent
validity  represents the extent to which items of a given construct vary with the construct.
Discriminant validity represents the extent to which items of a given construct differ from items
of other constructs in the same model.
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggest he evaluation method for these two validities. The test
for convergent validity is carried out by examining the statistical significance of the paths
between each latent variable and its indicators. These values, presented in Table 5.2, show that
all factor-loading estimates are significant, i.e.,  t-values are above 2.33 in absolute terms.
Therefore, it the conclusion is that convergent validity can be claimed.
Discriminant validity is satisfactory and can be claimed by two tests. First, the correlation
among the latent construct is determined by calculating a 95% confidential interval (5th and
95th percentile) around the correlation estimate for each of the latent constructs in the
measurement model. Table 5.3 presents the correlation estimates between the latent constructs
and their standard errors. There was no pair of latent construct that was perfectly correlated.
However, high correlation was found between:
• FORM ( 1)and CDC ( 22) at 0.689 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.557 and 0.820.
• SOL ( 4) and RPW ( 6) at 0.651 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.541 and 0.761.
• EPE ( 12) and SAT ( 13) at 0.599 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.548 and 0.721.
• AGG ( 10) and OPP ( 15) at 0.534 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.387 and 0.681.
• FORM ( 1) and MKT ( 16) at 0.530 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.405 and 0.655.
• INF ( 5) and SAT ( 13) at 0.527 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.394 and 0.660.
• FLEX ( 3) and SOL ( 4) at 0.513 with its corresponding confidence interval between
0.380 and 0.646.
Second, according to Fornell and Larcker (1981), ifthe average variance extracted for each
latent variable is higher than its highest shared variance, discriminant validity is demonstrated.
Average variance extracted was calculated and is presented in Table 5.2. Shared variance is a
square of correlations between the latent variables. This highest of each latent variable is also
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presented in Table 5.3. It is evident that all average variances extracted are greater than the
highest shared variance. Therefore, the conclusion is that discriminant validity can be claimed.
Table 5.3  Correlation matrix for the full measurement model. Standard errors in parentheses, insignificant
correlations in italics, and the highest correlation for each variable in bold
FORM CENT FLEX SOL INF RPW SSI BSI PSV AGG CRO EPE SAT UNC OPP MKT CDC
FORM 1.00
CENT 0.291
(0.069)
1.00
FLEX -0.159
(0.078)
-0.159
(0.083)
1.00
SOL  -0.084
(0.087)
-0.326
(0.66)
0.513
(0.068)
1.00
INF 0.272
(0.083)
-0.078
(0.082)
0.251
(0.079)
0.521
(0.063)
1.00
RPW  0.010
(0.078)
-0.080
(0.068)
0.302
(0.074)
0.651
(0.056)
0.369
(0.069)
1.00
SSI 0.313
(0.078)
0.097
(0.073)
-0.229
(0.071)
-0.052
(0.080)
0.022
(0.079)
-0.188
(0.075)
1.00
BSI  -0.013
(0.083)
-0.205
(0.076)
0.071
(0.081)
0.207
(0.071)
0.082
(0.073)
0.130
(0.075)
0.319
(0.068)
1.00
PSV  0.058
(0.080)
-0.052
(0.063)
0.237
(0.078)
0.431
(0.076)
0.325
(0.068)
0.310
(0.078)
0.185
(0.086)
0.105
(0.087)
1.00
AGG  0.039
(0.073)
0.188
(0.67)
-0.129
(0.094)
-0.376
(0.081)
-0.356
(0.077)
-0.244
(0.079)
0.161
(0.071)
0.104
(0.100)
-0.206
(0.086)
1.00
CRO 0.252
(0.073)
0.081
(0.073)
0.043
(0.074)
0.278
(0.082)
0.275
(0.080)
0.147
(0.077)
0.380
(0.072)
0.320
(0.068)
0.145
(0.078)
0.053
(0.087)
1.00
EPE 0.184
(0.072)
-0.035
(0.072)
-0.010
(0.076)
0.184
(0.080)
0.300
(0.070)
0.068
(0.079)
0.403
(0.064)
0.214
(0.064)
0.377
(0.096)
-0.163
(0.081)
0.312
(0.075)
1.00
SAT 0.187
(0.082)
-0.149
(0.070)
0.282
(0.075)
0.493
(0.070)
0.527
(0.068)
0.246
(0.074)
0.214
(0.079)
0.291
(0.061)
0.386
(0.078)
-0.291
(0.075)
0.399
(0.071)
0.599
(0.062)
1.00
UNC  -0.043
(0.081)
0.125
(0.074)
0.271
(0.075)
0.175
(0.077)
0.067
(0.084)
0.228
(0.073)
-0.080
(0.075)
0.173
(0.078)
0.029
(0.082)
-0.051
(0.088)
-0.072
(0.073)
-0.064
(0.090)
-0.040
(0.083)
1.00
OPP  0.088
(0.074)
0.025
(0.075)
-0.259
(0.077)
-0.376
(0.082)
-0.228
(0.084)
-0.310
(0.075)
0.286
(0.069)
0.047
(0.073)
-0.216
(0.079)
0.534
(0.075)
-0.132
(0.081)
0.003
(0.086)
-0.289
(0.077)
-0.144
(0.080)
1.00
MKT 0.530
(0.064)
0.235
(0.071)
-0.207
(0.083)
-0.164
(0.090)
-0.038
(0.082)
-0.077
(0.081)
0.087
(0.071)
-0.094
(0.079)
0.133
(0.076)
0.201
(0.068)
0.052
(0.077)
-0.012
(0.070)
-0.112
(0.076)
-0.144
(0.075)
0.221
(0.076)
1.00
CDC  0.689
(0.067)
-0.017
(0.080)
0.095
(0.086)
0.197
(0.088)
0.306
(0.086)
0.134
(0.081)
0.194
(0.075)
0.155
(0.075)
0.173
(0.082)
-0.023
(0.071)
0.211
(0.077)
0.090
(0.077)
0.432
(0.069)
0.029
(0.080)
-0.112
(0.074)
0.368
(0.079)
1.00
5.1.2.4. Summary and conclusions of the measurement model
The requirements for multivariate analysis were considered, using graphical examination,
missing value analysis, and non-normality testing. Some observed variables showed skewness
in the histogram chart, while some items failed the test of zero kurtosis. Therefore, robust
estimation that accounts for non-normality will be used for hypothesis testing.
Establishment of the measurement model began with the test dimensionality for construct of
hierarchical governance, followed by relational governance. The two-factor and four-factor
models fit the data better than other structural models. Next, the six constructs and other latent
variables were included in the full measurement model and confirmatory factors were analyzed.
After several modifications, the full measurement model demonstrated good fit in all indices.
Convergent validity was achieved, since all latent variables presented satisfactory composite
reliability and average variance extracted, while all factor-loading estimates were significant.
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Discriminant validity was satisfactory, since no pairs of any latent constructs are perfectly
correlated and average variance extracted of each latent construct was higher than its highest
shared variance.
5.1.3. Structural analysis
In this section, all hypotheses under Section 3.2 concerning the common tenet of TCE, the
incorporation of relational governance into TCE, and the integration of governance modes and
negotiation strategies are tested. All data used are observations (N = 198). This test constitutes
the later part of the two-step approach of Anderson and Gerbing (1998). Section 5.1.3.1
presents results from the test of direct effects. Section 5.1.3.2 presents results from the test for
interaction. Section 5.1.3.3 presents results from the test for full model. SEM was used to
analyze the direct effect and interaction effect models in the research model, with the help of
Mplus 7.0.
5.1.3.1. Testing sub-model 1 with reduced form hypotheses 1 - 6
This application tests direct effects. As presentedin Figure 5.3, the direct effect hypotheses of
the model consist of (a) the hypothesized effects of supplier-held and buyer-held specific
investments on hierarchical and relational governance and (b) the hypothesized effects of
hierarchical governance, relational governance, aggressive negotiation strategy, and problem-
solving negotiation strategy on cost reduction outcomes, end-product enhancement outcomes,
and satisfaction with collaboration.
Testing strategy, model fit, and results
The hypotheses were tested by estimating the model from the observed sample covariance
matrix and using the robust maximum likelihood estimator with Satorra-Bentler-scaling (due
to the non-normality of the data, as explained in Section 5.1.1).
First, CFA was performed on the measurement model. The measurement model in this case is
similar to the full measurement in the Section 5.1.2.3, in that all the factor loadings were fixed
to the un-standardized estimates as in the final full measurement. This ensures that the
constructs being measured in the present application are the same as those in the final full
measurement model (Anderson & Gerbing, 1998). Interpretational confounding can be
overcome; however, control variables were not included in this application.
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Figure 5.3 The direct effect model: the sub-model 1 with reduced-form Hypotheses 1-6
Note: SSI: supplier-held specific investments, BSI: Buyer-held specific investments, FORM:
Formalization, CENT: Centralization, FLEX: Flexibility, SOL: Solidarity, INF: Information exchange,
RPW: Restraint to the use of power, CRO: Cost reduction outcome, EPE: End-product enhancement
outcome, SAT: Satisfaction with collaboration, PSV: Problem-solving negotiation strategy, AGG:
Aggressive negotiation strategy
First, the results obtained by running the model showed that it fit that data well: MLM 2(405)=
429.746; CFI = 0.989; TLI =0.987; RMSEA = 0.018 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.031), close-fit test P =
1.000; SRMR = 0.045. Next, the structural model was analyzed. In a test of the structural
model, the fit index was highly significantly different from the measurement model: corrected
MLM 2(33)= 247.725, P  = 0.0. Therefore, imposing relations between latentvariables results
in a significantly worse fit of the model. However, based on the model fit indices of the
structural model per se, many fit indices exhibited reasonable fit: MLM 2(438) = 661.791; CFI
= 0.903; TLI =0.890; RMSEA = 0.051 (90% CI: 0.043, 0.059), close-fit test P =  0.426; SRMR
= 0.102.
H2f
h
BSI
SSI
INF
RPW
FORM
CENT
PSV
AGG
SOL
FLEX
H1c
SAT
CRO
EPE
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The model results are presented in the Table 5.4. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.
Supplier-held specific investments have significantpositive effects on formalization (0.349, P
= 0.000) and centralization (0.351, P  = 0.001), while buyer-held specific investments have a
significant negative effect on centralization (- 0.443, P  = 0.000) and a marginally significant
negative effect on formalization (-0.111, P  =0.069).
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Supplier-held specific investments have significant
negative effects on flexibility (- 0.468, P  = 0.000), solidarity (- 0.206, P  = 0.003), and restraint
to the use of power (- 0.418, P  = 0.000), but no effect on information exchange (- 0.044, P  =
0.257). Buyer-held specific investments have significant positive effects on flexibility (0.314,
P  = 0.003), solidarity (0.348, P  = 0.000), information exchange (0.144, P  = 0.011), and restraint
to the use of power (0.374, P  = 0.000).
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. Formalization has significant positive effects on cost
reduction outcomes (0.203, P  =0.002), end-product enhancement outcomes (0.175, P  =0.026),
and satisfaction with the collaboration (0.186,  P  =0.014). Centralization has a marginally
significant positive effect on cost reduction outcomes (0.050, P  =0.090), but no effects on end-
product enhancement outcomes (-0.028, P  =0.285) and satisfaction with the collaboration (-
0.048, P  =0.106).
Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. Flexibility has a significant negative effect on end-
product enhancement outcomes (- 0.106,  P  =0.040), and a significant positive effect on
satisfaction with collaboration (0.074, P  =0.027), but no effect on cost reduction outcomes (-
0.052, P  =0.135). Solidarity has significant positive effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.347,
P  =0.000), and satisfaction with collaboration (0.319, P  =0.000), but no effect on end-product
enhancement outcomes (-0.102,  P  =0.096). Information exchange has significant positive
effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.187,  P  =0.008), end-product enhancement outcomes
(0.273, P  =0.003), and satisfaction with the collaboration (0.405, P  =0.000). Restraint to the
use of power has no effects on cost reduction outcomes (-0.018,  P  =0.341), end-product
enhancement outcomes (-0.087, P  =0.062), and satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.063, P
=0.080).
Hypothesis 5 was rejected. Aggressive strategy has a significant positive effect on cost
reduction outcomes (0.172,  P  =0.007), but has no effects on end-product enhancement
outcomes (- 0.043, P  =0.314), and satisfaction with the collaboration (- 0.082, P  =0.121).
94
Hypothesis 6 was partially supported. Problem-solving strategy has no effect on cost reduction
outcomes (0.047,  P  =0.182), but significant positive effects on end-product enhancement
outcomes (0.375, P  =0.000), and satisfaction with the collaboration (0.194, P  =0.001).
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Table 5.4 Test of sub-model 1 with reduced-from hypotheses 1 - 6 (n=198)
Structural linkage in the model Sign Estimates One -tailedP-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H1a: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.349 0.000
H1b: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.111 0.069
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H1c: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.351 0.001
H1d: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.443 0.000
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
H2a: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.468 0.000
H2b: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.314 0.003
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
H2c: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.206 0.003
H2d: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.348 0.000
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
H2e: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.044 0.257
H2f: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.144 0.011
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
H2g: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.418 0.000
H2h: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.374 0.000
Dependent variable:
Cost reduction outcomes
H3a: Formalization + 0.203 0.002
H3b: Centralization + 0.050 0.090
H4a: Flexibility + -0.052 0.135
H4b: Solidarity + 0.347 0.000
H4c: Information exchange + 0.187 0.008
H4d: Restraint to the use of power + -0.018 0.341
H5a: Aggressive negotiation strategy - 0.172 0.007
H6a: Problem-solving negotiation strategy + 0.047 0.182
Dependent variable:
End-product enhancement outcomes
H3c: Formalization + 0.175 0.026
H3d: Centralization + -0.028 0.285
H4e: Flexibility + -0.106 0.040
H4f: Solidarity + -0.102 0.096
H4g: Information exchange + 0.273 0.003
H4h: Restraint to the use of power + -0.087 0.062
H5b: Aggressive negotiation strategy - -0.043 0.314
H6b: Problem-solving negotiation strategy + 0.375 0.000
Dependent variable:
Satisfaction with the collaboration
H3e: Formalization + 0.186 0.014
H3f: Centralization + -0.048 0.106
H4i: Flexibility + 0.074 0.027
H4j: Solidarity + 0.319 0.000
H4k: Information exchange + 0.405 0.000
H4l: Restraint to the use of power + -0.063 0.080
H5c: Aggressive negotiation strategy - -0.082 0.121
H6c: Problem-solving negotiation strategy + 0.194 0.001
MLM 2(438)=661.791, P  =0.0000; CFI = 0.903; TLI =0.890;
RMSEA = 0.051, 90% CI =(0.043, 0.059), close-fit test P =  0.426; SRMR = 0.102
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
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5.1.3.2. Analysis of interaction effects: Testing sub-model 2 with reduced form
hypotheses 7 - 12
This section tests hypotheses regarding (a) the alignment between specific investments and
modes of governance,with hierarchical and relational governance expected to strengthen the
positive relationships between specific investments and relationship performance; and (b) the
interaction between mode of governance and negotiation strategy, with problem solving
negotiation strategy hypothesized to strengthen the effect of mode of governance on
relationship performance and aggressive strategy expected to reduce this effect.
Testing strategy, model fit, and results
The testing of interactions involving latent variables has been a challenge (Wang & Wang,
2012). Although many techniques for testing these interaction effects have been suggested,
most of them are extremely complicated and time consuming. Since the model in this study has
many interactions of interest, the chosen technique and software should ease the analysis
process. Of the statistical modelling programs, Mplus provides the most advanced and least
complicated coding process. Therefore, Mpluswas used in this study. The Mplus program uses
the product indicant to create a new variable that is the product of the two observed variables.
The measurement model used in this analysis of interaction effects is the same model used in
the analysis of direct effects. Therefore, the measurement model should produce the same good
fit statistic, and there should no problem of interpretational confounding.
With these 72 hypotheses, there are 10 dimensions of integration and 1000 integration points.
The results could not be generated by running the interaction model with Mplus 7.0, since the
model was non-convergent. This was probably becausethe model was too big for Mplus 7.0.
Therefore, preliminary tests were done by testing each interaction individually to see whether
it was statistically significant. If it was significant, it was included in the model in the further
analysis.
Preliminary test of interaction effects
The interaction SEMs tested in the present application are preliminary hypothesis testing for
all individual interaction effects under Section 5.1. They are 24 single-interaction models. In
each model, the interaction was an independent variable and relationship performance was a
dependent variable. An example of the hypothesized model of this preliminary test is presented
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in Figure 5.4. It depicts the interaction between supplier-held specific investments and
formalization on cost reduction outcomes, end-product enhancement outcomes, and
satisfaction with the collaboration.
Figure 5.4 Hypothesized single-interaction model
Appendix J presents the results of the each interaction model. Most interaction models were
convergent in the first run. Some were not. These non-convergent interaction models were
modified by including the interactions from the convergent model. For example, the interaction
model between centralization and problem solving was originally non-convergent. The model
was modified by adding the interaction of formalization and problem solving and the direct
effect of formalization. The additional interaction effect was fixed to the unstandardized
estimates acquired from the interaction model of formalization and problem-solving
negotiation strategy. The result is that nine interactions have significant effects. These 9
interactions or 17 interaction effects will be included in the model in further analysis. They
include the following:
• Interaction of buyer-held specific investments and formalization on cost reduction
outcomes (-0.208,  P  = 0.033), and satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.289,  P  =
0.021).
• Interaction of supplier-held specific investments and centralization on end-product
enhancement outcomes (1.060, P  = 0.022).
• Interaction of buyer-held specific investments and centralization on cost reduction
outcomes (1.236, P  = 0.032), end-product enhancement outcomes (1.686, P  = 0.005),
and satisfaction with the collaboration (1.423, P  = 0.005).
Supplier-held
specificity
Formalization
Cost
reduction
outcomes
End-product
enhancement
outcomes
Satisfaction
with the
collaboration
H7a
H7e
H7i
98
• Interaction of buyer-held specific investments and flexibility on cost reduction
outcomes (-0.400, P  = 0.042) and end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.694,  P  =
0.000).
• Interaction of buyer-held specific investments and solidarity on cost reduction
outcomes (-0.212, P  = 0.042).
• Interaction of buyer-held specific investments and information exchange on cost
reduction outcomes (-0.231,  P  = 0.039) and end-product enhancement outcomes (-
0.314, P  = 0.031).
• Interaction of buyer-held specific investments and restraint to the use of power on cost
reduction outcomes (-4.772, P  = 0.038), end-product enhancement outcomes (-5.810,
P  = 0.010), and satisfaction with the collaboration (-7.268, P  = 0.000).
• Interaction of centralization and problem-solving negotiation strategy on cost reduction
outcomes (0.107,  P  = 0.041) and end-product enhancement outcomes (0.107,  P  =
0.011).
• Interaction of information exchange and problem-solving negotiation strategy on end-
product enhancement outcomes (-0.278, P  = 0.014).
5.1.3.3. Testing the full structural model including direct and interaction effects with
hypotheses 1 - 12
This application includes direct effects and interaction effects in the same model. All 36 direct
effects were included; only 17 significant interaction effects found in preliminary tests were
included. In addition, all factor loadings were fixed to the un-standardized estimates found in
the final full measurement model in Section 5.1.2.3. Control variables were not included.
A run of the model showed that it was non-convergent. This was probably because the model
was too complex due to many integration points for Mplus 7.0.
The model was then modified by adding the starting values to all effects. These starting values
were taken from the estimates in the direct effect model (see Table 5.4), and from the estimates
in the preliminary interaction effect model (see Appendix J). However, the model was still non-
convergent. Therefore, the model was divided into two sub-models: (a) sub-model 3, in which
hierarchical governance is the safeguarding mechanism and (b) sub-model 4, in which
relational governance is the governance mode used.
5.1.3.3.1. Testing sub-model 3 with reduced form hypotheses 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10
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This section tests the alignment of specific investments and hierarchical governance and the
interaction of hierarchical governance and negotiation strategies. The SEM tested in the
application tests hypotheses regarding (a) the path leading from supplier-held and buyer-held
specific investments to two dimensions of hierarchical governance; (b) the path leading from
two dimensions of hierarchical governance to three dimensions of relationship performance;
(c) the path leading from negotiation strategies torelationship performance; (d) the path leading
from the significant interaction effects, found in preliminary tests, between specific
investments and the two dimensions of hierarchical governance on relationship performance;
(e) the path leading form the significant interaction effects, found in preliminary tests, between
two dimensions of hierarchical governance and negotiation strategies; and (f) the path leading
from supplier-held or buyer-held specific investments to relationship performance only if their
interaction effects were significant in the preliminary test. The postulated structure of the model
to be tested is presented schematically in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 Hypothesized sub-model 3
Note: SSI: supplier-held specific investments, BSI: Buyer-held specific investments, FORM:
Formalization, CENT: Centralization, CRO: Cost reduction outcome, EPE: End-product
enhancement outcome, SAT: Satisfaction with collaboration, PSV: Problem-solving negotiation
strategy, AGG: Aggressive negotiation strategy
Running the model produced the results shown in Table 5.5. Hypothesis 1 was partially
supported. Hypotheses 1a and 1c were supported. Supplier-held specific investments have
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significant positive effects on formalization (0.618, P  = 0.000) and centralization (0.768, P  =
0.002). Hypotheses 1b and 1d were rejected. Buyer-held specific-investments have significant
negative effects on formalization (-0.313, P  = 0.008) and centralization (-0.741, P  = 0.002).
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. Hypotheses 3aand 3e were supported. Formalization has
significant positive effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.321, P  = 0.008) and satisfaction with
the collaboration (0.322, P  = 0.014). Hypotheses 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3f were rejected. Formalization
has no effect on end-product enhancement outcomes (0.101, P  = 0.308). Centralization has no
effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.034, P  = 0.327), end-product enhancement outcomes (-
0.082, P  = 0.232), and satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.078, P  = 0.205).
Hypothesis 5 was partially supported. Hypotheses 5b and 5c were supported. Aggressive
negotiation strategy has significant negative effects on end-product enhancement outcomes (-
0.259, P  = 0.037) and satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.319, P  = 0.002). Hypothesis 5a
was rejected. Aggressive negotiation strategy has no effect on cost reduction outcomes (-0.025,
P  = 0.411).
Hypothesis 6 was rejected. Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c were rejected. Problem-solving
negotiation strategy has no effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.050, P  = 0.356), or end-
product enhancement outcomes (0.210, P  = 0.128), and has a weak significant positive effect
on satisfaction with the collaboration (0.250, P  = 0.052).
Hypothesis 7 was rejected. Six preliminary findingsof significant interactions (H7b, H7d, H7g,
H7h, H7j, and H7l) were not supported. Hypothesis 7b (the interaction of buyer-held specific
investments and formalization) has no effect on cost reduction outcomes (-0.231, P  = 0.103).
Hypothesis 7d (the interaction of buyer-held specific investments and centralization) has a
marginally significant positive effect on cost reduction outcomes (0.139,  P  = 0.063).
Hypothesis 7g (the interaction of supplier-held specific investments and centralization) has no
effect on end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.028,  P  = 0.422). Hypothesis 7h (the
interaction of buyer-held specific investments and centralization) has no effect on end-product
enhancement outcomes (0.111, P  = 0.206). Hypothesis 7j (the interaction of buyer-held specific
investments and formalization) has no effect on satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.249, P
= 0.092). Hypothesis 7l (the interaction of buyer-held specific investments and centralization)
has no effect on satisfaction with the collaboration (0.100, P  = 0.130).
Hypothesis 9 was rejected. However, sub-hypotheses 9a - 9f were rejected during the
preliminary test. They are therefore not included in the sub-model 3.
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Hypothesis 10 was partially supported. Hypothesis 10d was supported. The interaction of
centralization and problem-solving negotiation strategy has a significant positive effect on end-
product enhancement outcomes (0.193, P  = 0.038). The preliminary finding of significance for
hypothesis 10b was not supported. The interaction of centralization and problem-solving
negotiation strategy has no effect on cost reduction outcomes (0.046, P  = 0.296).
Testing sub-model 3 including control variables
To account for spurious associations and other competing explanations, control variables are
included in sub-model 3. The control variables are uncertainty, market governance, and
contract design capability.
The hypothesized model is the sub-model 3 including (a) the path leading from uncertainty to
two dimensions of hierarchical governance and (b) the path leading from market governance
and contract design capability to relationship performance. The measurement model was
established in Section 5.1.2.3.
A run of the model produced the results presented in Table 5.5. To consider which model is
better, researchers usually use the test for 2 difference. However, when a model has interaction
effects, Mplus does not provide 2statistics. Instead, it provides Bayesian information criterion
(BIC), with the value difference between two models used for model comparison. The model
with a small BIC has a better fit. Raftery (1996) suggests that if the difference in absolute value
of BIC is between zero and two, there is weak evidence favouring one model against another
model. If BIC is between two and six, there is positive evidence. If BIC is between 6 and
10, there is strong evidence. If BIC is greater than 10, there is very strong evidence.
The BIC of the sub-model 3 is less than the BIC of the present model. The BIC is equal to
4134.459, indicating very strong evidence that the sub-model 3 has a better fit than this present
model. This increases the confidence in the sub-model 3. In addition, among the control
variables, only contract design capability has a significant effect; it also has a positive effect
on satisfaction with the collaboration. When we compare the sizes and significance levels
between sub-model 3 and the present model, we can see some slight changes. Most changes
are in the form of a drop in significant level from significant to marginally significant. The
significant positive effects of contract design capability on satisfaction with the collaboration
can be explained by high correlation between the two constructs (see Table 5.3). Moreover, the
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apparent replacement of formalization by contract design capability can also be explained by
the high correlation between these two constructs.
Structural linkage in the model
Sub-model3 Including control variables
Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H1a: Supplier-held specific investments 0.618 0.000 0.380 0.028
H1b: Buyer-held specific investments -0.313 0.008 -0.136 0.257
Uncertainty 0.004 0.487
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H1c: Supplier-held specific investments 0.768 0.002 0.376 0.093
H1d: Buyer-held specific investments -0.741 0.002 -0.501 0.052
Uncertainty 0.221 0.072
Dependent variable:
Cost reduction outcomes
Buyer-held specific investments 0.345 0.003 0.296 0.039
H3a: Formalization 0.321 0.008 0.271 0.063
H3b: Centralization 0.034 0.327 0.029 0.397
H5a: Aggressive negotiation strategy -0.025 0.411 0.011 0.420
H6a: Problem-solving negotiation strategy 0.050 0.356 0.044 0.390
H7b: Buyer-held specific investments*Formalization -0.231 0.103 -0.188 0.175
H7d: Buyer-held specific investments*Centralization 0.139 0.063 0.092 0.162
H10b: Centralization *Problem-solving negotiation strategy 0.046 0.296 0.066 0.264
Market governance -0.042 0.373
Contract design capability 0.029 0.426
Dependent variable:
End-product enhancement outcomes
Supplier-held specific investments 0.482 0.023 0.348 0.013
Buyer-held specific investments 0.031 0.440 0.126 0.260
H3c: Formalization 0.101 0.308 0.236 0.143
H3d: Centralization (CENT) -0.082 0.232 -0.071 0.307
H5b: Aggressive negotiation strategy -0.259 0.037 -0.214 0.097
H6b: Problem-solving negotiation strategy (PSV) 0.210 0.128 0.291 0.045
H7g: Supplier-held specific investments*Centralization -0.028 0.422 0.031 0.405
H7h: Buyer-held specific investments*Centralization 0.111 0.206 0.050 0.374
H10d: CENT*PSV 0.193 0.038 0.152 0.063
Market governance -0.061 0.356
Contract design capability -0.123 0.281
Dependent variable:
Satisfaction with the collaboration
Buyer-held specific investments 0.324 0.019 0.202 0.139
H3e: Formalization 0.322 0.014 0.175 0.200
H3f: Centralization -0.078 0.205 -0.048 0.352
H5c: Aggressive negotiation strategy -0.319 0.002 -0.214 0.070
H6c: Problem-solving negotiation strategy 0.250 0.052 0.252 0.072
H7j: Buyer-held specific investments*Formalization -0.249 0.092 -0.202 0.165
H7l: Buyer-held specific investments*Centralization 0.100 0.130 0.068 0.294
Market governance -0.243 0.069
Contract design capability 0.364 0.032
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
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5.1.3.3.2. Testing sub-model 4 with reduced form hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12
This section tests the alignment of specific investments and relational governance and the
interaction of relational governance and negotiation strategies. The SEM tested in the
application tests hypotheses regarding (a) the pathleading from supplier-held and buyer-held
specific investments to four dimensions of relational governance; (b) the path leading from
four dimensions of relational governance to three dimensions of relationship performance; (c)
the path leading from negotiation strategies to relationship performance; (d) the path leading
from the significant interaction effects, found in preliminary tests, between specific
investments and the four dimensions of relational governance to relationship performance; (e)
the path leading form the significant interaction effects, found in preliminary tests, between
four dimensions of relational governance and negotiation strategies; and (f) the path leading
from supplier-held or buyer-held specific investments to relationship performance only if their
interaction effects were significant in the preliminary test.
A run of the model showed that it was non-convergent. This may have been due to the
complexity of the model. The model was then modified by fixing the path coefficients between
specific investments and relational governance to un-standardized estimates acquired from sub-
model 1. However, the model was still non-convergent.
Therefore, sub-model 4 was divided into two sub-models, i.e., sub-models 4.1 and 4.2. Sub-
model 4.1 emphasizes the interaction of specific investments and relational governance, while
sub-model 4.2 focuses on the interaction of relational governance and negotiation strategies.
5.1.3.3.2.1. Testing sub-model 4.1 with reduced form hypotheses
This application tests the alignment of specific investments and relational governance. The
SEM tested in the application tests hypotheses regarding (a) the path leading from supplier-
held and buyer-held specific investments to four dimensions of relational governance; (b) the
path leading from four dimensions of relat11ional governance to three dimensions of
relationship performance; (c) the path leading from negotiation strategies to relationship
performance; (d) the path leading from the significant interaction effects, found in preliminary
tests, between specific investments and the four dimensions of relational governance to
relationship performance; and (e) the path leading from supplier-held or buyer-held specific
investments to relationship performance, only if their interaction effects were significant in the
preliminary test.
Sub-model 4.1: Running sub-model 4.1 showed that it was non-convergent.
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Sub-model 4.1b: The model was modified by fixing the path coefficients between specific
investments and four dimensions of relational governance to un-standardized estimates
acquired from sub-model 1. This provided more information for MPlus. The postulated
structure of the model to be tested is presented schematically in Figure 5.6.
The sub-model 4.1b was convergent. The model results are shown in Table 5.6. Hypothesis 4
was partially supported. Hypothesis 4k was supported. Information exchange has a significant
positive effect on satisfaction with the collaboration (0.446, P  = 0.006). Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c,
4d, 4e, 4f, 4g, 4h, 4i, 4j, and 4l were rejected. Flexibility has no effects on cost reduction
outcomes (-0.066, P  = 0.242), end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.103, P  = 0.186), and
satisfaction with the collaboration (0.065,  P  = 0.263). Solidarity has no effects on cost
reduction outcomes (0.128,  P  = 0.233), end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.042,  P  =
0.418), and satisfaction with the collaboration (0.219, P  = 0.132). Information exchange has
no effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.220,  P  = 0.112) and end-product enhancement
outcomes (0.224, P  = 0.165). Restraint to the use of power has no effects on cost reduction
outcomes (-0.023, P  = 0.415), end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.072, P  = 0.280), and
satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.076, P  = 0.224).
Hypothesis 5 was rejected. Aggressive negotiation strategy has no effects on cost reduction
outcomes (0.132, P  = 0.205), end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.093, P  = 0.280), and
satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.128, P  = 0.130).
Hypothesis 6 was partially supported. Hypothesis 6b was supported. Problem-solving
negotiation strategy has a significant positive effect on end-product enhancement outcomes
(0.360,  P  = 0.003). It has no effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.029,  P  = 0.410) and
satisfaction with the collaboration (0.173, P  = 0. 072).
Hypothesis 8 was rejected. Hypotheses 8b, 8d, 8f, 8h, 8n, 8p, 8r, and 8x were rejected, though
each has significant effects in preliminary tests.
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Figure 5.6  Hypothesized sub model 4.1b of the alignment of specific investments and relational
governance
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Table 5.6 Results from testing sub-model 4.1b
Structural linkage in the model Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
Supplier-held specific investments -0.468 999.0
Buyer-held specific investments 0.314 999.0
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
Supplier-held specific investments -0.206 999.0
Buyer-held specific investments 0.348 999.0
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
Supplier-held specific investments -0.044 999.0
Buyer-held specific investments 0.144 999.0
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
Supplier-held specific investments -0.418 999.0
Buyer-held specific investments 0.374 999.0
Dependent variable:
Cost reduction outcomes
Buyer-held specific investments + 0.291 0.027
H4a: Flexibility + -0.066 0.242
H4b: Solidarity + 0.128 0.233
H4c : Information exchange + 0.220 0.112
H4d : Restraint to the use of power + -0.023 0.415
H5a: Aggressive negotiation strategy - 0.132 0.205
H6a: Problem-solving negotiation strategy + 0.029 0.410
H8b: Buyer-held specific investments*Flexibility + -0.069 0.256
H8d: Buyer-held specific investments*Solidarity + -0.113 0.289
H8f: Buyer-held specific investments*Information exchange + -0.079 0.355
H8h: Buyer-held specific investments*Restraint to the use of power + -0.016 0.440
Dependent variable:
End-product enhancement outcomes
Buyer-held specific investments + 0.242 0.065
H4e: Flexibility + -0.103 0.186
H4f: Solidarity + -0.042 0.418
H4g : Information exchange + 0.224 0.165
H4h : Restraint to the use of power + -0.072 0.280
H5b: Aggressive negotiation strategy - -0.093 0.280
H6b: Problem-solving negotiation strategy + 0.360 0.003
H8n: Buyer-held specific investments*Information exchange + -0.232 0.146
H8p: Buyer-held specific investments*Restraint to the use of power + 0.050 0.350
Dependent variable:
Satisfaction with the collaboration
Buyer-held specific investments + 0.215 0.086
H4i: Flexibility + 0.065 0.263
H4j: Solidarity + 0.219 0.132
H4k : Information exchange + 0.446 0.006
H4l: Restraint to the use of power + -0.076 0.224
H5c: Aggressive negotiation strategy - -0.128 0.130
H6c: Problem-solving negotiation strategy + 0.173 0.072
H8r: Buyer-held specific investments*Flexibility + -0.012 0.451
H8x: Buyer-held specific investments*Restraint to the use of power + 0.006 0.480
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
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Testing sub-model 4.1b including control variables
To account for spurious associations and other competing explanations, control variables are
included in sub-model 4.1b. The control variables are opportunism, market governance and
contract design capability.
The hypothesized model is the sub-model 4.1b including (a) the path leading from opportunism
to four dimensions of relational governance and (b) the path leading from market governance
and contract design capability to relationship performance. The measurement model was
established in Section 5.1.2.3.
Running the model showed that it was non-convergent, indicating very strong evidence that
the sub-model 4.1b has a better fit than the present model. This increases the confidence in the
sub-model 4.1b.
5.1.3.3.2.2. Testing sub-model 4.2 with reduced form hypotheses
The present application tests the interaction of relational governance and negotiation strategies.
The SEM tested in the application hypotheses regarding (a) the path leading from supplier-held
and buyer-held specific investments to four dimensions of relational governance; (b) the path
leading from four dimensions of relational governance to three dimensions of relationship
performance; (c) the path leading from negotiation strategies to relationship performance; and
(d) the path leading from the significant interaction effects, found in preliminary tests, between
relational governance and negotiation strategy to relationship performance.
Sub-model 4.2: A run of the sub-model 4.2 showed that it was non-convergent, and that it
needed the modification.
Sub-model 4.2b: The model was modified by fixing the path coefficients between supplier-
held and buyer-held specific investments and four dimensions of relational governance to un-
standardized estimates acquired from sub-model 1. The postulated structure of the model to be
tested is presented schematically in Figure 5.7.
The model then converged. The model results are shown in Table 5.7. Hypothesis 4 was partly
supported. Hypothesis 4k was supported. Informationexchange has a significant positive effect
on satisfaction with the collaboration (0.465, P  = 0.002). Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f, 4g,
4h, 4i, 4j, and 4l were rejected. Flexibility has no effects on cost reduction outcomes (-0.080,
P  = 0.190), end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.138, P  = 0.089), and satisfaction with the
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collaboration (0.054, P  = 0.167). Solidarity has no effects on cost reduction outcomes (0.276,
P  = 0.059), end-product enhancement outcomes (0.114, P  = 0.285), and satisfaction with the
collaboration (0.314,  P  = 0.054). Information exchange has no effects on cost reduction
outcomes (0.271,  P  = 0.050) and end-product enhancement outcomes (0.309,  P  = 0.065).
Restraint to the use of power has no effects on cost reduction outcomes (-0.010, P  = 0.459),
end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.082, P  = 0.234), and satisfaction with the collaboration
(-0.066, P  = 0.236).
Hypothesis 5 was rejected. Aggressive negotiation strategy has no effects on cost reduction
outcomes (0.202, P  = 0.082), end-product enhancement outcomes (-0.021, P  = 0.448), and
satisfaction with the collaboration (-0.075, P  = 0.248).
Hypothesis 6 was partially supported. Hypothesis 6band 6c were supported. Problem-solving
negotiation strategy has significant positive effects on end-product enhancement outcomes
(0.379, P  = 0.003) and satisfaction with the collaboration (0.202, P  = 0.050). It has no effect
on cost reduction outcomes (0.068, P  = 0.291).
Hypothesis 12 was rejected. Hypothesis 12g was rejected. Interaction of information exchange
and problem-solving negotiation strategy has a significant negative effect on end-product
enhancement outcomes (-0268, P  = 0.021).
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Figure 5.7 Hypothesized model of the alignment of specific investments and relational governance
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Testing sub-model 4.2b including control variables
To account for spurious associations and other competing explanations, control variables are
included in model 4.2b. The control variables are opportunism, market governance and contract
design capability.
The hypothesized model is the sub-model 4.1b including (a) the path leading from opportunism
to four dimensions of relational governance and (b) the path leading from market governance
and contract design capability to relationship performance. The measurement model was
established in Section 5.1.2.3.
A run of the model produced the results presented in Table 5.7. The BIC of the sub-model 4.2b
is less than the BIC of the present model. The BIC is equal to 4152.625, indicating very strong
evidence that the sub-model 4.2b has a better fit than the present model (Raftery, 1996). This
increases the confidence in the sub-model 4.2b. With regard to the control variable,
opportunism has significant negative effects on all four dimensions of relational governance.
Contract design capability has a significant effect, and it has a positive effect on satisfaction
with the collaboration. When the sizes and significance levels of sub-model 4.2b and the
present model are compared, some slight changes canbe seen. Most changes occur in the form
of a drop in significant level from significant to marginally significant. This provides additional
support for the sub-model 4.2b.
111
Table 5.7 Results from testing sub-model 4.2b including control variables
Structural linkage in the model
Sub-model 4.2b Including control variables
Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
Supplier held specific investments 0.468 999.0 0.468 999.0
Buyer held specific investments 0.314 999.0 0.314 999.0
Opportunism 0.801 0.019
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
Supplier held specific investments 0.206 999.0 0.206 999.0
Buyer held specific investments 0.348 999.0 0.348 999.0
Opportunism -0.968 0.001
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
Supplier held specific investments 0.044 999.0 0.206 999.0
Buyer held specific investments 0.144 999.0 0.348 999.0
Opportunism -0.570 0.005
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
Supplier held specific investments 0.418 999.0 0.206 999.0
Buyer held specific investments 0.374 999.0 0.348 999.0
Opportunism -1.008 0.001
Dependent variable:
Cost reduction outcomes
H4a: Flexibility 0.080 0.190 0.106 0.225
H4b: Solidarity 0.276 0.059 0.245 0.234
H4c: Information exchange 0.271 0.050 0.243 0.188
H4d: Restraint to the use of power 0.010 0.459 0.029 0.421
H5a: Aggressive negotiation strategy 0.202 0.082 0.233 0.125
H6a: Problem solving negotiation strategy 0.068 0.291 0.113 0.324
Market governance 0.086 0.278
Contract design capability 0.195 0.140
Dependent variable:
End-product enhancement outcomes
H4e: Flexibility 0.138 0.089 0.162 0.139
H4f: Solidarity 0.114 0.285 0.212 0.316
H4g : Information exchange (INF) 0.309 0.065 0.342 0.158
H4h : Restraint to the use of power 0.082 0.234 0.071 0.337
H5b: Aggressive negotiation strategy 0.021 0.448 0.022 0.460
H6b: Problem solving negotiation strategy (PSV) 0.379 0.003 0.614 0.032
H12g: INF*PSV -0.268 0.021 0.357 0.067
Market governance 0.178 0.197
Contract design capability 0.124 0.291
Dependent variable:
Satisfaction with collaboration
H4i: Flexibility 0.054 0.167 0.017 0.442
H4j: Solidarity 0.314 0.054 0.145 0.335
H4k: Information exchange 0.465 0.002 0.344 0.095
H4l: Restraint to the use of power 0.066 0.236 0.096 0.217
H5c: Aggressive negotiation strategy 0.075 0.248 0.031 0.429
H6c: Problem solving negotiation strategy 0.202 0.050 0.320 0.076
Market governance 0.273 0.060
Contract design capability 0.459 0.008
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
112
5.1.4. Summary of results
The results of testing the hypothesized model in Section 5.1 are presented in Table 5.8. This
sub-section presents the short summary of results. The explanation and discussion of the results
are presented in Chapter 6. The parameter estimates in the model are based on the parameter
estimates obtained from using Satorra-Bentler scaling, due to the non-normality of the data.
In sub-model 1, it was found that supplier-held specific investments have significant positive
effects on formalization and centralization, significant negative effects on flexibility, solidarity,
and restraint to the use of power, and no effect on information exchange. In contrast, buyer-
held specific investments have a significant negative effect on centralization and no effect on
formalization, while they have significant positive effects on all four norms of relational
governance. With regard to association between governance mechanisms and relationship
performance, formalization has significant positive effects on all three dimensions of
relationship performance; centralization has no effect. Flexibility has significant positive
effects on end-product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration, but has
no effect on cost reduction outcomes. Solidarity has significant positive effects on cost
reduction outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration, but no effect on end-production
enhancement outcomes. Information exchange has significant positive effects on all
relationship performance. In contrast, restraint to the use of power has no effects on all
outcomes. With regard to relationship between negotiation strategy and relationship
performance, aggressive strategy has a significant positive effect on cost reduction outcomes,
but no effects on the other two relationship performance outcomes. Problem-solving strategy
has significant positive effects on end-product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with
collaboration, but no effect on cost reduction outcomes.
In sub-model 3, it was found that supplier-held specific investments have significant positive
effects on both dimensions of hierarchical governance, but buyer-held specific investments
have a significant negative effect on them. With regard to antecedents of relationship
performance, formalization has significant positive effects on cost reduction outcomes and
satisfaction with collaboration, but no effect on end-product enhancement outcomes.
Centralization has no effects on all three performance outcomes. Aggressive negotiation
strategy has significant negative effects on end-product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction
with the collaboration, but no effect on cost reduction outcomes. Problem-solving strategy has
no effects on all three performance outcomes. With regard to interaction effect, only interaction
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between centralization and problem-solving strategy has a significant positive effect on end-
product enhancement outcomes. Other interactions have no effects.
In sub-model 4.1b, it was found that problem-solving negotiation strategy has a significant
positive effect on end-product enhancement outcomes. Information exchange has a significant
positive effect on satisfaction with the collaboration. Other dimensions of relational
governance, negotiation strategies, and interactions have no effects on relationship
performance.
In sub-model 4.2b, information exchange has a significant positive effect on cost reduction
outcomes. Information exchange has a significant positive effect on satisfaction with
collaboration. Other dimensions of relational governance have no effects on relationship
performance. Problem-solving negotiation strategy has significant positive effects on end-
product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration, but no effect on cost
reduction outcomes. Aggressive negotiation strategyhas no effect on relationship performance.
With regard to interaction effect, information exchange and problem-solving negotiation
strategy have significant negative interaction effects on end-product enhancement outcomes.
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Table 5.8  Summary of hypothesis testing under Section 5.1
Structural linkage
in the model
Sub-model 1 Sub-model 3 Sub-model 4.1b Sub-model 4.2b
Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dep. var.:  FORM
H1a: SSI 0.349 0.000 0.618 0.000
H1b: BSI -0.111 0.069 -0.313 0.008
Dep. var.:  CENT
H1c: SSI 0.351 0.001 0.768 0.002
H1d: BSI -0.443 0.000 -0.741 0.002
Dep. var.:  FLEX
H2a: SSI -0.468 0.000 -0.468 999.0 -0.468 999.0
H2b: BSI 0.314 0.003 0.314 999.0 0.314 999.0
Dep. var.:  SOL
H2c: SSI -0.206 0.003 -0.206 999.0 -0.206 999.0
H2d: BSI 0.348 0.000 0.348 999.0 0.348 999.0
Dep. var.: INF
H2e: SSI -0.044 0.257 -0.044 999.0 -0.044 999.0
H2f: BSI 0.144 0.011 0.144 999.0 0.144 999.0
Dep. var.:  RPW
H2g: SSI -0.418 0.000 -0.418 999.0 -0.418 999.0
H2h: BSI 0.374 0.000 0.374 999.0 0.374 999.0
Dep. var.:  CRO
BSI 0.345 0.003 0.291 0.027
H3a: FORM 0.203 0.002 0.321 0.008
H3b: CENT 0.050 0.090 0.034 0.327
H4a: FLEX -0.052 0.135 -0.066 0.242 -0.080 0.190
H4b: SOL 0.347 0.000 0.128 0.233 0.276 0.059
H4c: INF 0.187 0.008 0.220 0.112 0.271 0.050
H4d: RPW -0.018 0.341 -0.023 0.415 -0.010 0.459
H5a: AGG 0.172 0.007 -0.025 0.411 0.132 0.205 0.202 0.082
H6a: PSV 0.047 0.182 0.050 0.356 0.029 0.410 0.068 0.291
H7b: BSI*FORM -0.231 0.103
H7d: BSI*CENT 0.139 0.063
H8b: BSI*FLEX -0.069 0.256
H8d: BSI*SOL -0.113 0.289
H8f: BSI*INF -0.079 0.355
H8h: BSI*RPW -0.016 0.440
H10b: CENT*PSV 0.046 0.296
Dep. var.:  EPE
SSI 0.482 0.023
BSI 0.031 0.440 0.242 0.065
H3c: FORM 0.175 0.026 0.101 0.308
H3d: CENT -0.028 0.285 -0.082 0.232
H4e: FLEX -0.106 0.040 -0.103 0.186 -0.138 0.089
H4f: SOL -0.102 0.096 -0.042 0.418 0.114 0.285
H4g : INF 0.273 0.003 0.224 0.165 0.309 0.065
H4h : RPW -0.087 0.062 -0.072 0.280 -0.082 0.234
H5b: AGG -0.043 0.314 -0.259 0.037 -0.093 0.280 -0.021 0.448
H6b: PSV 0.375 0.000 0.210 0.128 0.360 0.003 0.379 0.003
H7g: SSI*CENT -0.028 0.422
H7h: BSI*CENT 0.111 0.206
H8n: BSI*INF -0.232 0.146
H8p: BSI*RPW 0.050 0.350
H10d: CENT*PSV 0.193 0.038
H12g: INF*PSV -0.268 0.021
Dep. var.:  SAT
BSI 0.324 0.019 0.215 0.086
H3e: FORM 0.186 0.014 0.322 0.014
H3f: CENT -0.048 0.106 -0.078 0.205
H4i: FLEX 0.074 0.027 0.065 0.263 0.054 0.167
H4j: SOL 0.319 0.000 0.219 0.132 0.314 0.054
H4k: INF 0.405 0.000 0.446 0.006 0.465 0.002
H4l: RPW -0.063 0.080 -0.076 0.224 -0.066 0.236
H5c: AGG -0.082 0.121 -0.319 0.002 -0.128 0.130 -0.075 0.248
H6c: PSV 0.194 0.001 0.250 0.052 0.173 0.072 0.202 0.050
H7j: BSI*FORM -0.249 0.092
H7l: BSI*CENT 0.100 0.130
H8r: BSI*FLEX -0.012 0.451
H8x: BSI*RPW 0.006 0.480
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
When path coefficients are fixed, one-tailed P-value shows 999.0
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5.2. Testing the effect of asymmetric-power relationshipon TCE
The purpose of this section is to test hypotheses concerning asymmetric-power elationships.
Data used in this section are the sub-data from the data used in the Section 5.1 in which
respondents identified that they have asymmetric-power elationships with their buyers. The
total sample size is 108 cases.
The construct of specific investments is not the same as the construct used in Section 5.1; in
this case, it refers to stronger-held specific investments or weaker-held specific investments,
depending on the investors.
In Section 5.2.1, the data are analysed for normal distribution. CFA is performed on the
measurement model in Section 5.2.2. After the full measurement model is established, the
hypotheses are tested in structural models in Section 5.2.3. The final sub-section summarizes
the results of the hypothesis testing.
5.2.1. Requirement of multivariate analysis
It is necessary to examine whether the data is normal distributed (see more detail in Section
5.1.1). Most observed variables used in Section 5.2are predetermined by the final measurement
model in Section 5.1. Therefore, items reflecting constructs are not all items acquired during
data collection. For example, centralization is measured by CENT1 and CENT2, rather than
CENT1 to CENT4. Two measures were conducted based on Hair et al. (1998): graphical
examination and non-normality assessing. With regard to missing values analysis (as explained
in Section 5.1.1), cases with missing data were excluded before performing the data analysis.
• Graphical examination
Histograms and frequency tables produced by using IBM SPSS 20 provide better
understanding of the data. Observed variables that reflect formalization, centralization,
solidarity, information exchange, and restraint in the use of power seem to be skewed towards
high values on the Likert scale, while observed variables of opportunism and stronger-held
specific investments seem to be skewed towards low values.
• Normality assessing
Use of IBM SPSS 20 (see descriptive statistics in Appendix K) shows that no observed
variables exhibit the evidence of kurtosis.
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The conclusion is that many observed variables seem to be skewed. This may be sufficient to
render the distribution as multivariate non-normal. Robust estimators, therefore, will be used
for data analysis in Section 5.2.
5.2.2. Measurement models
In this step, the measurement models of stronger-held specific investments and weaker-held
specific investments were analyzed (all others were analyzed in Section 5.1). First, the
measurement models for these two constructs is analyzed (Section 5.2.2.1). Second, the full
measurement model, including the details of the assessments of fits, reliability, and validity, is
analyzed in Section 5.2.2.2. Section 5.2.2.3 presents the summary of the measurement model.
The structural analysis is detailed in section 5.2.3.
5.2.2.1. The measurement model for weaker-held and stronger-held specific
investments
Section 5.2 describes the test for hypotheses concerning the moderating effect of asymmetric
power on the relationship between specific investments and governance modes. More
specifically, it compares the effects of stronger-held specific investments and weaker-held
specific investments on governance modes. It was necessary to ensure that stronger-held
specific investments and weaker-held specific investments measure the same construct. To do
this, the two variables must be equality constrained, i.e., each factor loading of these two
constructs must be equally constrained to its counterpart. For example, STSI1 is equality
constrained to WKSI1. However, due to the parsimonious perspective, CFA is necessary to
find out which observed variables should be included in the model (rather than including all
eight observed variables of specific investments). This analysis follows the same approach as
the CFA of one-factor hierarchical governance in Section 5.1.
A run of CFA for each of these two models revealed that stronger-held specific investments
had four items with good fit: STSI3 STSI4 STSI5 STSI7, while weaker-held specific
investments have WKSI2 WKSI3 WKSI5 WKSI7 (see Table 5.9). Two latent variables have
different baseline models. It is not possible to impose equality constraint on them. Therefore,
it is necessary to find out which factorial structure between these two models better fits the
data; that structure will be the base line measurement model for the construct of weaker-held
and stronger-held specific investments.
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Table 5.9 CFA of stronger-held and weaker-held specific investments
Constructs MLM
2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remainingitems
Deleted
items
Stronger-held
specific
investments
2.131(2),
0.3446
0.025,
0.000-0.194,
0.438
0.999 0.998 0.017 STSI3 STSI4STSI5 STSI7
STSI1
STSI6
STSI8
STSI2
Weaker-held
specific
investments
2.166(2),
0.3385
0.028,
0.000-0.195,
0.432
0.999 0.996 0.021
WKSI2
WKSI3
WKSI5
WKSI7
WKSI1
WKSI4
WKSI6
WKSI8
Specific investments is measured by item 3, 4, 5, and 7 (Model A)
The CFA model tested in the application adopted the factorial structure of stronger-held
specific investments (see Table 5.9), and hypothesized a priori that (a) stronger-held and
weaker-held specific investments are invariant and can be explained by items 3, item 4, item
5, and item 7; (b) each item has a nonzero loading on the construct it was designed to measure,
and zero ladings on all other constructs; (c) the two constructs are correlated; and (d) the
measurement errors are uncorrelated. A schematic representation of this model is shown in
Figure 5.7.
•  Model A1: The a priori CFA model exhibited reasonable fit (see Table 5.10).
•  Model A2: Re-specifying the model based on the standardized factor-loading values
results in STSI7 having low loading. It was therefore removed, along with its
counterpart. The model fit the data perfectly. The model is presented in Figure 5.8.
Table 5.10  CFA of stronger-held and weaker-held specific investments with the equality constrained
Model MLM
2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remainingitems
Deleted
items
A1 36.108(22),0.0296
0.077,
0.025-0.121,
0.158
0.966 0.956 0.067
STSI3 STSI4
STSI5 STSI7
WKSI3WKSI4
WKSI5 WKSI7
A2 3.684(10),0.9605
0.000,
0.000-0.000,
0.985
1.000 1.029 0.017
STSI3 STSI4
STSI5
WKSI3WKSI4
WKSI5
STSI7
WKSI7
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Figure 5.8  Final measurement model of invariant factor between stronger-held specific investments and
weaker-held specific investments. Numbers above thepaths in parentheses represent each pair of
equality constraint. Numbers without parentheses are un-standardized loadings
Specific investments is measured by item 2, 3, 5, and 7 (Model B)
The CFA model tested in the present application adopted the factorial structure of weaker-held
specific investments (see Table 5.9), and hypothesized a priori that (a) stronger-held specific
investments and weaker-held specific investments are invariant and can be explained by the
four indicator variables of item 2, item 3, item 5, and item 7; (b) each item has a nonzero
loading on the construct it was designed to measure, and zero ladings on all other constructs;
(c) the two constructs are correlated, and (d) the measurement errors are uncorrelated.
•  Model B1: The a priori CFA model exhibited poor fit, see Table 5.11.
•  Model B2: Re-specifying the model, based on the model modification indices, results
in STSI7 and WKSI7 having correlation between their error variance. They were
therefore removed. The model results showed perfectfit.
Table 5.11  CFA of stronger-held and weaker-held specific investments with the equality constrained
Model MLM
2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA estimate,
90% C.I.,
close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Deleteditems
B1 52.095(22),0.0003
0.113,
0.073-0.152,
0.007
0.903 0.876 0.086
STSI2 STSI3 STSI5
STSI7
WKSI2 WKSI3
WKSI5 WKSI7
B2 8.675(10),0.5632
0.000,
0.000-0.094,
0.748
1.000 1.010 0.051
STSI2 STSI3 STSI5
WKSI2 WKSI3
WKSI5
STSI7
WKSI7
WKSI
STSI
(1)
(3)
WKSI 5
WKSI 4
WKSI 3
STSI 5
STSI 4
STSI 3
(2)
1.000
0.956
1.183
1.000
1.183
0.956(3)
(2)
(1)
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In summary, it is evident that model A2 delivered better fit than model B2 in all indices. Based
on these findings, the conclusion is that specific investments are better explained by items 3,
4, and 5, as in model A2. A schematic representation of this model is shown in Figure 5.8.
5.2.2.2. The full measurement model
In this section, the full measurement model is analyzed, following the same approach as the
testing of the full measurement model in Section 5.1. The CFA model tested in the present
application postulates a priori that:
a. The full measurement model consists of the following constructs: formalization ( 1 =
FORM), centralization ( 2 = CENT), flexibility ( 3 = FLEX), solidarity ( 4 = SOL),
information exchange ( 5 = INF), restraint to the use of power ( 6 = RPW), stronger-
held specific investments ( 7 = STSI), weaker-held specific investments ( 8 = WKSI),
environmental uncertainty ( 9 = UNC), and opportunisms ( 10 = OPP).
b. Each item-pair measure has a nonzero loading on the factor that it was designed to
measure and zero loading on all other factors.
c. All factor loadings of STSI and WKST are fixed to un-standardized factor loadings
acquired from their final measurement models in Section .2.2.1. The rest of the factor
loadings are fixed to un-standardized factor loadings acquired from the full
measurement model under Section 5.1. This ensures the location of these concepts
(Anderson and Gerbing ,1988);
d. All constructs are correlated to acquire the strongest test of measurement model
(Jøreskog, 1993).
e. Residual errors associated with each measure are uncorrelated.
f. The covariance matrix of the constructs was unconstrained. Therefore, a lack of fit can
be attributed only to the relations among the measures and their error terms.
A one-time run of the CFA model showed good fit: MLM 2 (df) = 226.058 (221), P-value =
0.3934; CFI = 0.995; TLI =0.994; RMSEA = 0.015 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.043), close-fit test P =
0.986; SRMR = 0.053. Therefore, this model was chosen as the final measurement model. It is
presented schematically in Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.9  The full measurement model, un-standardized estimates
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• Reliability
In the previous section, a measurement model was established with good global fit indices.
However, the internal fit of the model should be justified (as explained in Section 5.1.2.3).
Reliability measures were conducted according to the four evaluation criteria of Bagozzi and
Yi (1988). The results of testing the full measurement model are presented in Table 5.12. All
measures have significant parameter estimates greater than the 0.6 cut-off. Most individual
item reliabilities are high and satisfactory. Composite reliabilities of all constructs are greater
than the 0.6 cut-off. All values of average variance extracted are higher than the 0.5 cut-off.
Table 5.12  The full measurement model
Note to the table: (a) called R-SQUARE in the Mplus  7 output, (b) calculated as the square of the
highest correlation of each construct
Factor loading Error term
Item
reliability
(a)
Composite
reliability
Average
variance
extracted
Highest
shared
variance(b)
Standardized
estimate t-values
Standardized
estimate t-values
Formalization ( 1) 0.82 0.53 0.16
FORM1
FORM2
FORM3
FORM5
0.737
0.823
0.685
0.645
18.139
20.840
16.747
17.555
0.457
0.322
0.531
0.584
7.647
4.948
9.490
12.330
0.543
0.678
0.469
0.416
Centralization ( 2) 0.81 0.68 0.16
CENT1
CENT2
0.892
0.748
22.955
19.985
0.204
0.440
2.934
7.860
0.796
0.560
Flexibility ( 3) 0.76 0.62 0.38
FLEX2
FLEX3
0.862
0.705
19.498
19.521
0.257
0.503
3.373
9.877
0.743
0.497
Solidarity ( 4) 0.76 0.62 0.43
SOL3
SOL4
0.709
0.856
17.989
17.887
0.498
0.267
8.905
3.259
0.502
0.733
Information exchange ( 5) 0.81 0.68 0.20
INF3
INF4
0.886
0.760
26.653
14.887
0.215
0.422
3.660
5.437
0.785
0.578
Restraint o the use of power ( 6) 0.81 0.68 0.43
RPW2
RPW3
0.772
0.872
17.403
21.464
0.403
0.239
5.884
3.378
0.597
0.761
Stronger-held specific investments ( 7) 0.88 0.72 0.06
STSI3
STSI4
STSI5
0.838
0.942
0.757
31.301
59.440
23.218
0.298
0.113
0.426
6.651
3.797
8.626
0.702
0.887
0.574
Weaker-held specific investments ( 8) 0.89 0.72 0.13
WKSI3
WKSI4
WKSI5
0.838
0.928
0.776
27.922
35.381
26.540
0.298
0.138
0.398
5.939
2.833
8.760
0.702
0.862
0.602
Environmental uncertainty ( 9) 0.84 0.77 0.08
UNC1
UNC2
0.865
0.844
23.616
21.979
0.251
0.288
3.958
4.435
0.749
0.712
Opportunisms ( 10) 0.87 0.77 0.21
OPP1
OPP4
0.873
0.878
29.802
24.370
0.238
0.230
4.644
3.638
0.762
0.770
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• Validity
This section evaluates the construct validity of the scales, i.e., convergent validity and
discriminant validity (see Section 5.1.2.3 for more detail). Table 5.12 shows that all factor-
loading estimates are significant, i.e., with t-values above 2.33. Therefore, the conclusion is
that convergent validity can be claimed (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
Discriminant validity can be tested in two ways. The first is to check correlations among the
latent constructs. Table 5.13 presents the correlation estimates between the latent constructs
and their standard errors. There were no pairs of latent construct that correlated. High
correlation was found between (a) solidarity and restraint to the use of power at 0.659 (with its
corresponding confidence interval between 0.510 and 0.808) and (b) flexibility and solidarity
at 0.613 (with its corresponding confident interval between 0.454 and 0.772).
The second method, according to Fornell and Larcker (1981), is to check each latent variable
to determine whether its average variance extracted is higher than its highest shared variance;
if it is, discriminant validity is demonstrated. Average variance extracted was calculated and is
presented in Table 5.12. Shared variance is a square of correlations between the latent variables.
This highest of each latent variable is also presented in Table 5.13. It is evident that all average
variances extracted are greater than the highest shared variance. Therefore, the conclusion is
that discriminant validity can be claimed.
Table 5.13  Correlation matrix for the full measurement model. Standard errors in parentheses, insignificant
correlations in italics, and the highest correlation for each variable in bold
FORM CENT FLEX SOL INF RPW STSI WKSI UNC OPP
FORM 1.00
CENT 0.399
(0.095)
1.00
FLEX -0.207
(0.096)
-0.261
(0.094)
1.00
SOL -0.005
(0.105)
-0.263
(0.092)
0.613
(0.081)
1.00
INF 0.288
(0.120)
0.001
(0.108)
0.249
(0.107)
0.444
(0.087)
1.00
RPW 0.051
(0.103)
-0.040
(0.099)
0.413
(0.099)
0.659
(0.076)
0.438
(0.098)
1.00
STSI 0.095
(0.092)
-0.083
(0.098)
0.239
(0.087)
0.083
(0.097)
-0.015
(0.092)
-0.019
(0.085)
1.00
WKSI  0.363
(0.088)
0.109
(0.095)
-0.135
(0.113)
0.058
(0.099)
0.012
(0.102)
-0.210
(0.113)
0.094
(0.080)
1.00
UNC -0.055
(0.102)
0.119
(0.096)
0.282
(0.118)
0.110
(0.113)
0.035
(0.117)
0.235
(0.100)
0.132
(0.093)
-0.122
(0.102)
1.00
OPP 0.076
(0.083)
-0.023
(0.096)
-0.388
(0.105)
-0.416
(0.095)
-0.173
(0.085)
-0.459
(0.085)
0.145
(0.085)
0.135
(0.112)
-0.045
(0.098)
1.00
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5.2.2.3. Summary and conclusions of the measurement model
The data set used in this part of the hypothesis testing (Section 5.2), is a subset of the entire
dataset used in Section 5.1. It consists of 108 observations with a characteristic of asymmetric-
power relationships between exchange partners. The requirements for multivariate analysis
were considered, using graphical examination, missing value analysis, and non-normality
testing. Some observed variables showed skewness inhistogram chart, but no items failed the
test of zero kurtosis. This may be sufficient to render the distribution as multivariate non-
normal. Therefore, robust estimation (MLM estimators), was used.
Establishment of the measurement model was conducted only for the measurement model of
specific investments, to determine whether the final factorial structure should follow the pattern
of stronger or weaker specific investments. The measurement model with items 3, 4, and 5
better fit the data. The full measurement model gave good fit in all indices. Convergent validity
was achieved since all latent variables presented satisfactory composite reliability and average
variance extracted, while all factor-loading estimates were significant. Discriminant validity
was satisfactory since no pair of any latent constructs is perfectly correlated, and average
variance extracted of each latent construct was higher than its shared variance.
5.2.3. Structural analysis
In this section, hypotheses concerning asymmetric-power elationships developed in Chapter
3 are tested. This test constitutes the latter part of the two-step approach of Anderson and
Gerbing (1998). SEM was used to analyze the direct effects in the model, with the help of
Mplus 7.0.
Testing strategy, model fit, and results
The hypotheses were tested by estimating the model from the observed sample covariance
matrix and using the robust maximum likelihood estimator (as explained in Section 5.2.1).
Figure 5.10 is used to present the testing strategy of hypothesis 13, instead of Figure 3.3. In
that figure, the estimates between stronger-held specific investments and each mode of
governance will be compared with estimates of weaker-held specific investments and the same
mode of governance.
First, CRA was performed on the measurement model.. The measurement model was different
from the full measurement in the previous section (Section 5.2.2) in that it did not include
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control variables. The fit indices presented a goodfit: MLM 2 (154)= 156.682, P-value = 0.4247;
CFI = 0.997; TLI =0.996; RMSEA = 0.013 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.047), close-fit test P =  0.970;
SRMR = 0.056.
Figure 5.10 The model of asymmetric power relationships
Next, the structural model was analyzed, with stronger-held specific investments and weaker-
held specific investments equality constrained on their factor loading. Results showed that all
fit indices were the same as the indices of the measurement model, since both models are
saturated and have the same degree of freedom, i.e., the restriction of the equality constraint
between stronger-held and weaker-held specific investments and the relations between latent
variables did not significantly worsen the fit of the model.
The model results are presented in the Table 5.14. Hypothesis 13a was supported. Weaker-held
specific investments have a significant positive effect (0.255, P  = 0.000), while stronger-held
ones show no effect (0.051, P  =0.253).
Hypothesis 13b was rejected. Neither effect was significant. Weaker-held specific investments
have an insignificant positive effect on centralization (0.135, P  = 0.103), while stronger-held
specific investments have an insignificant negativeeffect (-0.130, P = 0.146).
Hypothesis 13c was rejected. Stronger-held specific investments have a significant positive
effect on flexibility (0.318,  P  = 0.002), while weaker-held specific investments show a
marginally significant negative effect (-0.168, P  = 0.081).
Hypothesis 13d was rejected. Neither effect was significant. Stronger-held specific investments
have an insignificant positive effect on solidarity(0.068, P  = 0.213), while weaker-held specific
investments have an insignificant positive effect to a low degree (0.037, P  = 0.306).
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governance
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Hypothesis 13e was rejected. Neither effect was significant. Weaker-held specific investments
have an insignificant positive effect (0.009, P  =0.449), while stronger-held investments have
an insignificant negative effect (-0.013, P  =0.428).
Hypothesis 13f was rejected. Stronger-held specificinvestments have an insignificant negative
effect (-0.002, P  = 0.494), while weaker-held specific investments have a significant negative
effect (-0.211, P  = 0.038).
Testing the model with control variables
To account for spurious associations and other competing explanations, control variables are
included in the model. The control variables are uncertainty and opportunism. The
hypothesized model used is the model of the previous application including (a) the path leading
from uncertainty to two dimensions of hierarchical governance and (b) the path leading from
opportunism to four dimensions of relational governance. The measurement model was
established in Section 5.2.2.2.
A run of the model produced the results presented in Table 5.14. The corrected MLM 2(73)=
76.32692, P = 0.3721, indicating that the two models are not significantly different. However,
the fit indices of the present model are worse thanthe model in previous application: MLM 2
(227)= 232.862, P-value = 0.3806; CFI = 0.995; TLI =0.994; RMSEA = 0.015 (90% CI: 0.000,
0.043), close-fit test P =  0.987; SRMR = 0.058. This increases the confidence in the model in
the previous application.
With regard to control variables, it was found thatuncertainty has a significant positive effect
on centralization, but no effect on formalization. Opportunism has significant negative effects
on all four dimensions of relational governance. A comparison of the sizes and significance
levels between the two models reveals some slight changes. Most significant effects are still
significant after including the control variables. This provides additional support for the
original model.
5.2.4. Summary of results
The results of testing the hypothesized model are presented in Figures 5.11 and 5.12. The
parameter estimates in the model are based on the parameter estimates obtained from using a
robust estimator. Paths that achieved support at the 5% significance level or higher are
indicated in black text, while insignificant paths are indicated in grey.
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Testing of the effect of asymmetric-power relationship effects on TCE framework showed that
the effect of weaker-held specific investments on formalization is greater than the effect of
stronger-held specific investments on the same mechanism. Other tests for asymmetric power
effect on hierarchical governance were rejected due to no-effects. Moreover, with regard to
relational governance, and contrary to expectation, the effect of stronger-held specific
investments on flexibility is greater than the effect of weaker-held specific investments on the
same relational norm; also, the effect of weaker-held specific investments on restraint to the
use of power is negative.
Table 5.14 Test of hypotheses – direct effects in the model pertaining to observations with asymmetric-power
relationships including control variables
Original model Including control
variables
Structural linkage in the model Sign Estimates One -tailedP-value Estimates
One -tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H13a: Stronger held specific investments + 0.051 0.236 0.051 0.242
H13a: Weaker held specific investments + 0.255 0.000 0.256 0.000
Uncertainty 0.000 0.499
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H13b: Stronger held specific investments + 0.130 0.146 0.161 0.086
H13b: Weaker held specific investments + 0.135 0.103 0.160 0.068
Uncertainty 0.205 0.019
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
H13c: Stronger held specific investments + 0.318 0.002 0.390 0.000
H13c: Weaker held specific investments + 0.168 0.081 0.116 0.146
Opportunism -0.499 0.000
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
H13d: Stronger held specific investments + 0.068 0.213 0.121 0.052
H13d: Weaker held specific investments + 0.037 0.306 0.076 0.141
Opportunism -0.372 0.000
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
H13e: Stronger held specific investments + 0.013 0.428 0.007 0.462
H13e: Weaker held specific investments + 0.009 0.449 0.023 0.363
Opportunism -0.137 0.022
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
H13f: Stronger held specific investments + 0.002 0.494 0.075 0.219
H13f: Weaker held specific investments + -0.211 0.038 0.160 0.066
Opportunism -0.518 0.000
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Figure 5.11  Results from testing the hypotheses in asymmetric relationships
Note:Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, Black texts and
arrows are significant effects, Grey texts and arrows are insignificant effects.
Figure 5.12 Results from testing the hypotheses in asymmetric relationships
Note:Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, Black texts and
arrows are significant effects, Grey texts and arrows are insignificant effects.
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5.3. Testing the asymmetric and symmetric power hypotheses
Section 5.3 tests hypotheses comparing the ability of the TCE framework to explain mode of
governance in asymmetric and symmetric-power elationships. A testable model of the effect
of power structure on TCE in buyer-supplier elationships is presented in Figure 3.4.
Data used in this section are the same data used inSection 5.1. However, the entire dataset was
divided into two groups: asymmetric-power and symmetric-power. In the asymmetric-power
group, respondents identified that they have asymmetric-power relationships with their
customer. In the symmetric-power group, in contrast, they selected either “Our firm and this
customer are equally dependent on each other,” or “Our firm is not dependent on this customer,
and this customer is not dependent on our firm.” The sample size of the asymmetric-power
group is 108, while the sample size of the symmetric-power group is 90. The construct of
specific investments are supplier-held and buyer-held specific investments.
First, the data were analyzed to determine whether they were normal distributed (Section 5.3.1).
Next, the test of measurement invariance was performed (Section 5.3.2). Structural invariance
is analyzed in Section 5.3.3. The summary of results is in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.1. Requirement of multivariate analysis
Two measurements are conducted based on Hair et al. (1998): graphical examination and non-
normality assessing. With regard to missing values analysis (as explained in Section 5.1.1),
there is no missing value in this study. Moreover, although the entire dataset had already been
analysed, with the finding that the data are non-normally distributed (see Section 5.1.1), it may
be beneficial to analyze the two groups of data (asymmetric-power and symmetric-power)
separately.
• Graphical examination
Histograms and frequency tables produced by IBM SPSS 20 provide a better understanding of
the data. In the group of asymmetric-power relationships, observed variables reflecting
formalization, centralization, and supplier-held specific investments seem to be skewed
towards high values on the Likert scale, while observed variables of opportunism and buyer-
held specific investments seem to be skewed towards low values. Similarly, for the group of
symmetric-power elationships, observed variables reflecting formalization, centralization, and
supplier-held specific investments eem to be skewed towards high values on the Likert scale,
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while observed variables of opportunism and buyer-held specific investments seem to be
skewed towards low values.
• Normality assessing
The descriptive statistics of a group of asymmetric-power and symmetric-power elationships
produced by using IBM SPSS 20 are presented in the Appendix L. They show that no observed
variables in the both groups exhibit evidence of kurtosis. Nevertheless, many observed
variables seem to be skewed. This may be sufficient to render the distribution as multivariate
non-normal. Robust estimators, therefore, will be used for data analysis under Section 5.3.
5.3.2. Measurement invariance
The multiple-group analysis is depicted as Figure 5.13. In general, before the structural
invariance can be tested, it is necessary to determine whether the observed variables under
study measure the same theoretical constructs in both groups, i.e., measurement invariance
(Byrne, 2012; Wang and Wang, 2012).
Figure 5.13 Hypothesized model of the impact of power structure on TCE
Testing for measurement invariance includes a cumulative series of steps. It begins with the
establishment of a separate baseline model for each group that fits the data from the
parsimonious perspective and for meaningfulness. Once the group-specific baseline models
have been determined, the test of measurement invariance can be conducted.
In the first step, configural invariance occurs when there is the same number of factors and the
same patterns of free and fixed loadings across groups without equality restrictions on any
other model parameters. Configural invariance is necessary; if it is not demonstrated, the
observed indicators are measuring different constructs in different groups.
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In the second step, a weak measurement model, or metric invariance, occurs when factor
loadings across groups are invariant. If so, the measures across groups are considered to be on
the same scale. When weak measurement is demonstrated, the latent constructs are measured
in the same way in all groups. Therefore, further testing invariance of relationships between
factors is meaningful.
In the test for measurement and structural invariance, restrictions are imposed on various
parameters of interest, across groups. To determine whether the corresponding hypothesis of
parameter invariance holds, the model 2statistic of the restricted and unrestricted models must
not change significantly. In addition, a change in comparative fit index (CFI) can also be used
to evaluate multi-group invariance (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). If CFI is less than or equal
to 0.01 between the nested model, there is no meaningful change in the model fit for testing
invariance. But if CFI is greater than 0.01, there is a meaningful change in the model fit-i.e.,
the invariance is not demonstrated.
In this study, the measurement model for all observations has been established and the factor
loadings have been identified in Section 5.1.2.3. Therefore, factor loadings of the measurement
model in this section are fixed to the unstandardized factor loadings found in the established
measurement model in Section 5.1.2.3. The method used in this study is not exactly the same
as the general procedure of testing measurement invariance. The application of the
establishment of baseline models and the test for configural invariance will not be conducted.
The application will start with the test for weak measurement invariance.
Testing weak measurement invariance
As previously explained, weak measurement invariance is defined as the invariance of factor
loading across groups. The null hypothesis of the application is that factor loadings are
invariant between the asymmetric-power and symmetric-power samples. In the normal
procedure, the LR test is used to test the model difference between the weak measurement
invariance model and the configural model. However, in this study there is no configural
model. Therefore, the model evaluation of the present application will use common model
goodness-of-fit indices and the modification indices.
Running the model shows that the weak CFA model fit the data very well: MLM 2 (390) =
391.594, P-value= 0.4678; CFI = 0.999; TLI =0.999; RMSEA = 0.006 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.037),
close-fit test  P =  0.998; SRMR = 0.065. This is sufficient to conclude that the weak
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measurement invariance is demonstrated, i.e., the relationships between responses to the
observed items and their underlying constructs are not significantly different in asymmetric-
power and symmetric-power groups. It is meaningful to conduct further tests of structural
invariance.
5.3.3. Structural analysis
Hypotheses 14 and 15 predict that the effects of specific investments on governance modes in
one group are greater than those on another group.
Testing strategy, model fit, and results
To examine whether the effect of specific investments are more positively related to
governance modes in one group than another, it was decided to test for equality or invariance
of path coefficients across groups. If the results show that the effect of specific investments
behaves differently across groups, the hypotheses can be tested by comparing the size and
direction of the effect. To test for the invariance of the effect, two baseline SEM models for
asymmetric-power and symmetric-power groups were established.
A run of the baseline model for the asymmetric-power group shows that the model fits the data
well (see Table 5.15 and Figure 5.14). For hypothesis 14a, supplier-held specific investments
have a significant positive effect on formalization(0.394, P = 0.000); however, for hypothesis
14b, buyer-held investments how no effect (-0.087, P  = 0.148). Similarly, for hypothesis 14c,
supplier-held specific investments have a significant positive effect on centralization (0.300, P
= 0.015), but for hypothesis 14d, buyer-held investments show no effect (-0.235, P = 0.068).
For hypothesis 15a, supplier-held specific investments have a significant negative effect on
flexibility (-0.453,  P  = 0.000), but for hypothesis 15b, buyer-held investments have a
significant positive effect (0.501,  P  = 0.000). For hypothesis 15c, supplier-held specific
investments (-0.013, P  = 0.444) show no effect on solidarity and for hypothesis 15d, buyer-
held specific investments (0.054,  P  = 0.282) show no effect on solidarity. Similarly, for
hypothesis 15e, supplier-held specific investments (-0.010,  P  = 0.455) show no effect on
information exchange, and for hypothesis 15f, buyer-held specific investments (-0.002, P  =
0.492) show no effect on information exchange. For hypothesis 15g, supplier-held specific
investments have significant negative effects on restraint to the use of power (-0.301,  P  =
0.010), but for hypothesis 15h, buyer-held investments how no effect (0.133, P = 0.184).
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A run of the baseline model for symmetric-power group shows that the model also fits the data
well (see Table 5.15 and Figure 5.14). For hypothesis 14a, supplier-held specific investments
have a significant positive effect on formalization(0.196, P = 0.028), but for hypothesis 14b,
buyer-held investments show no effect (-0.102, P  = 0.124). For hypothesis 14c, supplier-held
specific investments have no effect on centralization (0.126, P = 0.218), but for hypothesis 14d,
buyer-held investments have a significant negative effect (-0.453, P  = 0.000). For hypothesis
15a, supplier-held specific investments (-0.236, P  = 0.056) show no effect on flexibility and
for hypothesis 15b, buyer-held investments (-0.071, P  = 0.304) show no effect on flexibility.
For hypothesis 15c, supplier-held specific investments have a significant negative effect on
solidarity (-0.215, P = 0.044), but for hypothesis 15d, buyer-held investments have a significant
positive effect (0.331,  P  = 0.000). For hypothesis 15e, supplier-held specific investments
(0.011, P = 0.452) show no effect on information exchange and for hypothesis 15f, buyer-held
investments (0.115, P = 0.062) show no effect on information exchange. For hypothesis 15g,
supplier-held specific investments have a significant negative effect on restraint to the use of
power (-0.326, P = 0.024), but for hypothesis 15h, buyer-held investments have a significant
positive effect (0.366, P = 0.001).
It was evident that both baseline SEM models fit the data well. The estimated path coefficients
apparently differ between the two models, implying that population membership moderates the
causal relationships in the model. A further test for structural invariance will be conducted.
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Table 5.15  Results from the baseline SEM models
Asymmetric-power
model (N=108)
Symmetric-power model
(N=90)
Structural linkage Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H14a: Supplier held specific investments  + 0.394 0.000 0.196 0.028
H14b: Buyer held specific investments + 0.087 0.148 0.102 0.124
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H14c: Supplier held specific investments + 0.300 0.015 0.126 0.218
H14d: Buyer held specific investments + 0.235 0.068 -0.453 0.000
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
H15a: Supplier held specific investments  + -0.453 0.000 0.236 0.056
H15b: Buyer held specific investments + 0.501 0.000 0.071 0.304
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
H15c: Supplier held specific investments + 0.013 0.444 -0.215 0.044
H15d: Buyer held specific investments + 0.054 0.282 0.331 0.000
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
H15e: Supplier held specific investments  + 0.010 0.455 0.011 0.451
H15f: Buyer held specific investments + 0.002 0.492 0.115 0.062
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
H15g: Supplier held specific investments + -0.301 0.010 -0.326 0.024
H15h: Buyer held specific investments + 0.133 0.184 0.366 0.001
Goodness-of-fit statistics
MLM 2 (df) , P value 197.647(195), 0.4336 194.058(195), 0.5056
CFI 0.997 1.000
TLI 0.996 1.002
RMSEA, (90% CI), close fit P 0.011, (0.000,0.044), 0.985 0.000, (0.000, 0.045), 0.976
SRMR 0.059 0.071
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Figure 5.14 Results from testing the hypothesized baseline models of asymmetric-power
and symmetric-power groups
Note: Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, Black texts and
arrows are significant effects, Grey texts and arrows are insignificant effects.
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Testing invariance of structural path coefficients across groups
This section tests the structural path coefficient invariance. The non-significant effects in both
groups are apparently invariant, since they are notdifferent from zero in both groups; therefore,
hypotheses 14b, 15e, and 15f were not included in the test. The focus is on tests of hypotheses
14a, 14c, 14d, 15a, 15b, 15c, 15d, 15g, and 15h.
The SEM model tested in the application postulates a priori that item intercepts and factor
loadings were restricted invariant across group. These restrictions (a) ensure that the mean
structure part of the model identifiable and (b) enable comparison of the relationships between
latent variables and covariates by ensuring the same metric for the latent variables across
groups. Samples from asymmetric-power and symmetric-power groups were used
simultaneously in the model.
In Mplus, the command MODEL TEST is used to test a variety ofspecific null hypotheses,
including testing many hypotheses simultaneously (Wang and Wang, 2012). Therefore, the
application used the MODEL TEST command to test equality of the direct effects.
A run of the hypothesized model that was specified to test the structural path invariance for all
nine previously mentioned path coefficients shows that the model fit the data well (see Table
5.16). Mplus also provided a Wald test ( 2= 26.221, df = 9,  P = 0.0019), indicating that all null
hypotheses can be rejected. The conclusion is that the nine testing effects behave differently in
asymmetric-power and symmetric-power groups. As population membership significantly
moderates these effects, further comparison will beconducted.
Hypothesis 14a was supported (see Table 5.16). Supplier-held specific investments are more
positively related to formalization in an asymmetric-power relationship (0.394, P  = 0.000) than
in a symmetric-power elationship (0.194, P  = 0.029). Hypothesis 14b was rejected. Effects of
buyer-held specific investments on formalization donot vary between two groups. Hypothesis
14c was supported. Supplier-held specific investments are more positively related to
centralization in an asymmetric-power elationship (0.301, P  = 0.015) than in a symmetric-
power relationship (0.125,  P  = 0.219). Hypothesis 14d was rejected. Effects of buyer-held
specific investments are negatively related to centralization in both groups. Thus, hypothesis
14 is partially supported.
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Table5.16 Results from the multi-group SEM models
Asymmetric-power
model (N=108)
Symmetric-power model
(N=90)
Structural linkage Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H14a: Supplier held specific investments + 0.394 0.000 0.194 0.029
H14b: Buyer held specific investments + 0.088 0.147 0.102 0.125
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H14c: Supplier held specific investments + 0.301 0.015 0.125 0.219
H14d: Buyer held specific investments + 0.236 0.068 -0.453 0.000
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
H15a: Supplier held specific investments + -0.453 0.000 0.236 0.056
H15b: Buyer held specific investments + 0.502 0.000 0.071 0.304
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
H15c: Supplier held specific investments + 0.013 0.445 -0.216 0.043
H15d: Buyer held specific investments + 0.055 0.281 0.332 0.000
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
H15e: Supplier held specific investments + 0.010 0.455 0.011 0.453
H15f: Buyer held specific investments + 0.002 0.492 0.115 0.061
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
H15g: Supplier held specific investments + -0.301 0.010 -0.327 0.024
H15h: Buyer held specific investments + 0.134 0.183 0.366 0.001
MLM 2 (404) = 408.917, P-value = 0.4224; CFI = 0.997; TLI =0.996;
RMSEA = 0.011 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.038), close fit test P = 0.998; SRMR = 0.066
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
Hypothesis 15a was rejected. Effects of supplier-held specific investments are negatively
related to flexibility in both groups. Hypothesis 15b was rejected. Buyer-held specific
investments are not more positively related to flexibility in a symmetric-power elationship (-
0.071, P  = 0.304) than in an asymmetric-power elationship (0.502, P  = 0.000). Hypothesis
15c was rejected. Effects of supplier-held specific investments are negatively related to
solidarity in both groups. Hypothesis 15d was supported. Buyer-held specific investments are
more positively related to solidarity in a symmetric-power elationship (0.332, P  = 0.000) than
in an asymmetric-power relationship (0.055,  P  = 0.281). Hypothesis 15e was rejected.
Supplier-held specific investments have no effect on information exchange in both groups.
Hypothesis 15f was rejected. Similarly, buyer-held specific investments have no effect on
information exchange. Hypothesis 15g was rejected. Effects of supplier-held specific
investments are negative in both groups. Hypothesis 15h was supported. Buyer-held specific
investments are more positively related to restraint to the use of power in a symmetric-power
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relationship (0.366, P  = 0.001) than in an asymmetric-power elationship (0.134, P  = 0.183).
Thus, hypothesis 15 is partially supported.
Testing the model with control variables
To account for spurious associations and other competing explanations, the control variables
of uncertainty and opportunism are included in the model. The hypothesized model is the model
in the previous application, including (a) the pathleading from uncertainty to two dimensions
of hierarchical governance, (b) the path leading from opportunism to four dimensions of
relational governance. These additional paths also being tested for structural invariance. The
measurement model was established in Section 5.2.2.2.
A run of the hypothesized model that was specified to test the structural path invariance for all
previously mentioned fifteen mentioned path coefficients shows that the model fit the data well
(see Table 5.17). Mplus also provided a Wald test ( 2= 50.893, df = 15, P = 0.0000), indicating
that all null hypotheses can be rejected. The conclusion is that although control variables were
included in the model, the testing effects behave differently in asymmetric-power and
symmetric-power groups. Population membership significantly moderates these effects. This
increases the confidence in the model in the previous application.
With regard to control variables, the finding is that in asymmetric-power relationships,
uncertainty has a significant positive effect on centralization, but no effect on formalization.
Opportunism has significant negative effects on allfour dimensions of relational governance.
Comparing the sizes and significance levels between the original model and the model with
control variables reveals some slight changes. Mostsignificant effects are still significant. This
provides additional support for the original model. Similarly, in symmetric-power
relationships, uncertainty has a significant positive effect on centralization, but no effect on
formalization. Opportunism has a significant negative effect on information exchange, but no
effects on flexibility, solidarity, and restraint to the use of power. Comparing the sizes and
significance levels between the original model and the model with control variables reveals
some slight changes. Most significant effects are still. This provides additional support for the
original model.
5.3.4. Summary of results
Section 5.3 focuses on hypotheses involving multi-group comparison, in which the central
concern is whether the specific investments are more positively related to mode of governance
138
in one relationship than in another relationship, in asymmetric-power and symmetric-power
groups. The results from the test for weak measurement invariance showed that the latent
variables are measured in the same way, with the same metric in the two groups. Further
examination of structural invariance focusing on the significant effect of specific investments
on governance modes shows that population membership in asymmetric-power and symmetric-
power relationships significantly moderates the effect of specific investments on governance
modes. The next examination was to compare the size of the testing effect across groups. It
was found that supplier-held specific investments are more positively related to hierarchical
governance in asymmetric-power elationships than in symmetric-power elationships, while
buyer-held specific investments show no effect or significant negative effect on hierarchical
governance. Regarding relational governance, buyer-held specific investments are more
positively related to solidarity and restraint to the use of power in symmetric-power
relationships than in asymmetric-power relationship. In contrast, buyer-held specific
investments are more positively related to flexibility in asymmetric-power elationships than
in symmetric-power elationships.
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Table5.17 Results from the multi-group SEM models, includingcontrol predictors
Asymmetric-power model
(N=108) Symmetric-power model (N=90)
Structural linkage Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H14a: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.402 0.000 0.201 0.020
H14b: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.092 0.139 -0.118 0.096
Uncertainty - 0.022 0.348 0.041 0.276
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H14c: Supplier-held specific investments  + 0.348 0.006 0.154 0.146
H14d: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.275 0.043 -0.560 0.000
Uncertainty - 0.194 0.024 0.334 0.001
Dependent variable:
Flexibility
H15a: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.361 0.004 -0.236 0.102
H15b: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.573 0.000 -0.062 0.324
Opportunism - -0.486 0.000 -0.004 0.494
Dependent variable:
Solidarity
H15c: Supplier-held specific investments  + 0.071 0.233 -0.158 0.124
H15d: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.107 0.122 0.309 0.000
Opportunism - -0.406 0.000 -0.172 0.109
Dependent variable:
Information exchange
H15e: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.021 0.411 0.146 0.065
H15f: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.016 0.426 0.060 0.182
Opportunism - -0.144 0.015 -0.379 0.011
Dependent variable:
Restraint to the use of power
H15g: Supplier-held specific investments  + -0.198 0.060 -0.356 0.042
H15h: Buyer-held specific investments + 0.211 0.078 0.384 0.001
Opportunism - -0.533 0.000 0.084 0.348
MLM 2 (566) = 580.386, P-value = 0.3286; CFI = 0.992; TLI =0.991;
RMSEA = 0.016 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.037), close-fit test P =  0.999; SRMR = 0.067
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
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5.4. Testing the symmetric power hypotheses
Section 5.4 tests hypotheses concerning the ability of the TCE framework to explain firms in
symmetric-power relationships. In symmetric-power relationships there are two types of
relationships: mutual dependence and no-interdependence. As explained in Chapter 3, it is
more likely that firms with mutual dependence would employ governance modes at different
degrees than firms with no-interdependence. It is therefore of interest to examine whether the
structural regression paths between the constructs in the TCE framework differ in the two
symmetric-power groups. The model is schematically presented in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15 Hypothesized multi-group model of TCE framework
Data used in this section are drawn from the sub-data of the data used in Section 5.1 and 5.3
and from respondents who identify that they have either mutual-dependent or no-
interdependent relationships with their customer firms. The sample size for the mutual-
dependence group is 57; and for the no-interdependence group is 33, for a total of 90.
First, the data were analyzed to determine whether they were multivariate normal distributed
(Section 5.4.1). Next, the test of measurement invariance was performed (Section 5.4.2).
Structural analysis is presented in Section 5.4.3. The summary of results is presented in Section
5.4.4.
5.4.1. Requirement of multivariate analysis
Two measurements are made based on Hair et al. (1998): graphical examination and non-
normality assessing. With regard to missing values analysis, as explained in Section 5.1.1, there
is no missing value in this study.
It is noteworthy that although the entire dataset was already analyzed, with the finding that the
data are non-normally distributed (see Section 5.1.1), it may be beneficial to separate the data
analysis of the mutual-dependent and no-interdependent groups.
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H16
H17
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Histograms and frequency tables produced by IBM SPSS 20 provide a better understanding of
the data. In the no-interdependence group, observed variables reflecting formalization,
solidarity, information exchange, and restraint to the use of power seem to be skewed towards
high values on the Likert scale, while observed variables of opportunism and buyer-held
specific investments seem to be skewed towards low values. In the mutual-dependence group,
observed variables reflecting formalization, flexibility, solidarity, information exchange, and
restraint to the use of power seemed to be skewed towards high values on the Likert scale,
while observed variables of opportunism and buyer-held specific investments seem to be
skewed towards low values. To make precise decisions about which variables should be
excluded from the measurement model, statistical tests were conducted; they are detailed in the
following sub-section.
• Normality assessing
The descriptive statistics of a group of mutual-dependent and no-interdependent relationships
produced by using IBM SPSS 20 is presented in Appendix M. They show that two observed
variables in the group of mutual-dependence exhibitthe evidence of kurtosis: INF3 and INF4,
while in another group five observed variables exhibit evidence of kurtosis: INF3, INF4, BSI1,
BSI8, and OPP4. This presence of kurtotic variables is likely to be sufficient to render the
distribution as multivariate nonnormal, which violates the underlying assumption of normality.
Violation of assumption of normal distribution associated with the most common estimator
(such as maximum likelihood) can invalidate statistical hypothesis testing. Therefore, analysis
in Section 5.4 will use robust estimators.
5.4.2. Measurement invariance
Before testing for structural invariance, it must be determined whether the observed variables
under study measure the same theoretical constructs in both groups, i.e., measurement
invariance (Byrne, 2012; Wang & Wang, 2012).
As in Section 5.3, the application of the establishment of baseline models and the test for
configural invariance will not be conducted. The application will start with the test for weak
measurement invariance.
Testing weak measurement invariance
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As explained in Section 5.3.2, weak measurement invariance is defined as invariance of factor
loading across group. The null hypothesis of the present application is that factor loadings are
invariant between the mutual-dependent and no-interdependent samples.
A run of the model showed that the weak CFA model fit the data poorly: MLM 2 (390) =
578.903, P-value= 0.0000; CFI = 0.800; TLI =0.763; RMSEA = 0.104 (90% CI: 0.086, 0.121),
close-fit test P =  0.000; SRMR = 0.115. In addition, residual variance of CENT1 and RPW3
in no-interdependence group has negative values.
Model 2 was modified by fixing the residual variance of CENT1 and RPW3. However, the
model result still showed that the model fit the data poorly: MLM 2 (392)= 581.481, P-value=
0.0000; CFI = 0.799; TLI =0.763; RMSEA = 0.104 (90% CI: 0.085, 0.121), close-fit test P =
0.000; SRMR = 0.112.
Since the sample sizes of the groups are very small, the decision was made to split the model
into two sub-models to reduce the number of free parameters in the model, resulting in (a) a
model of specific investment and hierarchical governance, i.e., Hypothesis 16; and (b) a model
of specific investments and relational governance, i.e., Hypothesis 17.
Testing weak measurement invariance for the Hypothesis-16 model
The application hypothesizes that factor loadings are invariant across mutual-dependence and
no-interdependence groups. A run of the model showed that the weak CFA H16-model fit the
data reasonably: MLM 2 (162)= 182.718, P-value= 0.1267; CFI = 0.955; TLI =0.949; RMSEA
= 0.053 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.089), close-fit test P =  0.436; SRMR = 0.114. In addition, residual
variance of CENT1 in no-interdependence group has negative values.
After the model was modified by fixing the residualvariance of CENT1 to zero, the weak CFA
H16-model2 fits the data slightly better: MLM 2 (163) = 183.207, P-value = 0.1330; CFI =
0.956; TLI =0.951; RMSEA = 0.052 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.089), close-fit test P =  0.448; SRMR
= 0.114.
The goodness-of-fit statistics show that the model fit the data reasonably. It should be enough
evidence to demonstrate weak measurement invariance. The conclusion is that the null
hypothesis of weak measurement invariance was supported. Therefore, the relationships
between responses to the observed items and their underlying constructs are not significantly
different in mutual-dependent and no-interdependent groups. It is meaningful to conduct a
further test of structural invariance.
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Testing weak measurement invariance for the Hypothesis-17 model
The present application hypothesizes that factor loadings are invariant across mutual-
dependence and no-interdependence groups. A run of the model showed that the weak CFA
H17-model fit the data to a moderate degree: MLM 2 (198)= 275.171, P-value= 0.0002; CFI =
0.866; TLI =0.837; RMSEA = 0.093 (90% CI: 0.065, 0.118), close-fit test P =  0.010; SRMR
= 0.103. In addition, residual variance of RPW3 in no-interdependence group has negative
values.
After the model was modified by fixing the residualvariance of RPW3 to zero, the weak CFA
H17-model 2 fit the data slightly better: MLM 2 (199)= 276.864, P-value= 0.0002; CFI = 0.864;
TLI =0.837; RMSEA = 0.093 (90% CI: 0.065, 0.118), close-fit test P =  0.009; SRMR = 0.103.
The goodness-of-fit statistics show that the model fit the data to a mediocre degree, providing
insufficient evidence that the weak measurement invariance was demonstrated. Therefore, the
conclusion is that the null hypothesis of weak measurement invariance was rejected.
Consequently, Hypothesis 17 could not be tested.
5.4.3. Structural analysis
The purpose of this section is to test whether the effect of specific investments on hierarchical
governance is greater in the no-interdependent relationship than in the mutual-dependent
relationship.
Testing strategy, model fit, and results
The first step in comparing the size of the effect was to establish baseline SEM models for
mutual-dependence and no-interdependence. If the baseline models fit the data well, the second
step is the test of whether the effect of specific investments on hierarchical governance remains
unchanged across groups, controlling for covariates. If the testing effect behaves differently
across groups, the testing effects can be compared across groups.
A run of the baseline model for mutual-dependent group showed that the model fits the data
very well (see Table 5.18 and Figure 5.16): For Hypothesis 16b, buyer-held specific
investments have a significant negative effect on formalization (-0.231, P = 0.017), but for
Hypothesis 16a, supplier-held investments show no effect (0.106, P  = 0.184). Similarly, for
Hypothesis 16d, buyer-held specific investments have a significant negative effect on
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centralization (-0.305, P  = 0.007), but supplier-held investments show no effect (-0.032, P  =
0.444).
The no-interdependence model fits the data to a mediocre degree. Model modification indices
show no suggestions (see Table 5.18 and Figure 5.16). For Hypotheses 16a and 16c, supplier-
held specific investments have significant positive effects on both formalization (0.258, P  =
0.022) and centralization (0.435, P = 0.045), while for Hypotheses 16b and 16d, buyer-held
investments how no effect on formalization (0.157, P = 0.144) and have a significant negative
effect on centralization (-1.119, P = 0.000).
Table5.18 Results from the baseline SEM H16-models for mutual-dependence and no-interdependence groups
Mut.-dep. model (N=57) No-interdep. model (N=33)
Structural linkage Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H16a: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.106 0.184 0.258 0.022
H16b: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.231 0.017 0.157 0.144
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H16c: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.032 0.444 0.435 0.045
H16d: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.305 0.007 -1.119 0.000
Goodness-of-fit statistics
MLM 2 (df),  P-value 81.151(81), 0.4744 103.301(82), 0.0560
CFI 0.999 0.895
TLI 0.999 0.884
RMSEA, (90% CI), close-fit  P 0.006, (0.000,0.074), 0.780 0.089, (0.000, 0.138), 0.147
SRMR 0.097 0.138
Figure 5.16 Results from testing the hypotheses in symmetric relationships
Note: Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, Black texts and
arrows are significant effects, Grey texts and arrows are insignificant effects.
Supplier-held
specificity
Formalization
Mutual-dependent group (N = 57)
Centralization
H16a: 0.106
P= 0.184
H16d: -0.305
P= 0.007
Buyer-held
specificity
Supplier-held
specificity
Formalization
CentralizationBuyer-held
specificity
No-interdependent group (N = 33)
H16a: 0.258
P= 0.022
H16d: - 1.119
P= 0.00
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It is evident that the mutual-dependence baseline SEM model fits the data well, while the no-
interdependence model fits to a mediocre degree. The estimated path coefficients apparently
differ in the two models, implying that population membership moderates the causal
relationships in the model. The test for structural invariance is conducted in the next
application.
Testing invariance of structural path coefficients across groups
The purpose of the application is to test structural path coefficient invariance. The SEM model
tested in the application postulates a priori that item intercepts and factor loadings were
restricted invariant across group. These restrictions (a) ensure that the mean structure part of
the model identifiable and (b) enable us to comparethe relationships between latent variables
and covariates by ensuring the same metric for the latent variables across groups. Samples from
mutual-dependence and no-interdependence groups were used simultaneously in the same
model.
As with the test in Section 5.3.3, the Mplus MODEL TEST command is used to test the equality
of the direct effects. A run of the hypothesized model that was specified to test the structural
path invariance for all path coefficients showed that the model fit the data to a reasonable
degree (see Table 5.19). Mplus also provided a Wald test ( 2 = 17.700, df = 4,  P  = 0.0014),
indicating all effects behave differently between mutual-dependence and no-interdependence
groups. Population membership significantly moderates these effects. The further comparison
will be conducted.
Hypothesis 16 is partially supported (see Table 5.19). Hypothesis 16a was supported. Supplier-
held specific investments are more positively related to formalization in a no-interdependent
relationship (0.258, P = 0.022) than in a mutual-dependent relationship (0.106, P = 0.184).
Hypothesis 16b was rejected. Buyer-held specific investments have no effect on formalization
in a no-interdependent relationship and have a significantly negative effect in a mutual-
dependent relationship. Hypothesis 16c was supported. Supplier-held specific investments are
more positively related to centralization in a no-interdependent relationship than in a mutual-
dependent relationship. Hypothesis 16d was rejected. Buyer-held specific investments have
significant negative effects in both a no-interdependent relationship (-1.119, P = 0.000) and a
mutual-dependent relationship (-0.305, P = 0.007).
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Table 5.19  Results from the test for structural invariance ofSEM H16-models for mutual-dependence and no-
interdependence groups
Mut.-dep. model (N=57) No-interdep. model (N=33)
Structural linkage Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H16a: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.106 0.184 0.258 0.022
H16b: Buyer-held specific investments +
-0.231 0.017 0.157 0.144
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H16c: Supplier-held specific investments + -0.032 0.444 0.435 0.045
H16d: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.305 0.007 -1.119 0.000
MLM 2 (173) = 199.443, P-value = 0.0822; CFI = 0.942; TLI =0.939;
RMSEA = 0.058 (90% CI: 0.000, 0.092), close-fit test P =  0.356; SRMR = 0.118
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
Testing the model with control variables
To account for spurious associations and other competing explanations, the control variable of
uncertainty is included in the model. The hypothesized model is the model used in the previous
application including (a) the path leading from uncertainty to two dimensions of hierarchical
governance and (b) theses additional paths also tested for structural invariance. The
measurement model was established in Section 5.2.2.2.
A run of the hypothesized model that was specified to test the structural path invariance showed
that the model fit the data well (see Table 5.20). Mplus provided a Wald test ( 2 = 17.396, df =
6,  P  = 0.0079), indicating that although the control variable was included in the model, the
testing effects behave differently in mutual-dependence and no-interdependence groups. This
increases the confidence in the model used in the previous application.
With regard to the control variable, the findings show that in a mutual-dependent relationship,
uncertainty has no effects on centralization or formalization. Comparing the sizes and
significance levels of the original model and the model with the control variable reveals some
slight changes. Most significant effects are still significant. This provides additional support to
the original model. Similarly, in a no-interdependent relationship, uncertainty has a significant
positive effect on centralization, but no effect on formalization. Comparing the sizes and
significance levels of the original model and the model with control variable reveals some
slight changes. Most significant effects are still significant. This provides additional support to
the original model.
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Table 5.20  Results from the test for structural invariance ofSEM H16-models for mutual-dependence and no-
interdependence groups with control variables
Mut.-dep. model (N=57) No-interdep. model (N=33)
Structural linkage Sign Estimates One-tailedP-value Estimates
One-tailed
P-value
Dependent variable:
Formalization
H16a: Supplier-held specific investments + 0.110 0.164 0.228 0.030
H16b: Buyer-held specific investments +
-0.241 0.016 0.186 0.102
Uncertainty + 0.020 0.421 0.085 0.174
Dependent variable:
Centralization
H16c: Supplier-held specific investments +
-0.020 0.465 0.375 0.054
H16d: Buyer-held specific investments + -0.372 0.002 -1.033 0.000
Uncertainty + 0.142 0.159 0.379 0.002
MLM 2 (222) = 266.521, P-value = 0.0218; CFI = 0.923; TLI =0.917;
RMSEA = 0.067 (90% CI: 0.028, 0.095), close-fit test P =  0.198; SRMR = 0.112
Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, paths significant at 5% level in bold.
5.4.4. Summary of results
Section of 5.4 focuses on hypotheses involving multi-group comparisons in which the central
concern is whether specific investments are more positively related to mode of governance in
one relationship than in another relationship (with regard to mutual-dependent and no-
interdependent groups). The results from the test for weak measurement invariance showed the
model does not fit the data when all the effects from hypotheses 16 and 17 were included. This
may have been due to the small sample size. The model was therefore divided into two models
to reduce the number of free parameters.
For the model used to test hypothesis 16, the results showed that the latent variables are
measured in the same way with the same metric, for the two groups. However, in the model
used to test hypothesis 17, the results provided insufficient evident for weak measurement
invariance. Therefore, the first conclusion was that hypothesis 17 could not be tested due to
lack of weak measurement invariance. Further examination of structural invariance was
conducted only for hypothesis 16; the focus was on the effects of supplier-held and buyer-held
specific investments on formalization and centralization. The results showed that those effects
are not invariance, i.e., population membership between mutual-dependent and no-
interdependent relationship significantly moderates the effect of specific investments on
hierarchical governance. A further comparison shows that supplier-held specific investments
are more positively related to hierarchical governance in a no-interdependent relationship than
in a mutual-dependent relationship.
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6. Results
This chapter provides a summary and explanation of the results. Section 6.1 presents the results
from the test of the core prediction of TCE. Section 6.2 presents the relationship between
governance modes and negotiation strategies. Section 6.3 presents the results from the test for
the impact of power structure on TCE. Section 6.4 provides a summary of the main findings.
6.1. Testing for the core prediction of TCE
Section 6.1 focuses on the core prediction of TCE. Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.4 present results from
the test for antecedents of governance modes. Sections 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.1.5, and 6.1.6 present
results from the test for alignment of specific investments and governance modes.
6.1.1. Relationship of specific investments and hierarchical governance
The relationship between specific investments and hierarchical governance was hypothesized
to be positive. A model was tested in which two dimensions of hierarchical governance were
caused by both supplier-held and buyer-held specific investments, according to hypotheses 1a,
1b, 1c and 1d. The empirical testing found that these four hypotheses were partially supported
in both direct-effect model (sub-model 1) and direct and interaction effect model (sub-model
3). Supplier-held specific investments have significant positive effects on formalization and
centralization in both sub-models. However, in contradiction to the expectation, buyer-held
specific investments have a significant negative effect on formalization in sub-model 3 and
have a weakly significantly negative effect on formalization in sub-model 1. Similarly, buyer-
held specific investments have significant negativeeffect on centralization in both sub-model1
and 3.
A number of issues may have caused the significant negative associations between buyer-held
specific investments and the two dimensions of hierarchical governance. It may be that there
were unobserved variables not examined in this model, causing the negative-associations and
no-associations. A possible variable is power structure, which is a characteristic of the sample.
Buying firms in this study are oil firms that are usually big, and have power over their supplier
firms. Further investigation of asymmetric power was conducted; as expected, the empirical
findings suggest that TCE cannot explain how stronger firms choose their governance mode
(for further explanation, see Section 6.3).
6.1.2. Relationship of hierarchical governance and relationship performance
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A model was tested in which two dimensions of hierarchical governance have direct effects on
three dimensions of relationship performance. Results showed that formalization has
significant positive effects on all three dimensions of relationship performance. However,
contrary to expectation, centralization has no effect on any of them.
6.1.3. Alignment of specific investments and hierarchical governance
The model (sub-model 3) included both the direct effects and interaction effects of supplier-
held specific investments, buyer-held specific investments, formalization, and centralization
on all three dimensions of relationship performance. However, not all interactions were
included due to model complexity beyond the capability of Mplus. Only the significant
interactions found in preliminary tests were included.
With regard to the direct effects of specific investments on both dimensions of hierarchical
governance, the empirical testing found that the hypotheses were partially supported. Supplier-
held specific investments have significant positiveeffects on both dimensions of hierarchical
governance, but buyer-held specific investments have significant negative effects. It is
noteworthy that after including interaction effects, the effect of buyer-held specific investment
on formalization became significant in a negative direction, found to be weakly significant in
the direct effect model (sub-model 1), as detailed in Section 6.1.1.
With regard to direct effect of hierarchical governance on relationship performance, the
empirical testing found that the hypotheses were partially supported. Formalization has
significant positive effects on cost reduction outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration,
but no effect on end-product enhancement. Centralization has no effect on relationship
performance. These results are similar to results from sub-model 1; however, in sub-model 1,
formalization has a significant positive effect on end-product enhancement outcomes, but in
sub-model 3 it has no effect after the interaction effects were included in the model.
With regard to the interaction effects of specific investments and two dimensions of
hierarchical governance on relationship performance, the empirical testing found that all
interactions have no effect on relationship performance, even though buyer-held specific
investments and formalization individually have significant positive effects on cost-reduction
outcomes. Supplier-held specific investments per sehave a significant positive effect on end-
product enhancement outcomes. Buyer-held specific investments and formalization
individually have significant positive effects on satisfaction with the collaboration.
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6.1.4. Relationship of specific investments and relationalgovernance
A model was tested in which four dimensions of relational governance were caused by both
supplier-held and buyer-held specific investments. The empirical testing found that these
hypotheses were partially supported. In sub-model 1, buyer-held specific investments have
significant positive effects on all four dimensions of relational governance. Contrary to
expectation, however, supplier-held specific investments have significant negative effects on
flexibility, solidarity, and restraint to the use of power, and have no effect on information
exchange.
This implies that relational governance works as a safeguarding mechanism only when buying
firms make specific investments. However, unobserved variables not included in this model
may cause this negative-association or no-association of supplier-held specific investments and
relational governance.
6.1.5. Relationship of relational governance and relationship performance
A model was tested in which four dimensions of relational governance have direct effects on
three dimensions of relationship performance. The empirical testing found that these
hypotheses were partially supported. Flexibility has a significant positive effect on satisfaction
with the collaboration; however, contrary to expectation, it has a significant negative effect on
end-product enhancement outcomes and no effect on cost reduction outcomes. Solidarity has a
significant positive effect on cost reduction outcomes, and on satisfaction with collaboration,
but no effect on end-product enhancement outcomes. Information exchange has significant
positive effects on all three dimensions of relationship performance. Restraint to the use of
power has no effects on the three dimensions of relationship performance.
6.1.6. Alignment of specific investments and relational governance
The model (sub-model 4.1b) included both the directeffects and interaction effects of supplier-
held specific investments, buyer-held specific investments, flexibility, solidarity, information
exchange, and restraint to the use of power on all three dimensions of relationship performance.
However, not all interactions were included; only the significant interactions found in the
preliminary test were included. A model was tested in which four dimensions of relational
governance were caused by supplier-held and buyer-held specific investments at the fixed
levels of un-standardized estimates found in sub-model 1, since the model was non-convergent
if these path coefficients were freely estimated.
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With regard to the direct effect of relational governance on relationship performance in the
interaction model (sub-model 4.1b), the empirical testing found that those hypotheses were
partially supported. Only information exchange has a significant positive effect on satisfaction
with the collaboration. Other direct effects did not have any effects on relationship
performance. It is noteworthy that after including interaction effects, the effect of relational
governance changed from being became less significant or insignificant from significant in the
direct effect model (sub-model 1) to less significant or insignificant (for further detail see
Section 6.2.2).
With regard to the interaction of specific investments and relational governance on relationship
performance, the empirical testing found that all hypotheses were rejected. None of the
interaction effects of specific investments and relational governance has a significant effect on
relationship performance, even though some were found to be significant in the preliminary
individual test.
6.2. Relationship of governance modes and negotiation strategies
The purpose of Section 6.2 is to explain the relationship between governance modes and
negotiation strategies, based on the empirical findings of this study. Section 6.2.1 presents
results of the test for direct-effect of negotiation strategies on relationship performance. Section
6.2.2 presents results of the test for the relationship between hierarchical governance and
negotiation strategies. Section 6.2.3 presents results of the test for the relationship between
relational governance and negotiation strategies.
6.2.1. Effect of negotiation strategies on relationship performance
The next step was a test of the common findings of the previous empirical research regarding
outcomes of the two negotiation strategies. The relationship between aggressive negotiation
strategies and relationship performance was hypothesized to be negative, while the relationship
between problem-solving negotiation strategy and relationship performance was hypothesized
to be positive.
A test was conducted of a model (sub-model 1) in which three dimensions of relationship
outcomes (cost reduction outcomes, end-product enhancement outcomes, and satisfaction with
the collaboration) were caused by two styles of negotiation strategies. The empirical testing
found that the hypothesis 5 was rejected, while hypothesis 6 was partially supported (see Table
5.8). Problem-solving negotiation strategy has significant positive effects on end-product
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enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with collaboration, but has no effect on cost reduction
outcomes. However, aggressive negotiation strategy, contrary to expectation, has a significant
positive effect on cost reduction outcomes, and no effects on end-product enhancement
outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration.
6.2.2. Interaction of hierarchical governance and negotiation strategies
Sub-model 3 was used to test the hypotheses concerning the interaction between hierarchical
governance and negotiation strategies. These interactions were hypothesized in two ways. If
the negotiation strategy is the problem-solving approach, the impact of hierarchical governance
on relationship performance should be positive. If the negotiation strategy is aggressive, the
impact of hierarchical governance on relationship performance should be negative. However,
only two significant interactions found in the preliminary individual test were included.
Moreover, the model also included (a) direct effects of specific investments on governance
modes and (b) direct effects of formalization, centralization, aggressive negotiation strategies,
and problem-solving negotiation strategy on all three dimensions of relationship performance.
With regard to direct effect (see Table 5.8), the empirical testing found that hypothesis 1 was
partially supported. Supplier-held specific investments have significant positive effects on
formalization and centralization. But buyer-held specific investments have significant negative
effects on formalization and centralization. This is similar to the result from direct-effect model
(sub-model 1). For further detail, see Section 6.1.3.
Hypotheses 3 was partially supported. Formalization has significant positive effects on cost
reduction outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration, but no effect on end-product
enhancement outcomes. These results are similar to results from the direct-effect model (sub-
model 1), with the exception of the effect of formalization on end-product enhancement
outcomes being significant in that model, but insignificant in this model.
Hypothesis 5 was partially supported. Aggressive negotiation strategy has significant negative
effects on end-product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration, but no
effect on cost reduction outcomes. These results are opposite to the results from the direct-
effect model (sub-model 1). In that model, aggressive negotiation strategy has a significant
positive effect on cost reduction outcome, but no effects on end-product enhancement
outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration. The possible reason for this incongruence
may be seen when all results in Table 5.8 are considered. Sub-model 3 is the only model of the
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four sub-models that does not include relational governance. Sub-model 3 is the only model in
which aggressive negotiation strategy has significant negative effects on end-product
enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration. This implies that when
relational governance is included in the model, aggressive negotiation strategy has no effects
on end-product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration. However, this
pattern did not seem to apply to cost reduction outcomes, since sub-model 1 has different
results than sub-model 4.1b and 4.2b regarding this matter.
In the interaction model (sub-model 3), hypothesis 6 was rejected. Problem-solving has no
effects on all three dimensions of relationship outcomes. This result is different from the direct
effect model (sub-model 1) and other interaction effect models (sub-models 4.1b and 4.2b).
However, the results of all four models do not showany patterns that lead to further hypotheses.
Hypothesis 10 was partly supported. Only hypothesis 10d was supported. Hypothesis 10b was
rejected, though it was found to be significant in the preliminary test. The interaction of
centralization and problem-solving negotiation strategy has a significant positive effect on end-
product enhancement outcomes, but no effect on costreduction outcomes. It is noteworthy that
centralization and problem-solving negotiation strategy per se have no effect on end-product
enhancement outcomes.
6.2.3. Interaction of relational governance and negotiation strategies
The interaction between relational governance modes and negotiation strategies was
hypothesized in two ways. If the negotiation strategy is a problem-solving approach, the impact
on relationship performance should be positive. If the negotiation strategy is aggressive, the
impact on relationship performance should be negative.
Sub-model 4.2b was used for testing hypotheses concerning the interaction between relational
governance and negotiation strategies. Only the interaction of information exchange and
problem-solving negotiation strategy was included in the mode (according to hypothesis 12g),
because other interactions were found insignificant in the preliminary individual test.
In the model, the interaction and other direct effects were included. They are (a) the effect of
supplier-held and buyer-held specific investments on relational governance, (b) the effect of
four dimensions of relational governance on three dimensions of relationship performance, and
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(c) the effect of two styles of negotiation strategy on relationship performance, according to
Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c, 6a, 6b, and 6c.
With regard to direct effect, Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. Only Hypotheses 4c and 4k
were supported. Information exchange has significant positive effects on cost reduction
outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration. Compared to other models, these results are
similar to results from sub-model 4.1b, in that hypothesis 4k was supported, while other sub-
hypotheses of hypothesis 4 were rejected, (with the exception of hypothesis 4c, which was
supported).
Hypothesis 5 was rejected. Aggressive negotiation strategy has no effect on relationship
performance. This result is consistent with anotherinteraction effect model (sub-model 4.1b).
Hypothesis 6 was partially supported. Problem-solving negotiation strategy has significant
positive effects on end-product enhancement outcomes and satisfaction with the collaboration,
but no effect on cost reduction outcomes. This result is consistent with the direct effect model
(sub-model 1).
With regard to interaction effect, the empirical findings show that hypothesis 12g was rejected;
the interaction of information exchange and problem-solving negotiation strategy, contrary to
expectation, has a significant negative effect on end-product enhancement outcomes.
Information exchange individually has no effect on end-production enhancement outcomes,
but problem-solving negotiation has a significant positive effect. This implies that information
exchange decreases the effect of problem-solving negotiation strategy.
6.3. The impact of power structure relationship on TCE
Section 6.3 present results from the test for impact of power structure on TCE. Section 6.3.1
details the results of the test for impact of asymmetric power on TCE. Section 6.3.2 details
results of the test for the difference between asymmetric-power and symmetric-power
relationships. Section 6.3.3 details empirical results of the test for the difference between
mutual-dependence and no-interdependence.
6.3.1. Stronger firms versus weaker firms
In asymmetric-power relationships, a stronger firm can extract the best exchange terms by using
its power (Beier & Stern, 1969).In contrast, to protect itself from opportunistic behaviours of
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partner firms, a weaker firm needs to employ a more integrated structure as it makes specific
investments. It seems less motivating for a stronger firm to develop relational governance,
because the stronger firm is likely to retain its right to use its power to earn unilateral benefits
from the relationships at the expenses of its weaker partner (Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Frazier et
al., 1989; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Kale, 1986; Roering, 1977; Wilkinson & Kipnis, 1978). In
contrast, weaker firms might be motivated to employ relational governance because they can
benefit from relational norms that enhance the well-being of the relationship as a whole (Dwyer
et al., 1987; Kaufmann & Stern, 1988; Heide & John, 1992).
The expectation of the hypothesis is that TCE is better at explaining firms with lower power.
The effects of weaker-held specific investments on hierarchical and relational governance were
expected to be higher than the effect of stronger-held specific investments. A test was made of
a model in which (a) factor loadings of both stronger-held specific investments and weaker-
held specific investments were equality restricted and (b) both stronger-held and weaker-held
specific investments lead to two dimensions of hierarchical governance and four dimensions of
relational governance. This enabled comparison of the effects of strong-held specific
investments and weaker-held specific investments ongovernance modes.
With regard to hierarchical governance, the empirical testing found that hypothesis 13 was
partially supported. Hypothesis 13a was supported. Weaker-held specific investments have a
significant positive effect on formalization, but stronger-held specific investments have no
effect on formalization. Hypothesis 13b was rejected. Both stronger-held and weaker-held
specific investments have no effect on centralization.
With regard to relational governance, hypothesis 13c was rejected. Stronger-held specific
investments have a significant positive effect on flexibility, but weaker-held investments have
no effect on flexibility. Hypotheses 13d and 13e were rejected. Both types of specific
investments have no effects on solidarity and information exchange. Hypothesis 13f was
rejected. Weaker-held specific investments have a significant negative effect on restraint to the
use of power, but stronger-held investments have noeffect on restraint to the use of power.
In summary, hypothesis 13 was partially supported. The TCE prediction works well with
weaker firms using formalization and with stronger firms using flexibility.
6.3.2. Asymmetric-power versus symmetric-power relationships
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The expectations of the hypotheses are that (a) specific investments are more positively related
to hierarchical governance in an asymmetric-power elationship than in a symmetric-power
relationship, and (b) specific investments are more positively related to relational governance
in a symmetric-power elationship than in an asymmetric-power relationship.
The empirical testing found that the effect of specific investments on relational governance
behaves differently across asymmetric-power and symmetric-power groups. Hypothesis 14
was partially supported. Hypotheses 14a and 14c were supported. Supplier-held specific
investments are more positively related to formalization and centralization in asymmetric-
power relationship than in symmetric-power elationships. Contrary to expectation, hypotheses
14b and 14d were rejected. Buyer-held specific investments have significant and non-
significant negative effects on both formalization and centralization in both groups.
With regard to relational governance, Hypotheses 15d and 15h were supported. Buyer-held
specific investments are more positively related to solidarity and restraint to the use of power
in symmetric-power relationships than in asymmetric-power elationship. Hypotheses 15a,
15b, 15c, 15e, 15f, and 15g were rejected. Supplier-held specific investments have no effect on
flexibility in symmetric-power elationships, while they a have significant negative effect in
asymmetric-power relationships. Buyer-held specificinvestments have no effect in symmetric-
power relationships, while they have a significant positive effect in asymmetric-power
relationships. Supplier-held specific investments have a significant negative effect on solidarity
in symmetric-power relationships, while they have no effect in asymmetric-power
relationships. Supplier-held and buyer-held specific investments have no effects on
information exchange in both groups. Supplier-held specific investments have significant
negative effects on restraint to the use of power in both groups.
6.3.3. Mutual-dependent versus no-interdependent relationships
This study hypothesizes that specific investments are more positively related to hierarchical
governance in no-interdependent relationships than in mutual-dependent relationships,
according to hypothesis 16. Furthermore, this research also expects that specific investments
are more positively related to relational governance in mutual-dependent relationships than in
no-interdependent relationship, according to hypothesis 17.
The analysis began with the test for weak measurement invariance. The results show that only
the model used to test hypothesis 16 fit the data. The model for testing both hypotheses 16 and
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17 together, and the model for testing hypothesis 17 alone, do not fit the data. Therefore, further
testing of hypothesis 17 could not be carried out. Only hypothesis 16 could be tested.
The test for structural invariance could be conducted only for hypothesis 16. The empirical
testing found the group members of mutual-dependence and no-interdependence moderate the
effects of specific investments on hierarchical governance. The empirical testing shows that
hypothesis 16 is partially supported. Hypotheses 16a and 16c were supported. Supplier-held
specific investments are more positively related to formalization and centralization in a no-
interdependent relationship than in a mutual-dependent relationship. Hypotheses 16b and 16d
were rejected. Buyer-held specific investments have no effect on formalization in a no-
interdependent relationship, while they have a significant negative effect in a mutual-dependent
relationship. Moreover, buyer-held specific investments have significant negative effects on
centralization in both groups.
6.4. Summary
In summary, the findings in this dissertation provide partial support for the core prediction of
TCE, which is consistent with the findings of Davidand Han (2004). Furthermore, the findings
show partial support for hypotheses regarding the effect of power structure on the TCE
framework. In asymmetric-power elationships, TCE works well when weaker firms make
specific investments and use formalization. The relationship between specific investments and
governance modes behaves differently among various types of power structures. With regard
to interaction of negotiations and governance modes, testing shows the surprising result that
information exchange reduces the positive effect of problem-solving negotiation strategy on
end-product enhancement outcomes (see Chapter 7 fordetailed discussions). Summaries of the
findings are presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and6.4.
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Table 6.1  Summary of antecedent hypotheses to modes of governance and relationship performance
Sign Sub-model 1 Individual
interaction
models
Sub-model 3 Sub-model
4.1b
Sub-model
4.2b
H1a SSI FORM + Supported Supported
H1b BSI FORM + No effect Negative effect
H1c SSI CENT + Supported Supported
H1d BSI CENT + Negative effect Negative effect
H2a SSI FLEX + Negative effect
H2b BSI FLEX + Supported
H2c SSI SOL + Negative effect
H2d BSI SOL + Supported
H2e SSI INF + No effect
H2f BSI INF + Supported
H2g SSI RPW + Negative effect
H2h BSI RPW + Supported
H3a FORM CRO + Supported Supported
H3b CENT CRO + No effect No effect
H3c FORM EPE + Supported No effect
H3d CENT EPE + No effect No effect
H3e FORM SAT + Supported Supported
H3f CENT SAT + No effect No effect
H4a FLEX CRO + No effect No effect No effect
H4b SOL CRO + Supported No effect No effect
H4c INF CRO + Supported No effect No effect
H4d RPW CRO + No effect No effect No effect
H4e FLEX EPE + Negative effect No effect No effect
H4f SOL EPE + No effect No effect No effect
H4g INF EPE + Supported No effect No effect
H4h RPW EPE + No effect No effect No effect
H4i FLEX SAT + Supported No effect No effect
H4j SOL SAT + Supported No effect No effect
H4k INF SAT + Supported Supported Supported
H4l RPW SAT + No effect No effect No effect
H5a AGG CRO + Supported No effect No effect No effect
H5b AGG EPE + No effect Negative effect No effect No effect
H5c AGG SAT + No effect Negative effect No effect No effect
H6a PSV CRO + No effect No effect No effect No effect
H6b PSV EPE + Supported No effect Supported Supported
H6c PSV SAT + Supported No effect No effect Supported
H7b BSI * FORM CRO + Negative effect No effect
H7d BSI * CENT CRO + Supported No effect
H7g SSI * CENT EPE + Supported No effect
H7h BSI * CENT EPE + Supported No effect
H7j BSI * FORM SAT + Negative effect No effect
H7l BSI * CENT SAT + Supported No effect
H8b BSI*FLEX CRO + Negative effect No effect
H8d BSI*SOL CRO + Negative effect No effect
H8f BSI*INF CRO + Negative effect No effect
H8h BSI*RPW CRO + Negative effect No effect
H8n BSI*INF EPE + Negative effect No effect
H8p BSI*RPW EPE + Negative effect No effect
H8r BSI*FLEX SAT + Negative effect No effect
H8x BSI*RPW SAT + Negative effect No effect
H10b CENT* PSV CRO + Supported No effect
H10d CENT* PSV EPE + Supported Supported
H12g INF*PSV EPE + Negative effect Negative effect
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Table 6.2  Summary of asymmetric power hypotheses
Note: For example, (WKSI FORM) > (STSI FORM) means effect of weaker-held specific
investments on formalization is greater than the effect of stronger-held specific investments on
formalization.
H13a (WKSI FORM) > (STSI FORM) Supported
H13b (WKSI CENT) > (STSI CENT) No effect
H13c (WKSI FLEX) > (STSI FLEX) Rejected (reversed)
H13d (WKSI SOL) > (STSI SOL) No effect
H13e (WKSI INF) > (STSI INF) No effect
H13f (WKSI RPW) > (STSI RPW) Rejected (negative effect)
Table 6.3  Summary of asymmetric and symmetric power hypotheses
Note: For example, Asym(SSI FORM) > Sym(SSI FORM) means supplier-held specific
investments are more positively related to formalization under asymmetric-power relationship than
under symmetric-power elationship.
H14a Asym(SSI FORM) > Sym(SSI FORM) Supported
H14b Asym(BSI FORM) > Sym(BSI FORM) Rejected (no effect)
H14c Asym(SSI CENT) > Sym(SSI CENT) Supported
H14d Asym(BSI CENT) > Sym(BSI CENT) Rejected (negative effect)
H15a Sym(SSI FLEX) > Asym(SSI FLEX) Rejected (negative effect)
H15b Sym(BSI FLEX) > Asym(BSI FLEX) Rejected (reversed)
H15c Sym(SSI SOL) > Asym(SSI SOL) Rejected (negative effect)
H15d Sym(BSI SOL) > Asym(BSI SOL) Supported
H15e Sym(SSI INF) > Asym(SSI INF) Rejected (no effect)
H15f Sym(BSI INF) > Asym(BSI INF) Rejected (no effect)
H15g Sym(SSI RPW) > Asym(SSI RPW) Rejected (negative effect)
H15h Sym(BSI RPW) > Asym(BSI RPW) Supported
Table 6.4  Summary of symmetric power hypotheses
Note: For example, Mut(SSI FORM) > No-dep(SSI FORM) means supplier-held specific
investments are more positively related to formalization under mutual-dependent relationship than
under no-interdependent relationship.
H16a Mut(SSI FORM) > No-dep(SSI FORM) Supported
H16b Mut(BSI FORM) > No-dep(BSI FORM) Rejected (negative effect)
H16c Mut(SSI CENT) > No-dep(SSI CENT) Supported
H16d Mut(BSI CENT) > No-dep(BSI CENT) Rejected (negative effect)
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7. Discussion
First, this chapter discusses important findings and non-findings of this study in relation to
theory and previous empirical findings. Second, it provides theoretical implications. Third, it
presents implications for managerial decision making. Finally, it discusses limitations and
suggests possible future research.
7.1. Discussion of the results
There are two main contributions of this study. First, by presenting a thorough examination of
the impact of power structure on association between specific investments and governance
modes, it argues that TCE is not equally applicable to all types of firms. Second, it expands
TCE by integrating governance modes with negotiation strategies.
7.1.1. Discussion on the impact of power structure power on TCE
This study begins its investigation with the test for the core prediction of TCE, i.e., specific
investments leads to hierarchical governance. The results from the empirical testing in the
Norwegian O & G industry showed that the prediction of TCE is partially supported. TCE
prediction works well when supplying firms make specific investments. Supplier-held specific
investments are positively related to both formalization and centralization. But TCE prediction
does not work with the investments of buying firms. Buyer-held specific investments are
negatively related to both formalization and centralization.
Why is the TCE prediction “partially” supported?  This study proposes that asymmetric-power
relationship may be a potential unobserved variable moderating the effect of specific
investments on hierarchical governance. The furtherinvestigation in this study hypothesized
that an asymmetric-power relationship between buyerand supplier could be a reason why TCE
prediction does not work with buyer-held specific investments.
Buying firms in this study are oil firms that generally have more power than their suppliers do,
rendering them as having asymmetric-power elationships. Further investigation in this study
(i.e., hypothesis 13) empirically found that TCE prediction works well with weaker-held
specific investments. Further, the test for structure invariance shows that TCE provides a better
explanation of supplier firms in asymmetric-power elationships than it does of firms in
symmetric-power relationships, when hierarchical governance is considered. The findings
show that supplier-held specific investments are more positively related to hierarchical
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governance in asymmetric-power relationships than in symmetric-power relationships,
according to hypothesis 14.
These findings are consistent with the findings of Shervani et al. (2007), that firms with lower
power need to rely on highly integrated forward channel to lower transaction costs. But firms
with higher power have the ability to monitor and exercise legitimate authority to reduce
transaction costs rather than using an integrated forward channel. Bucklin and Sengupta’s
(1993) findings explains why weaker firms need a more integrated governance structure. They
find that contractual governance (analogous to formalization) helps to reduce the damaging
perceptions of power asymmetry. Nevertheless, thesefindings are inconsistent with Heide and
John’s (1988) and Buvik and Reve’s (2002) findings. Heide and John (1988) show that weaker
firm do have the ability to conduct more integratedgovernance, while Buvik and Reve (2002)
argue that as buyer’s power increases, the buyer uses its power to protect its specific
investments with comprehensive contracts. Thus, buyer-held specific investments are strongly
associated with formalized purchased contracts.
With regard to relational governance, this study also began with the test for incorporation
relational governance into TCE when it is considered a governance mechanism that safeguards
specific investments (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Heide & John, 1992). Many previous research
studies empirically support the positive association between specific investments and relational
governance (e.g., Anderson & Buvik, 2001; Bello & Gilliand, 1997; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
The empirical results in this study showed that relational governance is well incorporated into
the TCE framework only when buying firms make specific investments, according to
hypothesis 2. Buyer-held specific investments are positively related to all four dimensions of
relational governance, while supplier-held specific investments are negatively related to
flexibility, solidarity, and restraint to the use of power; they have no effect on information
exchange. In other words, when considering relational governance, TCE better explains buying
firms than supplying firms.
Why is the incorporation of relational governance only “partially” supported?  Similar to the
case of hierarchical governance, it was also expected that an asymmetric-power elationship
might moderate the effect of supplier-held specific investments on relational governance.
As previously mentioned, most buying firms in this study are firms with high power and most
supplying firms are firm with low power. The results seems to suggest hat when considering
relational governance, TCE better explains firms with high power than firms with low power.
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This opposes the expectation and is incongruent with the findings of Geyskens et al. (1996),
that when interdependence asymmetry increases, calculative commitment (or the need to
maintain the relationship) decreases for the stronger party, and increases for the weaker party.
Further investigation was conducted by checking the moderating effect of asymmetric power
on the association between specific investments and relational governance, according to
hypothesis 13. The hypothesis proposed that TCE better explains weaker firms than stronger
firms, because weaker firms may need relational governance to counter balance the power of
their stronger partner, while stronger firms may not need relational governance as it may hinder
them from using their power. Nevertheless, the findings show that hypothesis 13 was rejected.
TCE better explains high-power firms than low-powerfirms when flexibility is considered. In
other words, relational governance can be well incorporated into TCE when stronger firms
make specific investments and only when flexibilityis considered.
Further findings show the type of relationship—asymmetric power or symmetric power—that
TCE better explains when relational governance is considered, according to hypothesis 15. The
findings show that (a) TCE better explains buying firms in symmetric-power elationships than
buying firms in asymmetric-power relationship when considering solidarity and restraint to the
use of power, and (b) TCE better explains buying firms in asymmetric-power relationships than
symmetric-power elationships, when flexibility is considered.
With regard to related previous empirical findings, there do not appear to be any studies that
empirically investigate the extent to which specific investments made by stronger firms or
weaker firms are related to relational governance. All previous research focuses on the
relationships between power architecture (i.e., asymmetric power, mutual dependence) and
relational governance (or similar concepts). However, there are studies that have a similar
implication. For example, Kumar et al. (1995) findsthat asymmetric power reduces trust, while
mutual dependence increases trust. This is similar to the findings of hypothesis 15, that TCE
better explains buying firms in symmetric-power relationships than buying firms in
asymmetric-power relationships, when solidarity and restraint to the use of power are
considered.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the findings inthis study are inconsistent with this previous
research, according to the findings of hypothesis 15, that TCE better explains buying firms in
asymmetric-power relationships than symmetric-power relationships, when flexibility is
considered.
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7.1.2. Discussion on the integration of governance structure and negotiation strategy
Previous research suggests an association between governance modes and negotiation
strategies (Lumineau & Henderson, 2009; Ness & Haugland, 2005; Ness, 2009; Schurr &
Ozanne, 1985). This study, therefore, proposes that the use of governance modes and
negotiation strategies together may enhance understanding of the relationship performance.
Previous research suggests that inter-firm performance increases when firms adopt governance
structure to reduce transaction costs, mitigate opportunistic behaviour, and facilitate
cooperation (Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999; Ghosh & John,
2005; Heide & John, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), and when firms use problem-solving
negotiation strategy to interact to reach successful agreements (e.g., Clopton, 1984; Ganesan,
1993; Graham, 1986; Pruitt, 1981). Empirical results of this study confirm and advance this
literature and extend previous research by demonstrating that the centralization and problem-
solving negotiation strategies strengthen each other’s effect on end-product enhancement
outcomes. However, in the same model (see sub-model3 in Table 5.8), although centralization
and problem-solving negotiation strategies individually have no effects on end-product
enhancement outcomes; their interaction has a significant effect on this outcome.
The most surprising findings are that the interaction between information exchange and
problem-solving negotiation strategy is negatively related to end-product enhancement
outcomes, while problem solving alone is positively related to this outcome and information
exchange has no effect on this outcome. These findings suggest that information exchange
reduces the positive effect of problem-solving negotiation strategy on end-product
enhancement outcomes. This negative interaction effect seems somewhat curious. There does
not appear to be any previous literature or empirical research that suggests the negative effect
of information exchange on relationship performance. Moreover, the negotiation strategy of
problem solving per se requires information exchange. However, this finding may be evidence
that information exchange can play a negative role in promoting the successful end products
for supplying firms. Further research is needed to examine the extent to which the use of
information exchange and various types of information has a negative effect on end-production
enhancement outcomes.
7.2. Theoretical implications
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This section presents the theoretical implications. There are two aspects of inter-firm
relationships that this study has addressed. First, it demonstrates the impact of power structure
on association between specific investments and governance mechanisms. Second, it presents
the theoretical implication of the integration of governance modes and negotiation strategies.
7.2.1. Impact of power structure on TCE
Findings from this study provide partial support to the core prediction of standard TCE and
suggest hat TCE cannot fully explain how firms choose governance mechanisms. This study
suggests that mode of governance is contingent not only on specific investments, but also on
the power structure between partner firms. Power structure tends to moderate the association
between specific investments and governance mode. This finding coincides with Shervani et
al. (2007), in that there is a significant and positive association between weaker-held specific
investments and formalization, but no association between stronger-held specific investments
and formalization. Under asymmetric-power elationships, stronger firms seem to have the
ability to have their specific investments afeguarded by their power. In contrast, weaker firms
seem to need formalization to safeguard their specific investments. This implies that TCE has
scope conditions, i.e., it cannot provide equally good explanations of how all firms choose
control structures. When considering formalization as a mode of governance, TCE better
explains weaker firms than stronger firms. When considering flexibility as a mode of
governance, it provides a better explanation of stronger firms than weaker firms.
This study advances and extends previous research by comparing how well TCE explains the
behaviour of firms in various types of power structure relationships. The findings of this study
suggest hat the extent to which the TCE governancemode is moderated by the power structure
depends on the types of relationships between buying and selling firms. For example, in
asymmetric-power relationships, supplier-held specific investments are more positively related
to formalization than in symmetric-power elationships. This implies that the TCE framework
should be augmented with the condition of power structure.
7.2.2. Integration of governance mode and negotiation strategy
The successful performance of buyer-supplier elationships depends, at least to some degree,
on how their relationships are organized (Williamson, 1975) and how partner firms negotiate
(e.g., Day, Michaels, & Perdue, 1988). Although a substantial body of research examines how
governance choices and negotiation strategies influence the relationship performance, little of
165
this work integrates these two concepts (i.e., Lumineau & Henderson, 2009; Ness & Haugland,
2005; Ness, 2009; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985).
This study aims to expand the understanding of inter-firm performance by examining
synergistic effects of modes of governance and negotiation strategies on relationship
performance. Governance mechanisms help firms by structural means to maximize profit by
mitigating transaction costs, while negotiation strategies help firms to reach successful
agreement through the negotiation process. There are two main findings regarding integration
of governance mode and negotiation strategy.
First, centralization and problem-solving negotiation strategies have positive interaction effects
on end-product enhancement outcomes. In any inter-firm relationship, end-product
enhancement entails using different materials, components, or designs in an adaptation manner
that will increase customer utility (Ghosh & John, 2005). Problem-solving negotiation strategy
facilitates this process by discovering ways to increase benefits to both partner firms, while
centralization allows one firm to impose decisions on another firm, rather than relying on
complete contract terms. As Ghosh and Johh (2005) found, end-product enhancement requires
incomplete contracts to support specific investments.
Second, information exchange is more likely to hinder the positive effect of problem-solving
negotiation strategy on end-product enhancement outcomes. Increasing the desirability of end
products requires partner firms to work together to evaluate alternatives due to more complex
and cutting-edge components. However, the bilateral expectation that partner firms will
proactively provide useful information exchange was found to reduce the positive effect of
problem-solving strategy on end-product enhancementoutcomes. An important insight of this
finding is that information exchange is not always a positive antecedent.
7.3. Managerial implications
From a management point of view, this research provides insights on appropriate strategies for
managers who aim to form and coordinate inter-firm relationships. It argues that managers
should consider the characteristics of their inter-firm power and negotiation strategy. In this
section, there are some guidelines suggesting how to approach this matter. Section 7.3.1
discusses why power structure is important, and how it effects TCE. Section 7.3.2 discusses
why negotiation is important and identifies its role in implementation of market positioning
strategies.
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7.3.1. Power asymmetry in buyer-supplier relationships
Asymmetric-power elationships between partner firms involve interactions between stronger
and weaker firms. This relationship is observable, since one firm is dependent on its partner
firm. On one side, asymmetric power encourages tronger firms to behave opportunistically
toward their weaker partners. This hinders the development of effective buyer-supplier
relationships. On the other side, power provides stronger firms with an effective tool to
coordinate and promote fruitful relationships.
It is an advantage to acknowledge that asymmetric-power elationships have a moderating
effect on TCE. Empirical results from this study found that specific investments made by
stronger firms have no association with hierarchical governance. This suggests that stronger
firms may be able to reduce transaction costs and manage relationships with their weaker
partner firms without hierarchical governance. This finding lends support to the contention of
Shervani et al. (2007) that managers should evaluate their firm’s power before making the
forward channel integration. Firms with high power can handle hazards associated with using
market governance when specific investments and uncertainty are high. Although exchanges
are organized within a market governance structure, stronger firms are likely to be able to
exercise legitimate authority, monitor behaviour, and offer effective incentives by influencing
weaker firms’ decisions on, for example, prices, terms, amount of information, and work
activities. This helps stronger firms avoid the high cost of hierarchical governance.
With regard to weaker firms, empirical results from this study support the contention that
specific investments made by weaker firms are positively related to formalization. This lends
support to the common tenet of TCE. Weaker firms may not be able to reduce transaction costs
through market governance; therefore, they are motivated to adopt formalization, when rules
are specified, to reduce transaction costs.
With regard to relational governance, asymmetric-power relationships have been found to have
a moderating effect on the relationship between specific investments and relational governance.
Weaker firms may be able to handle transaction hazards and manage relationships with their
stronger partner firms without relational governance. This finding, combined with the results
from testing of the same model, shows that when weaker firms make specific investments, they
tend to safeguard these investments by relying on formalization. For weaker firms, relational
governance as a non-juridical mechanism does not have sufficient safeguarding capability.
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In contrast, empirical results from this study found that specific investments made by stronger
firms are positively related to flexibility. This may lend support to the finding of this study that
stronger firms do not choose to use hierarchical governance, but rather use the norm of
flexibility and their power to safeguard their specific investments.
7.3.2. Negotiation strategies, governance structures, and implementation of market
position strategies
Partner firms commonly communicate or negotiate with one another to reach agreement. Many
previous studies support the contention that problem-solving strategy positively influences a
firm’s profits and satisfaction (e.g., Clopton, 1984; Ganesan, 1993; Graham, 1986; Pruitt,
1981). However, empirical results from this study found mixed results when problem-solving
negotiation strategy interacts with governance structure.
The first result, as expected, is that there is a positive interaction effect between centralization
and problem-solving negotiation strategy on end-product enhancement outcomes, while neither
centralization or problem-solving negotiation strategy have any effect on end-product
enhancement outcomes. This suggests that in inter-firm relationships characterized by a high
degree of authority (where one firm can impose decisions on another firm), problem-solving
negotiation strategy may enhance end-product enhancement outcomes (Ghosh & John, 2005),
i.e., the joint net gains from increased customer utility delivered by the end product. This
finding is essential, because centralization alone or problem-solving strategy alone may not be
able provide firms with end-product enhancement outcomes.
A practical recommendation of this finding is that managers of supplier firms who wish to
achieve a differentiation advantage relative to their competitors should identify dominant
parties within their customer firms who may be ableto impose decisions on other parties. With
regard to such dominant parties, managers hould place high importance on both relationship
and end-product enhancement outcomes. Firm managersmust take into account mutual interest
when interacting with their partners and jointly developing and adopting mutually beneficial
agreements. With this approach, supplier firms may retain their goal of differentiation
advantage.
The second finding is contrary to expectation. Empirical results from this study found a
negative interaction effect of information exchange and problem-solving negotiation strategy
on end-product enhancement outcomes; information exchange has no effects on these
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outcomes, but problem-solving strategy has positiveeffects on theses outcomes. These results
suggest hat information exchange reduces the positive effect of problem-solving negotiation
strategy. When problem-solving negotiation strategy is applied, the norm of information
exchange may reduce the expected positive results of this negotiation strategy on end-product
enhancement outcomes.
In practice, if the goal of supplying firms is to achieve a differentiation advantage, managers
of supplying firms should first identify whether they use problem-solving negotiation strategy,
(which secures the best results for their own side while maintaining positive long-term working
relationships), to achieve agreements on exchange conditions. If so, they should exchange
information with partner firms with caution. Information exchange is found to hinder the
positive results from problem-solving negotiation strategy on reaching the goal of
differentiation advantage. Although information exchange can mitigate opportunism and
safeguard specific investments, it hinders a firm’s opportunity to attain its goal of
differentiation advantage through problem-solving negotiation strategy.
7.4. Limitations and suggestions for future research
Although this study advances the TCE literature in several ways, it has limitations that must be
considered.
First, although the study introduces the effect of power structure on TCE, it examined forward
integration governance (i.e., data from the supplier side). The element of power structure is
also found in backward integration governance (i.e., data from the customer side), a mode that
applies, for example, to relationships in which many retailing gas stations depend on their oil
firms. While the rationales presented and verified by this study for forward integration
governance effects are useful in understanding how firms choose their governance structures,
their application to a backward integration contextcan only be evaluated after further study.
Second, this research presents the importance of an integration of governance structures and
negotiation strategies. It is similar to the work of Lumineau and Henderson (2009), and Ness
and Haugland (2005), who consider the implication between the two concepts. These findings
extend the scope of research on governance structures beyond a common tenet of TCE and a
contingent alignment by considering the implicationof negotiation strategies. Further research
examining governance effects as contingent alignment effects within ongoing supplier-buyer
governance could provide important insights into supplier-buyer governance. For example, as
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a starting point, researchers may examine how buying firms influence, and are influenced by,
supplying firms’ negotiation strategies. In addition, issues of superior relationship performance
are central to the approach of this study. The exploration of how the asymmetric-power
relationship contributes to these aspects of performance would further the understanding of
both asymmetric-power elationships and governance structures.
Third, this study applies only two (i.e., problem-solving and aggressive) of many negotiation
strategies. Other strategies (i.e., accommodative, avoiding, and compromising) could be
integrated in the framework. This study chose not to expand the research model due to the
already high complexity of the model.
Fourth, although this study has a careful plan for data collection, the sample size of 198 is
relatively small considering that SEM was used for data analysis. Wang and Wang (2012)
suggests that N  = 100 – 150 is considered the minimum sample size. Thus, it was sufficient for
testing hypotheses 1-6. However, hypotheses 7-17 require greater numbers of data due to the
complexity of the model, and multi-group modelling used in testing hypotheses 13-17 requires
100 observations per group (Kline, 2005). Future research is needed to acquire more
observations. Further research could use more than one industry to consider the same
characteristics of asymmetric power. In addition, future study could make a cross-industry
comparison..
Fifth, the constructs of relationship performance used in this study are measured in a subjective
manner, using the Likert scale. This seems sufficient. However, future research may be more
reliable if it also includes objective measureable indicators.
Sixth, although data used are from the Norwegian O & G industry (which is acceptable because
asymmetric-power elationships between oil firms and their suppliers are common in many
countries), the issue arises of whether these findings are restricted to the O & G industry.
Although certain industrial characteristics might influence governance under asymmetric-
power relationships in the O & G industry, it is believed that the fundamental theoretical tenets
uncovered by this study have broad implications. For example, asymmetric-power
relationships are common not only in the O & G industry but in other industries, including
chain-store retailing and franchised grocery stores, where manufacturers and suppliers depend
very much on the stores. The study addresses the increasing convergence of business practice
across industries; the study of industry-specific effects has a long tradition within the marketing
170
literature, and the generalizability of the findings of this study will be examined as researchers
investigate asymmetric-power elationships in otherindustrial contexts.
Seventh, this research used single-sided data due to the limited budget. This single-informant
method is problematic, since such data limits the ability to triangulate findings (Dahlstrom &
Nygaard, 2010).
Eighth, with regard to the finding that information exchange reduces the positive effects of
problem-solving negotiation strategy on end-productenhancement outcomes, further research
is needed to examine the extent to which the firm’s use of information exchange (various types
of information), has a negative moderating effect on end-product enhancement outcomes.
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Appendix A: Telephone interview guide
1. If the provided telephone number
o  is disconnected or wrong, tick “ Wrong number ”
o  lead to answering machines, tick “Answering machine ”
o  lead to person with language difficulties, tick “Person with language
difficulties ”
2. Hello,
My name is xxx. I am a student at Norwegian School of Economic. I am calling on
behalf of Nasun Moadmuang who is also a PhD studentat our school. He is now doing
a research about relationship between buyer and supplier in oil and gas industry.
Regarding that, I am interested in talking with a person who is responsible for selling
products or services to oil or gas company.
3. Are you the person who is responsible for selling products or service of your company?
• If no, ask for the right person. Do you know who inyour company is responsible
for selling your company’s products or services? Itcan be a marketing manager
or sales department manager.
o  Note name, job position, and telephone number
o  Call the right person
• If yes, continue.
4. Do you sell to any oil or gas company?
• If no, ask for the right person who sells to oil or gas company. Do you know
who in your company is responsible for selling to company in oil and gas
industry?
o  If there is a right person, note name, job position, and telephone number;
and call the right person.
o  If this company does not sell to any oil and gas company, note down that
it is not in the industry. They are not informants. Tick “Out of scope.”
• If yes, continue.
5. Do you have a minute?
• If no, ask what time to call back; and call back atthat time.
• If yes, continue.
I would like to invite you to participate in survey of buyer-seller relationship. The
purpose of this project is to find out more how firms can cooperate better and get more
out of their relationships.
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The survey is an internet-based questionnaire. It consists of many short questions. It has
two parts. In general people take 10-15 minutes to complete each part. You do not need
to complete all three parts in one time. You can reply to them separately.
Everyone who replies to all questionnaires will receive a report with results from the
survey. You will know how to get more from the relationship with your customers.
More interestingly, every participant will receive a chance to win an iPad. The expected
date of the lucky draw is in August 2012, as all prospective respondents have replied.
So, what I wonder is: would you like to complete this internet-based questionnaire?
• If no, say thank you. Tick “Refusal .” Ask for reason.
o  You don’t have time, do you? If yes, tick “Lack of time”
o  You are not interested in any of voluntary researchquestionnaires, aren’t
you? If yes, tick “Not interested in surveys ”
o  Your company is not willing to release the data, isn’t it? If yes, tick
“Organizational constraints ”
• If yes, continue.
What I do now is to send you a link to the questionnaire. Then you follow the
instructions on the webpage. What is your name and email address?
• Note name:
• Note email address:
Note: If the prospect person hang up as soon as the interviewer has introduced themselves
or part-way through the interview, tick “Refusal ” and “Hang up ”
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Appendix B: Fist email to key informant
Original language: Norwegian
Hei <name of prospective respondent>
Viser til hyggelig telefonsamtale nettopp. Tusen takk for at du er positiv til vår undersøkelse!
Her er linken til spørreundersøkelsen vår:
www.nhh.no/oil
Setter stor pris på om du kan svare innen <date 2 weeks later>. Alle som deltar er med i
trekningen av en iPad.
Vennligst ta kontakt hvis du lurer på noe.
Takk for hjelpen!
Med vennlig hilsen,
<name of research assistance>
Forskningsassistent
Norges Handelshøyskole
PS. Kan du gi meg en tilbakemelding på at du har mottatt denne eposten? Takk.
Translated version: English
Dear <name of prospective respondent>
Thank you for the nice phone conversation we just had. And thank you for being positive to
our research.
Here is the link to our survey:
www.nhh.no/oil
We greatly appreciate it if you can answer within <date 2 weeks later>. All who participate
will be part of the lucky draw for an iPad.
If there is any question, please do not hesitate tocontact us.
Thank you so much for your help.
Best regards,
<name of research assistance>
Research assistance
Norwegian School of Economics
PS. Can you reply to this email, so that we know that you receive this email? Thank you.
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Appendix C: Web page of the study
190
Appendix D: Questionnaire
1 9 1
1 9 2
1 9 3
1 9 4
1 9 5
1 9 6
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Appendix E: Descriptive statistics of the sample, N=198
Table E.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample, N=198
Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Dependent variables
Hierarchical governance
Formalization
FORM1 5.22 1.378 -0.806 0.173 0.281 0.344
FORM2 4.71 1.731 -0.567 0.173 -0.608 0.344
FORM3 5.57 1.260 -1.085 0.173 1.176 0.344
FORM4 6.13 1.056 -1.847 0.173 4.603 0.344
FORM5 5.37 1.646 -0.944 0.173 0.048 0.344
Centralization
CENT1 4.49 1.762 -0.405 0.173 -0.847 0.344
CENT2 4.56 1.660 -0.420 0.173 -0.825 0.344
CENT3 5.21 1.846 -1.030 0.173 -0.044 0.344
CENT4 5.16 1.701 -0.779 0.173 -0.400 0.344
Relational governance
Flexibility
FLEX1 5.34 1.478 -0.895 0.173 0.132 0.344
FLEX2 4.32 1.684 -0.267 0.173 -0.876 0.344
FLEX3 4.07 1.826 -0.227 0.173 -1.129 0.344
Solidarity
SOL1 5.41 1.329 -0.940 0.173 0.373 0.344
SOL2 3.59 1.754 0.112 0.173 -1.020 0.344
SOL3 4.99 1.398 -0.779 0.173 0.298 0.344
SOL4 5.05 1.575 -0.747 0.173 -0.208 0.344
Information exchange
INF1 5.64 1.233 -1.126 0.173 1.201 0.344
INF2 4.41 1.836 -0.379 0.173 -1.046 0.344
INF3 6.01 1.032 -1.390 0.173 2.122 0.344
INF4 5.58 1.184 -1.158 0.173 1.737 0.344
INF5 3.86 1.914 -0.071 0.173 -1.340 0.344
Restraint in the use of Power
RPW1 4.06 1.690 -0.216 0.173 -0.890 0.344
RPW2 4.47 1.770 -0.513 0.173 -0.767 0.344
RPW3 4.68 1.563 -0.586 0.173 -0.201 0.344
Cost reduction outcomes
CRO1 3.25 1.560 -0.071 0.173 -1.137 0.344
CRO2 4.27 1.611 -0.569 0.173 -0.502 0.344
CRO3 4.30 1.524 -0.619 0.173 -0.317 0.344
CRO4 3.56 1.651 0.015 0.173 -1.021 0.344
CRO5 4.17 1.670 -0.247 0.173 -0.834 0.344
End product enhancement outcomes
EPE1 5.28 1.411 -1.061 0.173 0.900 0.344
EPE2 5.35 1.362 -1.296 0.173 1.970 0.344
EPE3 5.12 1.418 -0.779 0.173 0.404 0.344
EPE4 4.55 1.611 -0.587 0.173 -0.490 0.344
EPE5 4.38 1.584 -0.402 0.173 -0.734 0.344
Satisfaction with the collaboration
SAT1 5.71 1.215 -1.169 0.173 1.187 0.344
SAT2 4.63 1.485 -0.559 0.173 -0.005 0.344
SAT3 5.51 1.289 -1.207 0.173 1.513 0.344
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Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Independent variables
Supplying firm’s specific investments
SSI1 4.58 1.702 -0.578 0.173 -0.543 0.344
SSI2 4.41 1.628 -0.417 0.173 -0.693 0.344
SSI3 4.04 1.756 -0.142 0.173 -0.946 0.344
SSI4 4.36 1.670 -0.371 0.173 -0.749 0.344
SSI5 4.30 1.605 -0.429 0.173 -0.657 0.344
SSI6 2.97 1.675 0.564 0.173 -0.828 0.344
SSI7 5.11 1.456 -0.993 0.173 0.568 0.344
SSI8 3.99 1.858 -0.129 0.173 -1.127 0.344
Buying firm’s specific investments
BSI1 2.56 1.472 0.946 0.173 0.220 0.344
BSI2 2.49 1.463 1.003 0.173 0.254 0.344
BSI3 2.25 1.530 1.335 0.173 0.986 0.344
BSI4 2.08 1.260 1.277 0.173 1.358 0.344
BSI5 2.44 1.469 0.936 0.173 0.051 0.344
BSI6 2.30 1.316 1.013 0.173 0.317 0.344
BSI7 3.25 1.448 0.310 0.173 -0.793 0.344
BSI8 2.27 1.441 1.209 0.173 0.798 0.344
Problem-solving negotiation strategy
PSV1 5.81 0.993 -0.749 0.173 0.217 0.344
PSV2 4.96 1.300 -0.761 0.173 0.315 0.344
PSV3 5.15 1.011 -0.577 0.173 0.420 0.344
PSV4 5.54 1.064 -0.885 0.173 1.059 0.344
PSV5 5.32 1.280 -0.996 0.173 1.424 0.344
PSV6 5.20 1.242 -0.792 0.173 0.244 0.344
Aggressive negotiation strategy
AGG1 5.38 1.064 -0.613 0.173 0.617 0.344
AGG2 3.82 1.387 -0.164 0.173 -0.547 0.344
AGG3 4.90 1.320 -0.491 0.173 -0.064 0.344
AGG4 5.13 1.248 -0.949 0.173 1.178 0.344
AGG5 1.90 1.266 2.085 0.173 4.660  0.344
AGG6 1.63 0.961 2.252 0.173 7.002 0.344
AGG7 1.56 1.082 2.694 0.173 8.260  0.344
AGG8 1.84 1.215 1.703 0.173 2.658 0.344
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Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Control variables
Environmental uncertainty
UNC1 4.07 1.626 0.064 0.173 -1.143 0.344
UNC2 4.23 1.547 0.129 0.173 -0.927 0.344
UNC3 3.66 1.578 0.259 0.173 -0.706 0.344
Opportunism
OPP1 1.98 1.321 1.571 0.173 1.906 0.344
OPP2 2.77 1.629 0.856 0.173 -0.143 0.344
OPP3 2.52 1.537 1.038 0.173 0.291 0.344
OPP4 2.16 1.513 1.384 0.173 0.992 0.344
OPP5 2.30 1.677 1.346 0.173 0.705 0.344
OPP6 2.24 1.504 1.288 0.173 0.998 0.344
Market governance
MKT1 4.65 1.691 -0.500 0.173 -0.619 0.344
MKT2 4.98 1.637 -0.795 0.173 -0.132 0.344
MKT3 3.94 1.716 0.257 0.173 -0.831 0.344
Importance
IMP1 3.73 1.815 1.263 0.173 1.239 0.344
IMP2 3.09 2.115 0.306 0.173 0.220 0.344
Past experience
PAST1 5.90 1.609 -1.600 0.173 1.633 0.344
PAST2 6.14 1.033 -1.601 0.173 3.192 0.344
Future expectations
FUT1 6.34 0.874 -1.733 0.173 3.964 0.344
FUT2 4.45 2.373 -0.383 0.173 -1.470 0.344
Product/service characteristics
PCHA1 5.99 1.192 -1.433 0.173 2.106 0.344
PCHA2 5.93 1.169 -1.577 0.173 3.462 0.344
PCHA3 4.03 1.684 -0.085 0.173 -0.892 0.344
Contract design capability
CDC1 4.56 1.657 -0.525 0.173 -0.503 0.344
CDC2 5.36 1.551 -1.219 0.173 1.073 0.344
CDC3 4.48 1.595 -0.455 0.173 -0.500 0.344
CDC4 4.28 1.957 -0.430 0.173 -1.095 0.344
CDC5 5.13 1.440 -0.830 0.173 0.194 0.344
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Appendix F: Assessment of model fit
•  The model 2 statistic  which is the original fit index for structural model. It assesses the
magnitude of the difference between the sample and the model estimated
variance/covariance matrices. When we use this statistic, we expect a non-significant
2
. In other words, we expect not to reject the null hypothesis which is that there is no
difference between the two mentioned matrices. In this study the 2 is an adjusted one,
namely Satorra-Bentler2, see Section 6.1.1 for more detail.
•  Comparative fit index  (CFI, Bentler, 1990) compares the specified model with the null
model which assumes zero covariances among the observed variables. CFI is defined
as the ratio of improvement in moving from the null to specified model. It is an index
based on the noncentral 2 distribution. It ranges between 0 and 1. Values exceeding
0.90 indicate a good fit.
•  Tucker-Lewis index  (TLI, Tucker & Lewis, 1973) or  non-normed fit index  (NNFI,
Bentler & Bonett, 1980) is another way to compare the lack of fit of a specified model
to the lack of fit of the null model. Its values can extend outside the range of 0.0 to 1.0.
A TLI value less than 0.9 indicates a need to modify the model. Its value close to 1.0
indicates a well-fitting model.
•  Root mean square error of approximation  (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980) is an
absolute index of fit which does not need to compare with a reference model for
determining whether the model is improving. Rather, it tells how well the hypothesized
model fits the sample data. As RMSEA decreases, the goodness-of-fit improves.
Browne and Cudeck (1993) and MacCallum et al. (1996) suggest hat values less than
0.05 indicates good fit. Values between 0.05 to 0.08 indicate reasonable fit. Values
between 0.08 to 0.10 indicate mediocre fit. Those greater than 0.10 indicate poor fit. In
this study, RMSEA is reported with its 90 % confidence interval (CI) around its value.
The well-fitting model would give the lower limit close to 0, while upper limit less than
0.08. In addition, this study also reports a close-fit test for null hypothesis where H0:
RMSEA 0.05. If  P  is greater than 0.05, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis.
This means that the hypothesized model has a “closefit.”
•  Standardized Rood mean square residual  (SRMR) is also an absolute index. It is a
standard version of the square root of the average residual (RMR). Hu and Bentler
(1999) and Kline (2005) suggest that SRMR less than 0.08 is considered a good fit,
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while value less than 0.10 is acceptable. It is noteworthy that SRMR is like to be small
when sample size and the number of parameters increase (Wang & Wang, 2012)
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Appendix G: One-factor model for hierarchical governance
Figure G.1  Final measurement model for one-factor hierarchical governance
Table G.1  One-factor hierarchical governance with robust estimators
MLM 2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
Close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Deleted items
M1 145.383(27),0.0000
0.149,
0.126-0.173,
0.000
0.731 0.642 0.105
FORM1 FORM2
FORM3 FORM4
FORM5 CENT1
CENT2 CENT3
CENT4
M2 0.249(2),0.8828
0.000,
0.000-0.068,
0.926
1.000 1.031 0.007 FORM1 FORM2FORM3 FORM5
FORM4 CENT1
CENT2 CENT3
CENT4
HRC
FORM1
FORM2
FORM3
FORM5
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Appendix H:  Second-order model for hierarchical governance
Figure H.1  Final model for second-order CFA model of hierarchical governance
Note: Numbers above the links represents fixed loadings
Table H.1  Second-order measurement model for hierarchical governance with robust estimators
MLM 2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
Close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Specification
M1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
FORM1@1.000
FORM2@1.414
FORM3@0.889
FORM5@1.057
CENT1@1.000
CENT2@0.780
A priori
M2 1.249(12),1.0000
0.000,
0.000-0.000,
1.000
1.000 1.046 0.011
FORM1@1.000
FORM2@1.414
FORM3@0.889
FORM5@1.057
CENT1@1.000
CENT2@0.780
Fixing FORM and
CENT to 0.500.
CENT
FORM
FORM1
FORM2
FORM3
FORM5
CENT1
CENT2
1.000
0.889
1.414
1.057
1.000
0.780
0.500
HRCH
0.500
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Appendix I: Measurement model for relational governance
One-factor relational governance measurement model
CFA tested in the present application hypothesises a priori that (a) the relational governance
can be explained by one factor, and (b) residuals associated with each item are uncorrelated.
•  Model 1: All 15 items from the relational governance dimensions (i.e., flexibility:
FLEX1-3, solidarity: SOL1-4, information exchange: INF1-5, and restrain in the use of
power: RPW1-3) were used in the priori measurement model. All fit indices exhibited
poor fit, as presented in Table I.1
•  Model 2: Respecifying the hypothesized model of relational governance based on the
standardized factor-loading values, items with low loading were removed. As a result,
the model fit the data better, but at reasonable fit.
•  Model 3: Since in model 2 there was not any suggestions from model modification
indices, and only RPW3 had low factor-loading, it was removed in model 3. The model
results showed deterioration. Therefore, model2 was chosen to be the final model for
single-factor relational contract. A diagrammatic representation of this final
measurement model is presented in Figure I.1.
Table I.1  One-factor relational governance with robust estimators
MLM 2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
Close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Deleted items
M1 400.329(90),0.0000
0.132,
0.119-0.145,
0.000
0.690 0.639 0.095
FLEX1 FLEX2
FLEX3 SOL1 SOL2
SOL3 SOL4
INF1 INF2 INF3
INF4 INF5 RPW1
RPW2 RPW3
M2 15.249(9),0.0843
0.059,
0.000-0.109,
0.335
0.983 0.971 0.029
FLEX1 SOL1 SOL3
SOL4 INF1
RPW3
FLEX2 FLEX3
SOL2 INF2 INF3
INF4 INF5 RPW1
RPW2
M3 12.864(5),0.0247
0.089,
0.029-0.151,
0.118
0.976 0.953 0.028 FLEX1 SOL1 SOL3SOL4 INF1
FLEX2 FLEX3
SOL2 INF2 INF3
INF4 INF5 RPW1
RPW2 RPW3
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Figure I.1  Final measurement model for one factor relational governance
Four-factor relational governance measurement model
CFA model tested in the present application postulates a priori that (a) relational governance
is four-factor structure composed of flexibility (FLEX), solidarity (SOL), information
exchange (INF), and restraint to the use of power (RPW); (b) each item-pair measure has a
nonzero loading on factor that it was designed to measure and zero loading on all other factors;
(c) the four relational governance factors, consistent with the theory, are correlated; and (d)
residual errors associated with each measure are uncorrelated.
•  Model 1: The a priori CFA model exhibited mediocre fit, see Table I.2.
•  Model 2: Respecifying the model based on the standardized factor-loading values,
items with the low loading values were removed. Themodel results showed that some
indices became better (i.e., CFI, TLI, and SRMR), but some became worse (i.e.,
RMSEA).
•  Model 3:  Respecifying the model based on the model modification indices, high cross
loading items were removed. The model results showed good fit.
•  Model 4:  Respecifying the model by removing the item that had high correlation with
other items. The model results showed perfect fit. Since all loadings were greater than
the 0.6 cut-off point and no suggestion in model modification indices, model 4 was
chosen to be the final model for four-factor relational contract.
• Model 5:  Respecifying the model by fixing the loadings to the un-standardized
estimates acquired in model 4. This is to make a model that can be compared with
second-order relational contract in next application. The final model is presented
schematically in Figure I.2. The model results became slightly better.
RCT
FLEX
SOL 1
SOL 3
SOL 4
INF 1
RPW
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Table I.2 Four-factor CFA for relational governance with robust estimators
Note: In model 5, loadings were fixed as the values behind @ sign
MLM 2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA
estimate,
90% C.I.,
Close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Specification
M1 212.322(84),0.0000
0.088,
0.073-0.103,
0.000
0.872 0.840 0.078
FLEX1 FLEX2
FLEX3 SOL1
SOL2 SOL3 SOL4
INF1 INF2 INF3
INF4 INF5 RPW1
RPW2 RPW3
M2 97.213(38),0.0000
0.089,
0.067-0.111,
0.002
0.925 0.891 0.058
FLEX1 FLEX2
FLEX3 SOL1
SOL3 SOL4
INF1 INF3 INF4
RPW2 RPW3
SOL2 INF2 INF5
RPW1 were
removed.
M3 25.926(21),0.2093
0.034,
0.000-0.073,
0.706
0.991 0.984 0.033
FLEX2 FLEX3
SOL1 SOL3 SOL4
INF3 INF4 RPW2
RPW3
SOL2 INF2 INF5
RPW1 FLEX1
INF1 were
removed.
M4 10.514(14),0.7237
0.000,
0.000-0.052,
0.944
1.000 1.016 0.025
FLEX2 FLEX3
SOL3 SOL4
INF3 INF4 RPW2
RPW3
SOL2 INF2 INF5
RPW1 FLEX1
INF1 SOL1 were
removed.
M5 10.135(18),0.9274
0.000,
0.000-0.020,
0.994
1.000 1.028 0.025
FLEX2@1.000
FLEX3@0.893
SOL3@1.000
SOL4@1.337
INF3@1.000
INF4@1.041
RPW2@1.000
RPW3@1.006
SOL2 INF2 INF5
RPW1 FLEX1
INF1 SOL1 were
removed.
Loadings were
fixed to un-
standardized
estimates in
model4.
207
Figure I.2 Final four-factor CFA model of relational governance
Note: Numbers above the links represents fixed loadings.
Second-order measurement model for relational governance
The CFA model here hypothesizes a priori that (a) the relational governance can be explained
by four first-order factors (flexibility: FLEX, solidarity: SOL, information exchange: INF, and
restraint to the use of power: RPW) and one second-order factor (relational governance: RCT);
(b) each item has a nonzero loading on the first-order factor it was designed to measure, and
zero loadings on the other three first-order factors; (c) all factor loadings are fixed to be the un-
standardized factor loadings acquired from four-factor model, This enables us to see which
model between four-factor model (i.e., model 5 in previous application) and this second-order
model is better, (d) residuals associated with each item are uncorrelated; and (e) covariation
among the four first-order factors is explained fully by their regression on the second-order
factor.
• Model 1: The a priori CFA model exhibited perfect fit, see Table I.3. However, the
residual variance of SOL has a negative value. This means that the model does not
exactly fit the data because, to reproduce the correlations among first-order constructs,
Mplus  apparently needed to increase the SOL’s loading, which in turn resulted in
negative error estimate. SOL’s loading is greater than 1.0, meaning that SOL and RCT
are the same thing. Therefore, the model needed to be modified.
•  Model 2: Respecifying the model by imposing equality constraint on all first-order
constructs. The model fit indices became worse. However, it is still good fit. Moreover,
INF
SOL
FLEX
FLEX
FLEX
SOL 3
INF 4
RPW
1.006
1
1.041
1
1.337
1
0.893
1
SOL 4
INF 3
RPW
RPW
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the residual variance of SOL is no longer negative. This model is chosen to be the final
model for the second-order construct of relational contract. The schematic model is
presented in Figure I.3.
Figure I.3 Final model for second-order CFA model of relational governance
Note: Numbers above the links without parentheses represent
fixed loadings, while ones with parentheses represent he equality
constraint.
Table I.3  Second-order CFA relational governance with robustestimators
MLM 2 (df),
P-Value
RMSEA estimate,
90% C.I.,
Close-fit test  P
CFI TLI SRMR Remaining items Specification
M1 10.581(20),0.9
0.000,
0.000-0.000,
0.998
1.000 1.030 0.025
FLEX2@1.000 FLEX3@0.893
SOL3@1.000 SOL4@1.337
INF3@1.000 INF4@1.041
RPW2@1.000 RPW3@1.006
A priori model
M2 30.696(22),0.1025
0.045,
0.000-0.079
0.559
0.980 0.975 0.093
FLEX2@1.000 FLEX3@0.893
SOL3@1.000 SOL4@1.337
INF3@1.000 INF4@1.041
RPW2@1.000 RPW3@1.006
Loadings on
FLEX, SOL,
INF, and RPW
are equality
constrained.
INF
SOL
FLEX
FLEX
FLEX
SOL 3
RCT
RPW
1.006
1
1.041
1
1.337
1
0.893
1
SOL 4
INF 3
RPW
RPW
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)INF 4
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Appendix J: Results from the preliminary test for interaction effect
Table J.1  Results from testing the individual interaction models
Note to table: Unstandardized parameter estimates of the effects, interaction paths significant at 5%
level in bold.
Independent variables Dependent variables
Cost reduction outcomes End-product
enhancement outcomes
Satisfaction with the
collaboration
H7a H7e H7i
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Supplier-held specificity (SSI) 0.280 3.358 0.001 0.435 4.318 0.000 0.175 1.601 0.055
Formalization (FORM) 0.119 1.227 0.110 0.079 0.600 0.274 0.101 0.799 0.212
SSI*FORM -0.067 -0.908 0.182 0.059 0.599 0.275 -0.134 -1.447 0.074
H7b H7f H7j
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Buyer-held specificity (BSI) 0.262 2.811 0.003 0.232 1.982 0.024 0.288 2.583 0.005
Formalization (FORM) 0.270 2.533 0.006 0.254 2.007 0.023 0.241 2.042 0.021
BSI*FORM -0.208 -1.833 0.033  -0.155 -1.246 0.107  -0.289 -2.033 0.021
H7c H7g H7k
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Supplier-held specificity (SSI) 0.379 3.255 0.001 0.847 3.281 0.001 0.504 2.387 0.009
Centralization (CENT) -0.400 -0.547 0.293 -3.085 -2.009 0.023 -2.267 -1.697 0.045
SSI*CENT 0.373 1.076 0.141 1.060 2.029 0.022 0.479 1.217 0.112
H7d H7h H7l
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Buyer-held specificity (BSI) 0.286 1.939 0.026 -0.008 -0.037 0.485 0.027 0.148 0.442
Centralization (CENT) -1.160 -0.889 0.187 -5.565 -2.833 0.003 -5.552 -3.033 0.001
BSI*CENT 1.236 1.853 0.032 1.686 2.616 0.005 1.423 2.631 0.005
H8a H8i H8q
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Supplier-held specificity (SSI) 0.359 4.126 0.000 0.471 4.685 0.000 0.285 2.949 0.002
Flexibility (FLEX) 0.097 1.413 0.079 0.070 0.881 0.189 0.264 3.458 0.001
SSI*FLEX -0.022 -0.372 0.355 0.012 0.162 0.436 0.052 0.983 0.163
H8b H8j H8r
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Buyer-held specificity (BSI) 0.283 2.479 0.007 0.232 1.945 0.026 0.257 2.781 0.003
Flexibility (FLEX) 0.444 1.726 0.042 0.507 1.901 0.029 1.377 4.156 0.000
BSI*FLEX -0.400 -1.728 0.042 -0.331 -1.452 0.073 -0.694 -3.967 0.000
H8c H8k H8s
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Supplier-held specificity (SSI) 0.339 4.280 0.000 0.471 5.027 0.000 0.251 2.927 0.002
Solidarity (SOL) 0.301 3.070 0.001 0.287 2.512 0.006 0.601 5.316 0.000
SSI*SOL -0.008 -0.092 0.464 -0.083 -0.647 0.259 -0.042 -0.338 0.368
H8d H8l H8t
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Buyer-held specificity (BSI) 0.266 2.318 0.010 0.222 1.734 0.042 0.212 1.964 0.025
Solidarity (SOL) 0.207 1.848 0.033 0.196 1.478 0.070 0.535 4.224 0.000
BSI*SOL -0.212 -1.734 0.042 -0.140 -0.984 0.163 -0.123 -0.878 0.190
H8e H8m H8u
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Supplier-held specificity (SSI) 0.322 4.038 0.000 0.454 5.002 0.000 0.212 2.598 0.005
Information exchange (INF) 0.306 2.947 0.002 0.444 2.981 0.002 0.687 5.290 0.000
SSI*INF -0.067 -0.675 0.250 -0.110 -0.837 0.201 -0.035 -0.310 0.379
H8f H8n H8v
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Buyer-held specificity (BSI) 0.255 2.494 0.007 0.228 1.855 0.032 0.250 2.503 0.006
Information exchange (INF) 0.243 2.030 0.021 0.373 1.815 0.035 0.649 3.829 0.000
BSI*INF -0.231 -1.764 0.039 -0.341 -1.873 0.031  -0.226 -1.447 0.074
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Independent variables Dependent variables
Cost reduction outcomes End-product
enhancement outcomes
Satisfaction with the
collaboration
H8g H8o H8w
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Supplier-held specificity (SSI) 0.375 4.412 0.000 0.488 4.600 0.000 0.281 3.168 0.001
Restraint to the use of power
(RPW) 0.161 2.474
0.007 0.136 1.786 0.037 0.235 3.928 0.00
SSI*RPW -0.075 -1.218 0.112 -0.026 -0.403 0.344 -0.014 -0.255 0.400
H8h H8p H8x
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Buyer-held specificity (BSI) 0.261 2.664 0.004 0.208 1.771 0.039 0.277 2.781 0.003
Restraint to the use of power
(RPW) 7.869 2.469
0.007 11.901 2.613 0.005 14.296 4.425 0.000
BSI*RPW -4.772 -1.779 0.038 -5.810 -2.323 0.010 -7.268 -3.745 0.000
H9a H9c H9e
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Formalization (FORM) 0.243 2.471 0.007 2.233 1.884 0.030 0.213 2.058 0.020
Aggressive nego. str. (AGG) 0.034 0.370 0.356 -0.203 -1.487 0.069 -0.329 -3.353 0.001
FORM*AGG 0.087 0.692 0.245 -0.011 -0.062 0.476 0.057 0.393 0.348
H9b H9d H9f
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Centralization (CENT) 1.898 1.663 0.048 1.166 0.837 0.202 -1.197 -0.949 0.172
Aggressive nego. str. (AGG) -0.384 -1.059 0.145 -0.320 -0.743 0.229 -0.015 -0.039 0.485
CENT*AGG -0.100 -0.416 0.339 -0.380 -1.500 0.067 0.051 0.208 0.418
H10a H10c H10e
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Formalization (FORM) 0.239 2.598 0.005 0.223 1.946 0.026 0.189 1.845 0.033
Prob.-solv. nego. str. (PSV) 0.103 1.284 0.100 0.387 4.525 0.000 0.356 3.601 0.000
FORM*PSV -0.058 -0.662 0.254 -0.102 -0.976 0.165 -0.091 -0.813 0.208
H10b H10d H10f
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Formalization (FORM) 0.244 2.399 0.008 0.273 2.055 0.020 0.259 2.118 0.017
Centralization (CENT) -0.008 -0.115 0.454 -0.099 -1.122 0.131 -0.141 -1.803 0.036
Prob.-solv. nego. str. (PSV) 0.083 0.947 0.172 0.353 3.189 0.001 0.338 3.123 0.001
FORM*PSV -0.058 999.0 999.0 -0.102 999.0 999.0 -0.091 999.0 999.0
CENT*PSV 0.107 1.738 0.041 0.198 2.288 0.011 0.044 0.545 0.293
H11a H11e H11i
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Flexibility (FLEX) 0.034 0.491 0.312 -0.042 -0.479 0.316 0.192 2.786 0.003
Aggressive nego. str. (AGG) 0.056 0.562 0.287 -0.163 -1.110 0.134 -0.258 -2.048 0.021
FLEX*AGG -0.001 -0.011 0.496 0.093 0.868 0.193 0.035 0.463 0.322
H11b H11f H11j
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Solidarity (SOL) 2.364 1.006 0.157 1.285 0.524 0.300 4.712 1.273 0.102
Information exchange (INF) -0.539 -0.577 0.282 -0.035 -0.033 0.487 -1.233 -0.837 0.202
Restraint to the use of power(RPW) -0.788 -0.920 0.179 -0.523 -0.608 0.272 -1.604 -1.216 0.112
Aggressive nego. str. (AGG) 0.347 0.976 0.165 0.027 0.084 0.467 0.350 0.658 0.256
SOL*AGG -0.240 -1.373 0.085 -0.140 -0.675 0.250 0.007 0.034 0.487
INF*AGG -0.064 999.0 999.0 -0.054 999.0 999.0 -0.001 999.0 999.0
RPW*AGG 0.169 999.0 999.0 0.166 999.0 999.0 0.059 999.0 999.0
H11c H11g H11k
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Information exchange (INF) 0.393 2.917 0.002 0.418 2.456 0.007 0.623 4.680 0.000
Aggressive nego. str. (AGG) 0.147 1.116 0.133 -0.081 -0.470 0.319 -0.122 -0.980 0.164
INF*AGG -0.064 -0.593 0.277 -0.054 -0.300 0.382 -0.001 -0.004 0.499
H11d H11h H11l
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Restraint to the use of power(RPW) 1.601 1.737 0.041 0.124 0.154 0.439 2.231 1.891 0.030
Aggressive nego. str. (AGG) 0.773 1.645 0.050 -0.046 -0.121 0.452 0.594 1.153 0.125
RPW*AGG 0.169 0.809 0.210 0.166 0.726 0.234 0.059 0.237 0.406
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Independent variables Dependent variables
Cost reduction outcomes End-product
enhancement outcomes
Satisfaction with the
collaboration
H12a H12e H12i
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Flexibility (FLEX) -0.030 -0.390 0.349 -0.129 -1.555 0.120 0.098 1.274 0.230
Information exchange(INF) 0.293 2.431 0.008 0.298 1.666 0.096 0.551 3.943 0.000
Prob.-solv. nego. str.(PSV) 0.053 0.497 0.310 0.340 3.075 0.002 0.191 1.703 0.044
FLEX* PSV -0.031 -0.594 0.277 -0.023 -0.308 0.758 -0.007 -0.122 0.452
INF*PSV 0.007 999.0 999.0 -0.278 999.0 999.0 -0.078 999.0 999.0
H12b H12f H12j
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Solidarity (SOL) 1.010 0.888 0.188 -1.855 -0.983 0.163 1.910 1.163 0.123
Information exchange(INF) -0.234 -0.375 0.354 1.214 1.211 0.113 -0.407 -0.457 0.324
Prob.-solv. nego. str.(PSV) -0.245 -0.708 0.240 0.884 1.420 0.078 -0.330 -0.669 0.252
SOL* PSV -0.039 -0.391 0.348 0.008 0.049 0.481 -0.022 -0.144 0.443
INF*PSV 0.007 999.0 999.0 -0.278 999.0 999.0 -0.078 999.0 999.0
H12c H12g H12k
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Information exchange(INF) 0.286 2.576 0.005 0.249 1.551 0.061 0.578 4.689 0.000
Prob.-solv. nego. str.(PSV) 0.056 0.691 0.245 0.328 3.024 0.001 0.221 2.342 0.010
INF* PSV 0.007 0.078 0.469  -0.278 -2.210 0.014  -0.078 -0.693 0.244
H12d H12h H12l
Estimates t-values One-tailedP-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value Estimates t-values
One-tailed
P-value
Information exchange(INF) 0.285 2.313 0.011 0.325 1.736 0.042 0.569 4.112 0.000
Restraint to the use of power(RPW) 0.020 0.319 0.375 -0.107 -1.119 0.132 0.016 0.221 0.413
Prob.-solv. nego. str.(PSV) 0.041 0.469 0.320 0.328 3.116 0.001 0.223 2.225 0.013
INF*PSV 0.007 999.0 999.0 -0.278 999.0 999.0 -0.078 999.0 999.0
RPW* PSV -0.012 -0.289 0.386 -0.032 -0.477 0.317 0.021 0.374 0.354
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Appendix K: Descriptive statistics of the asymmetric power sample
Table K.1  Descriptive statistics of the asymmetric power sample, N=108
Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Dependent variables
Hierarchical governance
Formalization
FORM1 5.15 1.420 -0.806 0.233 0.207 0.461
FORM2 4.79 1.664 -0.585 0.233 -0.433 0.461
FORM3 5.63 1.294 -1.254 0.233 1.544 0.461
FORM5 5.37 1.615 -0.880 0.233 -0.049 0.461
Centralization
CENT1 4.69 1.737 -0.574 0.233 -0.619 0.461
CENT2 4.71 1.571 -0.513 0.233 -0.675 0.461
Relational governance
Flexibility
FLEX2 4.37 1.722 -0.280 0.233 -0.869 0.461
FLEX3 4.06 1.815 -0.251 0.233 -1.075 0.461
Solidarity
SOL3 4.82 1.459 -0.737 0.233 0.075 0.461
SOL4 4.84 1.572 -0.691 0.233 -0.342 0.461
Information exchange
INF3 5.99 1.046 -1.281 0.233 1.604 0.461
INF4 5.44 1.248 -0.929 0.233 0.725 0.461
Restraint to the use of power
RPW2 4.19 1.847 -0.309 0.233 -1.178 0.461
RPW3 4.51 1.638 -0.420 0.233 -0.624 0.461
Independent variables
Stronger-held specific investments
STSI1 2.61 1.521 0.961 0.233 0.238 0.461
STSI2 2.56 1.500 1.051 0.233 0.475 0.461
STSI3 2.27 1.392 1.010 0.233 0.197 0.461
STSI4 2.31 1.483 1.140 0.233 0.613 0.461
STSI5 2.57 1.499 0.847 0.233 -0.006 0.461
STSI6 2.44 1.376 1.082 0.233 0.895 0.461
STSI7 3.49 1.519 0.230 0.233 -0.623 0.461
STSI8 2.19 1.361 1.401 0.233 1.663 0.461
Buying firm’s specific investments
WKSI1 4.80 1.605 -0.808 0.233 0.041 0.461
WKSI2 4.53 1.626 -0.516 0.233 -0.474 0.461
WKSI3 4.09 1.683 -0.196 0.233 -0.823 0.461
WKSI4 4.37 1.770 -0.467 0.233 -0.831 0.461
WKSI5 4.29 1.708 -0.505 0.233 -0.700 0.461
WKSI6 3.00 1.612 0.464 0.233 -0.781 0.461
WKSI7 5.18 1.433 -1.132 0.233 0.958 0.461
WKSI8 4.35 1.779 -0.295 0.233 -0.816 0.461
Control variables
Environmental uncertainty
UNC1 3.93 1.700 0.129 0.233 -1.247 0.461
UNC2 4.21 1.624 0.035 0.233 -1.083 0.461
Opportunism
OPP1 2.04 1.394 1.558 0.233 1.778 0.461
OPP4 2.25 1.601 1.210 0.233 0.387 0.461
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Appendix L: Descriptive statistics of the asymmetric and symmetric power sample
Table L.1  Descriptive statistics of the asymmetric power sample, N=108
Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Dependent variables
Hierarchical governance
Formalization
FORM1 5.15 1.420 -0.806 0.233 0.207 0.461
FORM2 4.79 1.664 -0.585 0.233 -0.433 0.461
FORM3 5.63 1.294 -1.254 0.233 1.544 0.461
FORM5 5.37 1.615 -0.880 0.233 -0.049 0.461
Centralization
CENT1 4.69 1.737 -0.574 0.233 -0.619 0.461
CENT2 4.71 1.571 -0.513 0.233 -0.675 0.461
Relational governance
Flexibility
FLEX2 4.37 1.722 -0.280 0.233 -0.869 0.461
FLEX3 4.06 1.815 -0.251 0.233 -1.075 0.461
Solidarity
SOL3 4.82 1.459 -0.737 0.233 0.075 0.461
SOL4 4.84 1.572 -0.691 0.233 -0.342 0.461
Information exchange
INF3 5.99 1.046 -1.281 0.233 1.604 0.461
INF4 5.44 1.248 -0.929 0.233 0.725 0.461
Restraint to the use of power
RPW2 4.19 1.847 -0.309 0.233 -1.178 0.461
RPW3 4.51 1.638 -0.420 0.233 -0.624 0.461
Independent variables
Supplier-held specific investments
SSI2 4.60 1.612 -0.542 0.233 -0.418 0.461
SSI4 4.47 1.732 -0.563 0.233 -0.675 0.461
SSI5 4.31 1.689 -0.497 0.233 -0.689 0.461
Buyer-held specific investments
BSI1 2.56 1.416 0.771 0.233 -0.304 0.461
BSI3 2.19 1.322 1.094 0.233 0.497 0.461
BSI5 2.55 1.488 0.837 0.233 -0.043 0.461
BSI6 2.39 1.289 0.838 0.233 0.188 0.461
BSI8 2.29 1.401 1.113 0.233 0.660 0.461
Control variables
Environmental uncertainty
UNC1 3.93 1.700 0.129 0.233 -1.247 0.461
UNC2 4.21 1.624 0.035 0.233 -1.083 0.461
Opportunism
OPP1 2.04 1.394 1.558 0.233 1.778 0.461
OPP4 2.25 1.601 1.210 0.233 0.387 0.461
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Table L.2  Descriptive statistics of the symmetric power sample, N=90
Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Dependent variables
Hierarchical governance
Formalization
FORM1 5.31 1.329 -0.800 0.254 0.411 0.503
FORM2 4.62 1.815 -0.536 0.254 -0.787 0.503
FORM3 5.50 1.220 -0.892 0.254 0.891 0.503
FORM5 5.37 1.692 -1.024 0.254 0.198 0.503
Centralization
CENT1 4.26 1.771 -0.224 0.254 -0.965 0.503
CENT2 4.38 1.752 -0.292 0.254 -0.970 0.503
Relational governance
Flexibility
FLEX2 4.26 1.646 -0.266 0.254 -0.869 0.461
FLEX3 4.08 1.850 -0.204 0.254 -1.075 0.461
Solidarity
SOL3 5.20 1.300 -0.790 0.254 0.075 0.461
SOL4 5.29 1.493 -0.843 0.254 -0.342 0.461
Information exchange
INF3 6.03 1.022 -1.555 0.254 1.604 0.461
INF4 5.74 1.087 -1.512 0.254 0.725 0.461
Restraint to the use of power
RPW2 4.81 1.621 -0.756 0.254 -1.178 0.461
RPW3 4.88 1.452 -0.796 0.254 -0.624 0.461
Independent variables
Supplier-held specific investments
SSI2 4.18 1.625 -0.294 0.254 -0.901 0.503
SSI4 4.22 1.592 -0.135 0.254 -0.699 0.503
SSI5 4.28 1.507 -0.327 0.254 -0.625 0.503
Buyer-held specific investments
BSI1 2.54 1.545 1.122 0.254 0.711 0.503
BSI3 2.32 1.754 1.371 0.254 0.698 0.503
BSI5 2.32 1.444 1.085 0.254 0.309 0.503
BSI6 2.19 1.348 1.250 0.254 0.696 0.503
BSI8 2.24 1.494 1.327 0.254 1.028 0.503
Control variables
Environmental uncertainty
UNC1 4.24 1.524 0.043 0.254 -1.006 0.503
UNC2 4.26 1.458 0.299 0.254 -0.702 0.503
Opportunism
OPP1 1.91 1.233 1.571 0.254 2.039 0.503
OPP4 2.06 1.401 1.654 0.254 2.172 0.503
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Appendix M: Descriptive statistics of the mutual dependent and no-interdependent
sample
Table M.1  Descriptive statistics of the mutual dependence sample, N=57
Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Dependent variables
Formalization
FORM1 5.42 1.295 -0.945 0.316 1.054 0.623
FORM2 4.74 1.737 -0.637 0.316 -0.532 0.623
FORM3 5.33 1.244 -1.017 0.316 1.476 0.623
FORM5 5.35 1.768 -0.960 0.316 -0.093 0.623
Centralization
CENT1 4.32 1.627 -0.199 0.316 -0.744 0.623
CENT2 4.47 1.616 -0.188 0.316 -0.880 0.623
Relational governance
Flexibility
FLEX2 4.12 1.659 -0.348 0.316 -0.798 0.623
FLEX3 4.12 1.862 -0.254 0.316 -1.135 0.623
Solidarity
SOL3 5.26 1.203 -0.468 0.316 -0.308 0.623
SOL4 5.42 1.375 -0.940 0.316 -0.278 0.623
Information exchange
INF3 6.18 0.805 -1.400 0.316 3.612 0.623
INF4 5.91 1.023 -2.207 0.316 8.602 0.623
Restraint to the use of power
RPW2 4.88 1.536 -0.706 0.316 0.021 0.623
RPW3 4.96 1.336 -0.539 0.316 0.462 0.623
Independent variables
Supplier-held specific investments
SSI2 4.56 1.402 -0.614 0.316 0.166 0.623
SSI4 4.49 1.465 -0.282 0.316 -0.362 0.623
SSI5 4.56 1.350 -0.406 0.316 -0.039 0.623
Buyer-held specific investments
BSI1 2.79 1.601 0.899 0.316 0.355 0.623
BSI3 2.53 1.853 1.240 0.316 0.306 0.623
BSI5 2.44 1.376 0.900 0.316 0.149 0.623
BSI6 2.40 1.348 0.984 0.316 0.038 0.623
BSI8 2.54 1.593 1.098 0.316 0.435 0.623
Control variables
Environmental uncertainty
UNC1 4.40 1.510 0.014 0.316 -0.896 0.623
UNC2 4.26 1.458 0.489 0.316 -0.533 0.623
Opportunism
OPP1 1.89 1.113 1.423 0.316 1.522 0.623
OPP4 2.09 1.392 1.566 0.316 2.163 0.623
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Table M.2  Descriptive statistics of the no-interdependence sample, N=33
Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Dependent variables
Formalization
FORM1 5.12 1.386 -0.604 0.409 -0.160 0.798
FORM2 4.42 1.953 -0.375 0.409 -1.081 0.798
FORM3 5.79 1.139 -0.636 0.409 -0.979 0.798
FORM5 5.39 1.580 -1.210 0.409 1.173 0.798
Centralization
CENT1 4.15 1.478 -1.117 0.409 0.542 0.798
CENT2 4.21 1.623 -0.111 0.409 -1.219 0.798
Relational governance
Flexibility
FLEX2 4.48 1.659 -0.348 0.316 -0.798 0.623
FLEX3 4.00 1.862 -0.254 0.316 -1.135 0.623
Solidarity
SOL3 5.09 1.203 -0.468 0.316 -0.308 0.623
SOL4 5.06 1.375 -0.940 0.316 -0.278 0.623
Information exchange
INF3 5.79 0.805 -1.400 0.316 3.612 0.623
INF4 5.45 1.023 -2.207 0.316 8.602 0.623
Restraint to the use of power
RPW2 4.70 1.536 -0.706 0.316 0.021 0.623
RPW3 4.73 1.336 -0.539 0.316 0.462 0.623
Independent variables
Supplier-held specific investments
SSI2 3.52 1.787 0.376 0.409 -1.202 0.798
SSI4 3.76 1.714 0.243 0.409 -0.779 0.798
SSI5 3.79 1.654 0.007 0.409 -1.155 0.798
Buyer-held specific investments
BSI1 2.12 1.364 1.735 0.409 2.742 0.798
BSI3 1.97 1.531 1.668 0.409 1.727 0.798
BSI5 2.12 1.556 1.480 0.409 1.103 0.798
BSI6 1.82 1.286 2.051 0.409 3.907 0.798
BSI8 1.73 1.153 1.877 0.409 2.843 0.798
Control variables
Environmental uncertainty
UNC1 3.97 1.531 0.110 0.409 -1.215 0.798
UNC2 4.24 1.480 -0.015 0.409 -0.939 0.798
Opportunism
OPP1 1.94 1.435 1.667 0.409 2.180 0.798
OPP4 2.00 1.436 1.887 0.409 2.812 0.798
